diff options
author | Qin Long <qin.long@intel.com> | 2014-11-14 08:41:12 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | qlong <qlong@Edk2> | 2014-11-14 08:41:12 +0000 |
commit | 20333c6d566748d7c78c1b546ba8f37c6d253dea (patch) | |
tree | cdd1196a23f4b41bf0c732ea82b49a86b51ad6de /SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | |
parent | 2e70cf8ade0dd1e023274f7358c7c72cfd17460c (diff) | |
download | edk2-platforms-20333c6d566748d7c78c1b546ba8f37c6d253dea.tar.xz |
UEFI 2.4 X509 Certificate Hash and RFC3161 Timestamp Verification support for Secure Boot
Main ChangeLogs includes:
1. Introduce the new GUID and structure definitions for certificate hash and timestamp support;
2. Update Image Verification Library to support DBT signature checking;
3. Update the related SecureBoot Configuration Pages;
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Qin Long <qin.long@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guo Dong <guo.dong@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Siyuan Fu <siyuan.fu@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@16380 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
Diffstat (limited to 'SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c')
-rw-r--r-- | SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 525 |
1 files changed, 467 insertions, 58 deletions
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c index 0a48ce1628..3324dba0af 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c @@ -64,11 +64,11 @@ UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = { };
HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {
- { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[0], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init, Sha1Update, Sha1Final },
- { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[5], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },
- { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[14], 9, Sha256GetContextSize,Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},
- { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[23], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },
- { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[32], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[0], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init, Sha1Update, Sha1Final },
+ { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[5], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },
+ { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[14], 9, Sha256GetContextSize, Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},
+ { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[23], 9, Sha384GetContextSize, Sha384Init, Sha384Update, Sha384Final},
+ { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[32], 9, Sha512GetContextSize, Sha512Init, Sha512Update, Sha512Final}
};
/**
@@ -99,11 +99,11 @@ SecureBootHook ( @param FileHandle Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.
@param FileOffset Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.
- @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.
+ @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.
On output, the number of bytes actually read.
@param Buffer Output buffer that contains the data read from the PE/COFF image.
-
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead ( UINTN EndPosition;
if (FileHandle == NULL || ReadSize == NULL || Buffer == NULL) {
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
if (MAX_ADDRESS - FileOffset < *ReadSize) {
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ HashPeImage ( SectionHeader = NULL;
Status = FALSE;
- if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) {
+ if ((HashAlg >= HASHALG_MAX)) {
return FALSE;
}
@@ -315,13 +315,28 @@ HashPeImage ( //
ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
- if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA1) {
- mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
- mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid;
- } else if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA256) {
- mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
- mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;
- } else {
+ switch (HashAlg) {
+ case HASHALG_SHA1:
+ mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid;
+ break;
+
+ case HASHALG_SHA256:
+ mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;
+ break;
+
+ case HASHALG_SHA384:
+ mImageDigestSize = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ mCertType = gEfiCertSha384Guid;
+ break;
+
+ case HASHALG_SHA512:
+ mImageDigestSize = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ mCertType = gEfiCertSha512Guid;
+ break;
+
+ default:
return FALSE;
}
@@ -347,8 +362,8 @@ HashPeImage ( //
if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
//
- // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value
- // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
+ // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value
+ // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
// Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
// then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
//
@@ -359,7 +374,7 @@ HashPeImage ( //
Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
}
-
+
//
// 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.
// 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.
@@ -466,7 +481,7 @@ HashPeImage ( if (!Status) {
goto Done;
}
- }
+ }
}
//
@@ -604,7 +619,7 @@ Done: @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode Signature retrieved from signed image.
@param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode Signature in bytes.
-
+
@retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.
@@ -804,6 +819,124 @@ AddImageExeInfo ( }
/**
+ Check whether the hash of an given X.509 certificate is in forbidden database (DBX).
+
+ @param[in] Certificate Pointer to X.509 Certificate that is searched for.
+ @param[in] CertSize Size of X.509 Certificate.
+ @param[in] SignatureList Pointer to the Signature List in forbidden database.
+ @param[in] SignatureListSize Size of Signature List.
+ @param[out] RevocationTime Return the time that the certificate was revoked.
+
+ @return TRUE The certificate hash is found in the forbidden database.
