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authorPatrick Rudolph <patrick.rudolph@9elements.com>2019-05-05 16:38:04 +0200
committerPatrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com>2019-05-08 10:33:44 +0000
commitfe80bf2fd1e4f027d68af1c5bc58a8b1344a806d (patch)
tree8a997c4c984a3ff3fd8f878378ceee6abea919e4 /Documentation/Intel
parent62bc1cb88ba0103189f6c1c957207c9520986043 (diff)
downloadcoreboot-fe80bf2fd1e4f027d68af1c5bc58a8b1344a806d.tar.xz
Documentation: Convert vboot to markdown
Convert the HTML document to markdown and place it under security section. Change-Id: I212c6d0c977fd6772371ff6676478d48cc215d6e Signed-off-by: Patrick Rudolph <siro@das-labor.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/32610 Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
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-rw-r--r--Documentation/Intel/vboot.html402
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diff --git a/Documentation/Intel/index.html b/Documentation/Intel/index.html
index b4daa960a9..9d8aad05e9 100644
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+++ b/Documentation/Intel/index.html
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
</li>
<li><a target="_blank" href="SoC/soc.html">SoC</a> support</li>
<li><a target="_blank" href="Board/board.html">Board</a> support</li>
- <li><a target="_blank" href="vboot.html">Verified Boot (vboot)</a> support</li>
</ul>
diff --git a/Documentation/Intel/vboot.html b/Documentation/Intel/vboot.html
deleted file mode 100644
index ca49ac2e2d..0000000000
--- a/Documentation/Intel/vboot.html
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,402 +0,0 @@
-<!DOCTYPE html>
-<html>
- <head>
- <title>vboot - Verified Boot Support</title>
- </head>
- <body>
-
-<h1>vboot - Verified Boot Support</h1>
-
-<p>
-Google's verified boot support consists of:
-</p>
-<ul>
- <li>A root of trust</li>
- <li>Special firmware layout</li>
- <li>Firmware verification</li>
- <li>Firmware measurements</li>
- <li>A firmware update mechanism</li>
- <li>Specific build flags</li>
- <li>Signing the coreboot image</li>
-</ul>
-
-Google's vboot verifies the firmware and places measurements
-within the TPM.
-
-<hr>
-<h2>Root of Trust</h2>
-<p>
-When using vboot, the root-of-trust is basically the read-only portion of the
-SPI flash. The following items factor into the trust equation:
-</p>
-<ul>
- <li>The GCC compiler must reliably translate the code into machine code
- without inserting any additional code (virus, backdoor, etc.)
- </li>
- <li>The CPU must reliably execute the reset sequence and instructions as
- documented by the CPU manufacturer.
- </li>
- <li>The SPI flash must provide only the code programmed into it to the CPU
- without providing any alternative reset vector or code sequence.
- </li>
- <li>The SPI flash must honor the write-protect input and protect the
- specified portion of the SPI flash from all erase and write accesses.
- </li>
-</ul>
-
-<p>
-The firmware is typically protected using the write-protect pin on the SPI
-flash part and setting some of the write-protect bits in the status register
-during manufacturing. The protected area is platform specific and for x86
-platforms is typically 1/4th of the SPI flash
-part size. Because this portion of the SPI flash is hardware write protected,
-it is not possible to update this portion of the SPI flash in the field,
-without altering the system to eliminate the ground connection to the SPI flash
-write-protect pin. Without hardware modifications, this portion of the SPI
-flash maintains the manufactured state during the system's lifetime.
-</p>
-
-<hr>
-<h2>Firmware Layout</h2>
-<p>
-Several sections are added to the firmware layout to support vboot:
-</p>
-<ul>
- <li>Read-only section</li>
- <li>Google Binary Blob (GBB) area</li>
- <li>Read/write section A</li>
- <li>Read/write section B</li>
-</ul>
-<p>
-The following sections describe the various portions of the flash layout.
