diff options
author | Patrick Rudolph <patrick.rudolph@9elements.com> | 2019-12-01 07:04:04 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com> | 2020-08-18 08:49:57 +0000 |
commit | 24bb8036c90feb8c2f45f59cce15eec7792a6393 (patch) | |
tree | 9938a69ddb8c1e6bf9f9185a69bae69977d55f0b /src | |
parent | 5eeead2d73d2daa2361d0272db41e85e1de79a6c (diff) | |
download | coreboot-24bb8036c90feb8c2f45f59cce15eec7792a6393.tar.xz |
cpu/x86/smm/smm_stub: Add x86_64 support
Enable long mode in SMM handler.
x86_32 isn't affected by this change.
* Enter long mode
* Add 64bit entry to GDT
* Use x86_64 SysV ABI calling conventions for C code entry
* Change smm_module_params' cpu to size_t as 'push' is native integer
* Drop to protected mode after c handler
NOTE: This commit does NOT introduce a new security model. It uses the
same page tables as the remaining firmware does.
This can be a security risk if someone is able to manipulate the
page tables stored in ROM at runtime. USE FOR TESTING ONLY!
Tested on Lenovo T410 with additional x86_64 patches.
Change-Id: I26300492e4be62ddd5d80525022c758a019d63a1
Signed-off-by: Patrick Rudolph <patrick.rudolph@9elements.com>
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/37392
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Heymans <arthur@aheymans.xyz>
Reviewed-by: Eugene Myers <cedarhouse1@comcast.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
-rw-r--r-- | src/cpu/x86/smm/smm_stub.S | 52 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/include/cpu/x86/smm.h | 2 |
2 files changed, 49 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/src/cpu/x86/smm/smm_stub.S b/src/cpu/x86/smm/smm_stub.S index 425724d559..11ea9a71a8 100644 --- a/src/cpu/x86/smm/smm_stub.S +++ b/src/cpu/x86/smm/smm_stub.S @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ */ #include <cpu/x86/cr.h> +#include <cpu/x86/msr.h> .code32 .section ".module_parameters", "aw", @progbits @@ -148,8 +149,8 @@ smm_trampoline32: pushl $0x0 mov %esp, %ebp - /* Allocate locals (fxsave) */ - subl $0x4, %esp + /* Allocate locals (fxsave, efer_backup) */ + subl $0xc, %esp /* calculate fxsave location */ mov fxsave_area, %edi @@ -177,22 +178,65 @@ smm_trampoline32: /* Align stack to 16 bytes. Another 32 bytes are pushed below. */ andl $0xfffffff0, %esp +#ifdef __x86_64__ + mov %ecx, %edi + /* Backup IA32_EFER. Preserves ebx. */ + movl $(IA32_EFER), %ecx + rdmsr + movl %eax, -0x8(%ebp) + movl %edx, -0xc(%ebp) + + /* entry64.inc preserves ebx, esi, edi */ +#include <cpu/x86/64bit/entry64.inc> + mov %edi, %ecx + +#endif + /* Call into the c-based SMM relocation function with the platform * parameters. Equivalent to: * struct arg = { c_handler_params, cpu_num, smm_runtime, canary }; * c_handler(&arg) */ +#ifdef __x86_64__ + push %rbx /* uintptr_t *canary */ + push $(smm_runtime) + push %rcx /* size_t cpu */ + push c_handler_arg /* void *arg */ + + mov %rsp, %rdi /* *arg */ + + movl c_handler, %eax + call *%rax + + /* + * The only reason to go back to protected mode is that RSM doesn't restore + * MSR registers and MSR IA32_EFER was modified by entering long mode. + * Drop to protected mode to safely operate on the IA32_EFER MSR. + */ + + /* Disable long mode. */ + #include <cpu/x86/64bit/exit32.inc> + + /* Restore IA32_EFER as RSM doesn't restore MSRs. */ + movl $(IA32_EFER), %ecx + rdmsr + movl -0x8(%ebp), %eax + movl -0xc(%ebp), %edx + + wrmsr + +#else push $0x0 /* Padding */ push $0x0 /* Padding */ push $0x0 /* Padding */ push %ebx /* uintptr_t *canary */ push $(smm_runtime) - push %ecx /* int cpu */ + push %ecx /* size_t cpu */ push c_handler_arg /* void *arg */ push %esp /* smm_module_params *arg (allocated on stack). */ mov c_handler, %eax call *%eax - +#endif /* Retrieve fxsave location. */ mov -4(%ebp), %edi test %edi, %edi diff --git a/src/include/cpu/x86/smm.h b/src/include/cpu/x86/smm.h index db63e8be25..de16a431b3 100644 --- a/src/include/cpu/x86/smm.h +++ b/src/include/cpu/x86/smm.h @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ struct smm_runtime { struct smm_module_params { void *arg; - int cpu; + size_t cpu; const struct smm_runtime *runtime; /* A canary value that has been placed at the end of the stack. * If (uintptr_t)canary != *canary then a stack overflow has occurred. |