+ @return FALSE The certificate hash is not found in the forbidden database.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (
+ IN UINT8 *Certificate,
+ IN UINTN CertSize,
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList,
+ IN UINTN SignatureListSize,
+ OUT EFI_TIME *RevocationTime
+ )
+{
+ BOOLEAN IsFound;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *DbxList;
+ UINTN DbxSize;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertHash;
+ UINTN CertHashCount;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINT32 HashAlg;
+ VOID *HashCtx;
+ UINT8 CertDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ UINT8 *DbxCertHash;
+ UINTN SiglistHeaderSize;
+
+ IsFound = FALSE;
+ DbxList = SignatureList;
+ DbxSize = SignatureListSize;
+ HashCtx = NULL;
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_MAX;
+
+ ASSERT (RevocationTime != NULL);
+
+ while ((DbxSize > 0) && (SignatureListSize >= DbxList->SignatureListSize)) {
+ //
+ // Determine Hash Algorithm of Certificate in the forbidden database.
+ //
+ if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA256;
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) {
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA384;
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) {
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA512;
+ } else {
+ DbxSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;
+ DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Calculate the hash value of current db certificate for comparision.
+ //
+ if (mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize == NULL) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ ZeroMem (CertDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ HashCtx = AllocatePool (mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize ());
+ if (HashCtx == NULL) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit (HashCtx);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, Certificate, CertSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal (HashCtx, CertDigest);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ SiglistHeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + DbxList->SignatureHeaderSize;
+ CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + SiglistHeaderSize);
+ CertHashCount = (DbxList->SignatureListSize - SiglistHeaderSize) / DbxList->SignatureSize;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertHashCount; Index++) {
+ //
+ // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
+ //
+ DbxCertHash = CertHash->SignatureData;
+ if (CompareMem (DbxCertHash, CertDigest, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength) == 0) {
+ //
+ // Hash of Certificate is found in forbidden database.
+ //
+ IsFound = TRUE;
+
+ //
+ // Return the revocation time.
+ //
+ CopyMem (RevocationTime, (EFI_TIME *)(DbxCertHash + mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength), sizeof (EFI_TIME));
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertHash + DbxList->SignatureSize);
+ }
+
+ DbxSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;
+ DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);
+ }
+
+Done:
+ if (HashCtx != NULL) {
+ FreePool (HashCtx);
+ }
+
+ return IsFound;
+}
+
+/**
Check whether signature is in specified database.
@param[in] VariableName Name of database variable that is searched in.
@@ -831,6 +964,7 @@ IsSignatureFoundInDatabase ( UINTN Index;
UINTN CertCount;
BOOLEAN IsFound;
+
//
// Read signature database variable.
//
@@ -890,24 +1024,296 @@ Done: }
/**
- Verify PKCS#7 SignedData using certificate found in Variable which formatted
- as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. The Variable may be PK, KEK, DB or DBX.
+ Check whether the timestamp is valid by comparing the signing time and the revocation time.
- @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode Signature retrieved from signed image.
- @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode Signature in bytes.
- @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to search for Certificate.
- @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
+ @param SigningTime A pointer to the signing time.
+ @param RevocationTime A pointer to the revocation time.
- @retval TRUE Image pass verification.
- @retval FALSE Image fail verification.
+ @retval TRUE The SigningTime is not later than the RevocationTime.
+ @retval FALSE The SigningTime is later than the RevocationTime.
**/
BOOLEAN
-IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (
+IsValidSignatureByTimestamp (
+ IN EFI_TIME *SigningTime,
+ IN EFI_TIME *RevocationTime
+ )
+{
+ if (SigningTime->Year != RevocationTime->Year) {
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Year < RevocationTime->Year);
+ } else if (SigningTime->Month != RevocationTime->Month) {
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Month < RevocationTime->Month);
+ } else if (SigningTime->Day != RevocationTime->Day) {
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Day < RevocationTime->Day);
+ } else if (SigningTime->Hour != RevocationTime->Hour) {
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Hour < RevocationTime->Hour);
+ } else if (SigningTime->Minute != RevocationTime->Minute) {
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Minute < RevocationTime->Minute);
+ }
+
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Second <= RevocationTime->Second);
+}
+
+/**
+ Check if the given time value is zero.
+
+ @param[in] Time Pointer of a time value.
+
+ @retval TRUE The Time is Zero.
+ @retval FALSE The Time is not Zero.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsTimeZero (
+ IN EFI_TIME *Time
+ )
+{
+ if ((Time->Year == 0) && (Time->Month == 0) && (Time->Day == 0) &&
+ (Time->Hour == 0) && (Time->Minute == 0) && (Time->Second == 0)) {
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+/**
+ Check whether the timestamp signature is valid and the signing time is also earlier than
+ the revocation time.