-</p>
-
-<h3>Read-Only Section</h3>
-<p>
-The read-only section contains a coreboot file system (CBFS) that contains all
-of the boot firmware necessary to perform recovery for the system. This
-firmware is typically protected using the write-protect pin on the SPI flash
-part and setting some of the write-protect bits in the status register during
-manufacturing. The protected area is typically 1/4th of the SPI flash part
-size and must cover the entire read-only section which consists of:
-</p>
-<ul>
- <li>Vital Product Data (VPD) area</li>
- <li>Firmware ID area</li>
- <li>Google Binary Blob (GBB) area</li>
- <li>coreboot file system containing read-only recovery firmware</li>
-</ul>
-
-<h3>Google Binary Blob (GBB) Area</h3>
-<p>
-The GBB area is part of the read-only section. This area contains a 4096 or
-8192 bit public root RSA key that is used to verify the VBLOCK area to obtain
-the firmware signing key.
-</p>
-
-<h3>Recovery Firmware</h3>
-<p>
-The recovery firmware is contained within a coreboot file system and consists
-of:
-</p>
-<ul>
- <li>reset vector</li>
- <li>bootblock</li>
- <li>verstage</li>
- <li>romstage</li>
- <li>postcar</li>
- <li>ramstage</li>
- <li>payload</li>
- <li>flash map file</li>
- <li>config file</li>
- <li>processor specific files:
- <ul>
- <li>Microcode</li>
- <li>fspm.bin</li>
- <li>fsps.bin</li>
- </ul>
- </li>
-</ul>
-
-<p>
-The recovery firmware is written during manufacturing and typically contains
-code to write the storage device (eMMC device or hard disk). The recovery
-image is usually contained on a socketed device such as a USB flash drive or
-an SD card. Depending upon the payload firmware doing the recovery, it may
-be possible for the user to interact with the system to specify the recovery
-image path. Part of the recovery is also to write the A and B areas of the
-SPI flash device to boot the system.
-</p>
-
-
-<h3>Read/Write Section</h3>
-
-<p>
-The read/write sections contain an area which contains the firmware signing
-key and signature and an area containing a coreboot file system with a subset
-of the firmware. The firmware files in FW_MAIN_A and FW_MAIN_B are:
-</p>
-<ul>
- <li>romstage</li>
- <li>postcar</li>
- <li>ramstage</li>
- <li>payload</li>
- <li>config file</li>
- <li>processor specific files:
- <ul>
- <li>Microcode</li>
- <li>fspm.bin</li>
- <li>fsps.bin</li>
- </ul>
- </li>
-</ul>
-
-<p>
-The firmware subset enables most issues to be fixed in the field with firmware
-updates. The firmware files handle memory and most of silicon initialization.
-These files also produce the tables which get passed to the operating system.
-</p>
-
-<hr>
-<h2>Firmware Updates</h2>
-<p>
-The read/write sections exist in one of three states:
-</p>
-<ul>
- <li>Invalid</li>
- <li>Ready to boot</li>
- <li>Successfully booted</li>
-</ul>
-
-<table border="1">
-<tr bgcolor="#ffc0c0">
-<td>
-Where is this state information written?
-<br/>CMOS?
-<br/>RW_NVRAM?
-<br/>RW_FWID_*
-</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<p>
-Firmware updates are handled by the operating system by writing any read/write
-section that is not in the "successfully booted" state. Upon the next reboot,
-vboot determines the section to boot. If it finds one in the "ready to boot"
-state then it attempts to boot using that section. If the boot fails then
-vboot marks the section as invalid and attempts to fall back to a read/write
-section in the "successfully booted" state. If vboot is not able to find a
-section in the "successfully booted" state then vboot enters recovery mode.
-</p>
-
-<p>
-Only the operating system is able to transition a section from the "ready to
-boot" state to the "successfully booted" state. The transition is typically
-done after the operating system has been running for a while indicating
-that successful boot was possible and the operating system is stable.
