Documentation/vendorcode/eltan: Update security document

Update the security document to reflect the current state of the
coreboot implementation.

Add more detail and document the change to the public vboot API.

BUG=N/A
TEST=build

Change-Id: I228d0faae0efde70039680a981fea9a436d2384f
Signed-off-by: Wim Vervoorn <wvervoorn@eltan.com>
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/38591
Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com>
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>

1 files changed, 96 insertions, 23 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/vendorcode/eltan/security.md b/Documentation/vendorcode/eltan/security.md
index 04537df23c..9dd47c03f9 100644
--- a/Documentation/vendorcode/eltan/security.md
+++ b/Documentation/vendorcode/eltan/security.md
@@ -1,38 +1,111 @@
 # Eltan Security
 
-## Security
 This code enables measured boot and verified boot support.
-Verified boot is available in coreboot, but based on ChromeOS. This vendorcode
-uses a small encryption library and leave much more space in flash for the
-payload.
+Verified boot is available in coreboot, but based on ChromeOS. This vendorcode security
+solution is intended to be used for system without ChromeOS support.
+
+This solution allows implementing verified boot support for systems that do not contain a TPM.
 
 ## Hashing Library
-The library suppports SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512. The required routines of
-`3rdparty/vboot/firmware/2lib` are used.
+The API functions of `3rdparty/vboot/firmware` are used.
 
 ## Measured boot
-measured boot support will use TPM2 device if available. The items specified
-in `mb_log_list[]` will be measured.
+Measured boot support requires a TPM2 device.
+
+The items specified in `mb_log_list[]` and `*_verify_list[]` will be measured.
+
+The `mb_log_list[]` should only contain items that are not contained in one of the verify_lists
+below (except for the `bootblock_verify_list[]`).
+
+The list can contain the following items: `config`, `revision`, `cmos_layout.bin`.
+`oemmanifest.bin` should be added to the list when Verified boot is enabled.
 
 ## Verified boot
-verified boot support will use TPM2 device if available. The items specified
-in the next table will be verified:
-* `bootblock_verify_list[]`
-* `verify_item_t romstage_verify_list[]`
-* `ram_stage_additional_list[]`
-* `ramstage_verify_list[]`
-* `payload_verify_list[]`
-* `oprom_verify_list[]`
+Verified boot support will use the OEM manifest to verify the items.
+
+The verification process is controlled using the following verify lists:
+* `bootblock_verify_list[]` (will not be measured, verified in bootblock)
+* `romstage_verify_list[]`  (verified in early romstage)
+* `postcar_verify_list[]`   (verified in just before postcar loading)
+* `ramstage_verify_list[]`  (verified in just before ramstage loading)
+* `payload_verify_list[]`   (verified in just before payload loading)
+* `oprom_verify_list[]`     (verified before option rom execution)
+
+A verify_list entry contains a `related_items` member. This can point to an additional `verify_list`
+which will be verified before the specified item is verified. As an example the `grub` entry in
+`payload_verify_list[]` can point to the `grub_additional_list[]` that contains the items used by
+the grub payload and the `seabios` entry in `payload_verify_list[]` can point to the
+`seabios_additional_list[]` that contains the items used by the seabios payload. By doing this the
+entries that are verified (and measured) depend on the payload selected at runtime.
+
+## Creating private and public keys
+Create private key in RSA2048 format: `openssl genrsa -F4 -out <private_key_file> 2048`
+
+Create public key using private key:
+`futility --vb1 create <private_key_file> <public_key_file_without_extension>`
+
+The public key will be included into coreboot and used for verified boot only.
 
 ## Enabling support
+To enable measured boot support:
+* Enabled *VENDORCODE_ELTAN_MBOOT*
+* Create `mb_log_list` table with list of items to measure
+
+To enable verified boot support:
+* Enable *VENDORCODE_ELTAN_VBOOT*
+* Create the verify lists `*_verify_list[]`
+* *VENDORCODE_ELTAN_VBOOT_KEY_FILE* must point to location of the public key file created with `futility`
+
+## Creating signed binary
+
+During build of coreboot binary an empty `oemmanifest.bin` is added to the binary.
+
+This binary must be replaced by a correct (signed) binary when *VENDORCODE_ELTAN_VBOOT* is enabled
+
+The `oemmanifest.bin` file contains the SHA-256 (or SHA-512) hashes of all the different parts
+contained in verify_lists.
+
+When *VENDORCODE_ELTAN_VBOOT_SIGNED_MANIFEST* is enabled the manifest should be signed and the
+signature should appended to the manifest.
+
+Please make sure the public key is in the RO part of the coreboot image. The `oemmanifest.bin` file
+should be in the RW part of the coreboot image.
+
+### Hashing
+
+The `oemmanifest.bin` file contains the hashes of different binaries parts of the binary e.g.:
+bootblock, romstage, postcar, ramstage, fsp etc.
+
+The total number of items must match `VENDORCODE_ELTAN_OEM_MANIFEST_ITEMS`.
+
+For every part the SHA (SHA-256) must be calculated. First extract the binary from the coreboot
+image using: `cbfstool <coreboot_file_name> extract -n <cbfs_name> -f <item_binary_file_name>`
+followed by: `openssl dgst -sha256 -binary -out <hash_file_name> <item_binary_file_name>`
+
+Replace -sha256 with -sha512 when `VENDORCODE_ELTAN_VBOOT_USE_SHA512` is enabled.
+
+All the hashes must be combined to a hash binary. The hashes need to be placed in the same order as
+defined by the `HASH_IDX_XXX` values.
+
+### Signing
+
+The oemmanifest needs to be signed when `VENDORCODE_ELTAN_VBOOT_SIGNED_MANIFEST` is enabled.
+
+This can be done with the following command:
+`openssl dgst -sign <private_key_file_name> -sha256 -out <signature_binary> <hash_binary>`
+
+The signed manifest can be created by adding the signature to the manifest:
+`cat <hash_binary> <signature_binary> >hash_table.bin`
+
+## Create binary
+The `oemmanifest.bin` file must be replaced in the coreboot binary by the generated
+`hash_table.bin`.
 
-* Measured boot can be enabled using **CONFIG_MBOOT**
-* Create mb_log_list table with list of item to measure
-* Create tables bootblock_verify_list[], verify_item_t romstage_verify_list[],
-  ram_stage_additional_list[], ramstage_verify_list[], payload_verify_list[],
-  oprom_verify_list[]
-* Verified boot can be enabled using **CONFIG_VERIFIED_BOOT**
-* Added Kconfig values for verbose console output
+To replace the binary: Remove using:
+`cbfstool <coreboot_file_name> remove -n oemmanifest.bin`
+Then add the new image using:
+`cbfstool coreboot.bin add -f <hash_table_file_name> -n oemmanifest.bin -t raw \`
+`-b <CONFIG_VENDORCODE_ELTAN_OEM_MANIFEST_LOC>`
 
 ## Debugging