+
+ @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.
+ @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
+ @param[in] RevocationTime The time that the certificate was revoked.
+
+ @retval TRUE Timestamp signature is valid and signing time is no later than the
+ revocation time.
+ @retval FALSE Timestamp signature is not valid or the signing time is later than the
+ revocation time.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+PassTimestampCheck (
+ IN UINT8 *AuthData,
+ IN UINTN AuthDataSize,
+ IN EFI_TIME *RevocationTime
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;
+ UINT8 *DbtData;
+ UINTN DbtDataSize;
+ UINT8 *RootCert;
+ UINTN RootCertSize;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINTN CertCount;
+ EFI_TIME SigningTime;
+
+ //
+ // Variable Initialization
+ //
+ VerifyStatus = FALSE;
+ DbtData = NULL;
+ CertList = NULL;
+ Cert = NULL;
+ RootCert = NULL;
+ RootCertSize = 0;
+
+ //
+ // If RevocationTime is zero, the certificate shall be considered to always be revoked.
+ //
+ if (IsTimeZero (RevocationTime)) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // RevocationTime is non-zero, the certificate should be considered to be revoked from that time and onwards.
+ // Using the dbt to get the trusted TSA certificates.
+ //
+ DbtDataSize = 0;
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbtDataSize, NULL);
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ DbtData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DbtDataSize);
+ if (DbtData == NULL) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbtDataSize, (VOID *) DbtData);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) DbtData;
+ while ((DbtDataSize > 0) && (DbtDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
+ if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
+ //
+ // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
+ //
+ RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
+ RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);
+ //
+ // Get the signing time if the timestamp signature is valid.
+ //
+ if (ImageTimestampVerify (AuthData, AuthDataSize, RootCert, RootCertSize, &SigningTime)) {
+ //
+ // The signer signature is valid only when the signing time is earlier than revocation time.
+ //
+ if (IsValidSignatureByTimestamp (&SigningTime, RevocationTime)) {
+ VerifyStatus = TRUE;
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ }
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
+ }
+ }
+ DbtDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
+ }
+
+Done:
+ if (DbtData != NULL) {
+ FreePool (DbtData);
+ }
+
+ return VerifyStatus;
+}
+
+/**
+ Check whether the image signature is forbidden by the forbidden database (dbx).
+ The image is forbidden to load if any certificates for signing are revoked before signing time.
+
+ @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from the signed image.
+ @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
+
+ @retval TRUE Image is forbidden by dbx.
+ @retval FALSE Image is not forbidden by dbx.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsForbiddenByDbx (
+ IN UINT8 *AuthData,
+ IN UINTN AuthDataSize
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ BOOLEAN IsForbidden;
+ UINT8 *Data;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINT8 *CertBuffer;
+ UINTN BufferLength;
+ UINT8 *TrustedCert;
+ UINTN TrustedCertLength;
+ UINT8 CertNumber;
+ UINT8 *CertPtr;
+ UINT8 *Cert;
+ UINTN CertSize;
+ EFI_TIME RevocationTime;
+
+ //
+ // Variable Initialization
+ //
+ IsForbidden = FALSE;
+ Data = NULL;
+ Cert = NULL;
+ CertBuffer = NULL;
+ BufferLength = 0;
+ TrustedCert = NULL;
+ TrustedCertLength = 0;
+
+ //
+ // The image will not be forbidden if dbx can't be got.
+ //
+ DataSize = 0;
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
+ if (Data == NULL) {
+ return IsForbidden;
+ }
+
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);
+ }
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return IsForbidden;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Retrieve the certificate stack from AuthData
+ // The output CertStack format will be:
+ // UINT8 CertNumber;
+ // UINT32 Cert1Length;
+ // UINT8 Cert1[];
+ // UINT32 Cert2Length;
+ // UINT8 Cert2[];
+ // ...
+ // UINT32 CertnLength;
+ // UINT8 Certn[];
+ //
+ Pkcs7GetSigners (AuthData, AuthDataSize, &CertBuffer, &BufferLength, &TrustedCert, &TrustedCertLength);
+ if (BufferLength == 0) {
+ IsForbidden = TRUE;
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check if any certificates in AuthData is in the forbidden database.