-</p>
-
-<p>
-Note that as long as the SPI write protection is in place then the system is
-always recoverable. If the flash update fails then the system will continue
-to boot using the previous read/write area. The same is true if coreboot
-passes control to the payload or the operating system and then the boot fails.
-In the worst case, the SPI flash gets totally corrupted in which case vboot
-fails the signature checks and enters recovery mode. There are no times where
-the SPI flash is exposed and the reset vector or part of the recovery firmware
-gets corrupted.
-</p>
-
-<hr>
-<h2>Build Flags</h2>
-<p>
-The following Kconfig values need to be selected to enable vboot:
-</p>
-<ul>
- <li>COLLECT_TIMESTAMPS</li>
- <li>VBOOT</li>
-</ul>
-
-<p>
-The starting stage needs to be specified by selecting either
-VBOOT_STARTS_IN_BOOTBLOCK or VBOOT_STARTS_IN_ROMSTAGE.
-</p>
-
-<p>
-If vboot starts in bootblock then vboot may be built as a separate stage by
-selecting VBOOT_SEPARATE_VERSTAGE. Additionally, if static RAM is too small
-to fit both verstage and romstage then selecting VBOOT_RETURN_FROM_VERSTAGE
-enables bootblock to reuse the RAM occupied by verstage for romstage.
-</p>
-
-<p>
-Non-volatile flash is needed for vboot operation. This flash area may be in
-CMOS, the EC, or in a read/write area of the SPI flash device. Select one of
-the following:
-</p>
-<ul>
- <li>VBOOT_VBNV_CMOS</li>
- <li>VBOOT_VBNV_EC</li>
- <li>VBOOT_VBNV_FLASH</li>
-</ul>
-<p>
-More non-volatile storage features may be found in src/vboot/Kconfig.
-</p>
-
-<p>
-A TPM is also required for vboot operation. TPMs are available in
-drivers/i2c/tpm and drivers/pc80/tpm.
-</p>
-
-<p>
-In addition to adding the coreboot files into the read-only region, enabling
-vboot causes the build script to add the read/write files into coreboot file
-systems in FW_MAIN_A and FW_MAIN_B.
-</p>
-
-<hr>
-<h2>Signing the coreboot Image</h2>
-<p>
-The following command script is an example of how to sign the coreboot image file.
-This script is used on the Intel Galileo board and creates the GBB area and
-inserts it into the coreboot image. It also updates the VBLOCK areas with the
-firmware signing key and the signature for the FW_MAIN firmware. More details
-are available in 3rdparty/vboot/README.
-</p>
-
-<pre><code>#!/bin/sh
-#
-# The necessary tools were built and installed using the following commands:
-#
-# pushd 3rdparty/vboot
-# make
-# sudo make install
-# popd
-#
-# The keys were made using the following command
-#
-# 3rdparty/vboot/scripts/keygeneration/create_new_keys.sh \
-# --4k --4k-root --output $PWD/keys
-#
-#
-# The "magic" numbers below are derived from the GBB section in
-# src/mainboard/intel/galileo/vboot.fmd.
-#
-# GBB Header Size: 0x80
-# GBB Offset: 0x611000, 4KiB block number: 1553 (0x611)
-# GBB Length: 0x7f000, 4KiB blocks: 127 (0x7f)
-# COREBOOT Offset: 0x690000, 4KiB block number: 1680 (0x690)
-# COREBOOT Length: 0x170000, 4KiB blocks: 368 (0x170)
-#
-# 0x7f000 (GBB Length) = 0x80 + 0x100 + 0x1000 + 0x7ce80 + 0x1000
-#
-# Create the GBB area blob
-# Parameters: hwid_size,rootkey_size,bmpfv_size,recoverykey_size
-#
-gbb_utility -c 0x100,0x1000,0x7ce80,0x1000 gbb.blob
-
-#
-# Copy from the start of the flash to the GBB region into the signed flash
-# image.
