diff options
| author | Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> | 2016-01-07 18:48:13 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | lersek <lersek@Edk2> | 2016-01-07 18:48:13 +0000 |
| commit | 65d2bf42235d04f6e12ac80b661ab4aa0484bd6e (patch) | |
| tree | 95d0a4d512580db60324465726a90230d417fc8b /OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | |
| parent | 1d3fa1bd3817b6cdcfdf9fb502768f791c5a7c5a (diff) | |
| download | edk2-platforms-65d2bf42235d04f6e12ac80b661ab4aa0484bd6e.tar.xz | |
OvmfPkg: inherit Image Verification Policy defaults from SecurityPkg
Secure Boot support was originally addded to OvmfPkg on 2012-Mar-09, in
SVN r13093 (git 8cee3de7e9f4), titled
OvmfPkg: Enable secure-boot support when SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE==TRUE
At that time the image verification policies in
SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec were:
- option ROM image: 0x00 (ALWAYS_EXECUTE)
- removable media image: 0x05 (QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION)
- fixed media image: 0x05 (QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION)
The author of SVN r13093 apparently didn't want to depend on the
SecurityPkg defaults for the latter two image origins, plus the
ALWAYS_EXECUTE policy for option ROM images must have been deemed too lax.
For this reason SVN r13093 immediately spelled out 0x05
(QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) within OvmfPkg for all three image
origins.
Fast forward to 2013-Aug-28: policy 0x05
(QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) had been forbidden in the UEFI spec,
and SVN r14607 (git db44ea6c4e09) reflected this in the source code:
- The policies for the latter two image origins were switched from 0x05 to
0x04 (DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) in SecurityPkg,
- the patch changed the default policy for option ROM images too, from
0x00 (ALWAYS_EXECUTE) to 0x04 (DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION),
- any other client DSC files, including OvmfPkg's, underwent a whole-sale
0x05 (QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) -> 0x04
(DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) replacement too.
The practical result of that patch for OvmfPkg was that the explicit 0x04
settings would equal the strict SecurityPkg defaults exactly.
And that's what we have today: the "override the default values from
SecurityPkg" comments in OvmfPkg's DSC files are stale, in practice.
It is extremely unlikely that SecurityPkg would change the defaults from
0x04 (DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) any time in the future, so let's
just inherit those in OvmfPkg.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19613 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
Diffstat (limited to 'OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc')
| -rw-r--r-- | OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 7 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc index 63fbb25efd..a45aa0faba 100644 --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc @@ -387,13 +387,6 @@ gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmApSyncTimeout|100000
!endif
-!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
- # override the default values from SecurityPkg to ensure images from all sources are verified in secure boot
- gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04
- gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04
- gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04
-!endif
-
# IRQs 5, 9, 10, 11 are level-triggered
gPcAtChipsetPkgTokenSpaceGuid.Pcd8259LegacyModeEdgeLevel|0x0E20
|