+ //
+ CertNumber = (UINT8) (*CertBuffer);
+ CertPtr = CertBuffer + 1;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertNumber; Index++) {
+ CertSize = (UINTN) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)CertPtr);
+ Cert = (UINT8 *)CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32);
+ if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, Cert, &gEfiCertX509Guid, CertSize)) {
+ //
+ // Raw certificate in dbx means the image signed by the certificate is forbidden.
+ //
+ IsForbidden = TRUE;
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ if (IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (Cert, CertSize, (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data, DataSize, &RevocationTime)) {
+ //
+ // Check the timestamp signature and signing time to determine if the image can be trusted.
+ //
+ IsForbidden = TRUE;
+ if (PassTimestampCheck (AuthData, AuthDataSize, &RevocationTime)) {
+ IsForbidden = FALSE;
+ }
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ CertPtr = CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32) + CertSize;
+ }
+
+Done:
+ if (Data != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Data);
+ }
+
+ Pkcs7FreeSigners (CertBuffer);
+ Pkcs7FreeSigners (TrustedCert);
+
+ return IsForbidden;
+}
+
+/**
+ Check whether the image signature can be verified by the trusted certificates in DB database.
+
+ @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.
+ @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
+
+ @retval TRUE Image passed verification using certificate in db.
+ @retval FALSE Image didn't pass verification using certificate in db.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsAllowedByDb (
IN UINT8 *AuthData,
- IN UINTN AuthDataSize,
- IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
- IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid
+ IN UINTN AuthDataSize
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
@@ -929,14 +1335,14 @@ IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList ( VerifyStatus = FALSE;
DataSize = 0;
- Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
if (Data == NULL) {
return VerifyStatus;
}
- Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto Done;
}
@@ -947,14 +1353,15 @@ IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList ( CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
- Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
- CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
+
for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
//
// Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
//
- RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
- RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);
+ RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
+ RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);
//
// Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.
@@ -968,12 +1375,14 @@ IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList ( mImageDigestSize
);
if (VerifyStatus) {
- SecureBootHook (VariableName, VendorGuid, CertList->SignatureSize, Cert);
+ SecureBootHook (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, CertList->SignatureSize, Cert);
goto Done;
}
+
Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
}
}
+
DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
}
@@ -1108,7 +1517,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( }
//
- // The policy QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
+ // The policy QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
// violates the UEFI spec and has been removed.
//
ASSERT (Policy != QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION && Policy != ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION);
@@ -1183,8 +1592,8 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
//
- // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value
- // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
+ // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value
+ // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
// Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
// then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
//
@@ -1195,7 +1604,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( //
Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
}
-
+
if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
//
// Use PE32 offset.
@@ -1203,7 +1612,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {
SecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
- }
+ }
} else {
//
// Use PE32+ offset.
@@ -1219,7 +1628,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( //
if (SecDataDir == NULL || SecDataDir->Size == 0) {
//
- // This image is not signed. The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db",
+ // This image is not signed. The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db",
// and not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".
//
if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {
@@ -1247,7 +1656,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( }
//
- // Verify the signature of the image, multiple signatures are allowed as per PE/COFF Section 4.7
+ // Verify the signature of the image, multiple signatures are allowed as per PE/COFF Section 4.7
// "Attribute Certificate Table".
// The first certificate starts at offset (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress) from the start of the file.
//
@@ -1259,13 +1668,13 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) < WinCertificate->dwLength) {
break;
}
-
+
//
// Verify the image's Authenticode signature, only DER-encoded PKCS#7 signed data is supported.
//
if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {
//
- // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS which is described in the
+ // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS which is described in the
// Authenticode specification.
//
PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) WinCertificate;
@@ -1298,11 +1707,11 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
continue;
}
-
+
//
// Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in forbidden database (dbx).
//
- if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (AuthData, AuthDataSize, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {
+ if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {
Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;
VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
break;
@@ -1312,7 +1721,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( // Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed database (db).
//
if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {
- if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (AuthData, AuthDataSize, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {
+ if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {
VerifyStatus = EFI_SUCCESS;
}
}
@@ -1337,7 +1746,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( //
VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
-
+
if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {
return EFI_SUCCESS;
} else {
@@ -1407,7 +1816,7 @@ OnReadyToBoot ( return ;
}
- ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;
+ ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;
gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) ImageExeInfoTable);
}
@@ -1434,10 +1843,10 @@ DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor ( //
EfiCreateEventReadyToBootEx (
TPL_CALLBACK,
- OnReadyToBoot,
- NULL,
+ OnReadyToBoot,
+ NULL,
&Event
- );
+ );
return RegisterSecurity2Handler (
DxeImageVerificationHandler,
|