-#
-# 1553 * 4096 = 0x611 * 0x1000 = 0x611000, size of area before GBB
-#
-dd conv=fdatasync ibs=4096 obs=4096 count=1553 \
- if=build/coreboot.rom of=build/coreboot.signed.rom
-
-#
-# Append the empty GBB area to the coreboot.rom image.
-#
-# 1553 * 4096 = 0x611 * 0x1000 = 0x611000, offset to GBB
-#
-dd conv=fdatasync obs=4096 obs=4096 seek=1553 if=gbb.blob \
- of=build/coreboot.signed.rom
-
-#
-# Append the rest of the read-only region into the signed flash image.
-#
-# 1680 * 4096 = 0x690 * 0x1000 = 0x690000, offset to COREBOOT area
-# 368 * 4096 = 0x170 * 0x1000 = 0x170000, length of COREBOOT area
-#
-dd conv=fdatasync ibs=4096 obs=4096 skip=1680 seek=1680 count=368 \
- if=build/coreboot.rom of=build/coreboot.signed.rom
-
-#
-# Insert the HWID and public root and recovery RSA keys into the GBB area.
-#
-gbb_utility \
- --set --hwid='Galileo' \
- -r $PWD/keys/recovery_key.vbpubk \
- -k $PWD/keys/root_key.vbpubk \
- build/coreboot.signed.rom
-
-#
-# Sign the read/write firmware areas with the private signing key and update
-# the VBLOCK_A and VBLOCK_B regions.
-#
-3rdparty/vboot/scripts/image_signing/sign_firmware.sh \
- build/coreboot.signed.rom \
- $PWD/keys \
- build/coreboot.signed.rom
-</code></pre>
-
-<hr>
-<h2>Boot Flow</h2>
-<p>
-The reset vector exist in the read-only area and points to the bootblock entry
-point. The only copy of the bootblock exists in the read-only area of the SPI
-flash. Verstage may be part of the bootblock or a separate stage. If separate
-then the bootblock loads verstage from the read-only area and transfers control
-to it.
-</p>
-
-<p>
-Upon first boot, verstage attempts to verify the read/write section A. It gets
-the public root key from the GBB area and uses that to verify the VBLOCK area
-in read-write section A. If the VBLOCK area is valid then it extracts the
-firmware signing key (1024-8192 bits) and uses that to verify the FW_MAIN_A
-area of read/write section A. If the verification is successful then verstage
-instructs coreboot to use the coreboot file system in read/write section A for
-the contents of the remaining boot firmware (romstage, postcar, ramstage and
-the payload).
-</p>
-
-<p>
-If verification fails for the read/write area and the other read/write area is
-not valid vboot falls back to the read-only area to boot into system recovery.
-</p>
-
-<hr>
-<h2>Chromebook Special Features</h2>
-<p>
-Google's Chromebooks have some special features:
-</p>
-<ul>
- <li>Developer mode</li>
- <li>Write-protect screw</li>
-</ul>
-
-<h3>Developer Mode</h3>
-<p>
-Developer mode allows the user to use coreboot to boot another operating system.
-This may be a another (beta) version of Chrome OS, or another flavor of
-GNU/Linux. Use of developer mode does not void the system warranty. Upon
-entry into developer mode, all locally saved data on the system is lost.
-This prevents someone from entering developer mode to subvert the system
-security to access files on the local system or cloud.
-</p>
-
-<h3>Write Protect Screw</h3>
-<p>
-Chromebooks have a write-protect screw which provides the ground to the
-write-protect pin of the SPI flash. Google specifically did this to allow
-the manufacturing line and advanced developers to re-write the entire SPI flash
-part. Once the screw is removed, any firmware may be placed on the device.
-However, accessing this screw requires opening the case and voids the system
-warranty!
-</p>
-
-<hr>
-<p>Modified: 2 May 2017</p>
- </body>
-</html>