UEFI 2.4 X509 Certificate Hash and RFC3161 Timestamp Verification support for Secure Boot

Main ChangeLogs includes:
1. Introduce the new GUID and structure definitions for certificate hash and timestamp support;
2. Update Image Verification Library to support DBT signature checking;
3. Update the related SecureBoot Configuration Pages;

Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0

Signed-off-by: Qin Long <qin.long@intel.com> 
Reviewed-by: Guo Dong <guo.dong@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Siyuan Fu <siyuan.fu@intel.com>

git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@16380 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524

1 files changed, 467 insertions, 58 deletions

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
index 0a48ce1628..3324dba0af 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
@@ -64,11 +64,11 @@ UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = {
   };

 

 HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {

-  { L"SHA1",   20, &mHashOidValue[0],  5, Sha1GetContextSize,  Sha1Init,   Sha1Update,    Sha1Final  },

-  { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[5],  9, NULL,                NULL,       NULL,          NULL       },

-  { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[14], 9, Sha256GetContextSize,Sha256Init, Sha256Update,  Sha256Final},

-  { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[23], 9, NULL,                NULL,       NULL,          NULL       },

-  { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[32], 9, NULL,                NULL,       NULL,          NULL       }

+  { L"SHA1",   20, &mHashOidValue[0],  5, Sha1GetContextSize,   Sha1Init,   Sha1Update,   Sha1Final  },

+  { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[5],  9, NULL,                 NULL,       NULL,         NULL       },

+  { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[14], 9, Sha256GetContextSize, Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},

+  { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[23], 9, Sha384GetContextSize, Sha384Init, Sha384Update, Sha384Final},

+  { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[32], 9, Sha512GetContextSize, Sha512Init, Sha512Update, Sha512Final}

 };

 

 /**

@@ -99,11 +99,11 @@ SecureBootHook (
 

   @param  FileHandle      Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.

   @param  FileOffset      Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.

-  @param  ReadSize        On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.  

+  @param  ReadSize        On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.

                           On output, the number of bytes actually read.

   @param  Buffer          Output buffer that contains the data read from the PE/COFF image.

-  

-  @retval EFI_SUCCESS     The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size 

+

+  @retval EFI_SUCCESS     The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size

 **/

 EFI_STATUS

 EFIAPI

@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead (
   UINTN               EndPosition;

 

   if (FileHandle == NULL || ReadSize == NULL || Buffer == NULL) {

-    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;    

+    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

 

   if (MAX_ADDRESS - FileOffset < *ReadSize) {

@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ HashPeImage (
   SectionHeader = NULL;

   Status        = FALSE;

 

-  if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) {

+  if ((HashAlg >= HASHALG_MAX)) {

     return FALSE;

   }

 

@@ -315,13 +315,28 @@ HashPeImage (
   //

   ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);

 

-  if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA1) {

-    mImageDigestSize  = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;

-    mCertType         = gEfiCertSha1Guid;

-  } else if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA256) {

-    mImageDigestSize  = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;

-    mCertType         = gEfiCertSha256Guid;

-  } else {

+  switch (HashAlg) {

+  case HASHALG_SHA1:

+    mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;

+    mCertType        = gEfiCertSha1Guid;

+    break;

+

+  case HASHALG_SHA256:

+    mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;

+    mCertType        = gEfiCertSha256Guid;

+    break;

+

+  case HASHALG_SHA384:

+    mImageDigestSize = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE;

+    mCertType        = gEfiCertSha384Guid;

+    break;

+

+  case HASHALG_SHA512:

+    mImageDigestSize = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE;

+    mCertType        = gEfiCertSha512Guid;

+    break;

+

+  default:

     return FALSE;

   }

 

@@ -347,8 +362,8 @@ HashPeImage (
   //

   if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {

     //

-    // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value 

-    //       in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the 

+    // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value

+    //       in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the

     //       Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC

     //       then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC

     //

@@ -359,7 +374,7 @@ HashPeImage (
     //

     Magic =  mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;

   }

-  

+

   //

   // 3.  Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.

   // 4.  Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.

@@ -466,7 +481,7 @@ HashPeImage (
       if (!Status) {

         goto Done;

       }

-    }    

+    }

   }

 

   //

@@ -604,7 +619,7 @@ Done:
 

   @param[in]  AuthData            Pointer to the Authenticode Signature retrieved from signed image.

   @param[in]  AuthDataSize        Size of the Authenticode Signature in bytes.

-  

+

   @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED             Hash algorithm is not supported.

   @retval EFI_SUCCESS                 Hash successfully.

 

@@ -804,6 +819,124 @@ AddImageExeInfo (
 }

 

 /**

+  Check whether the hash of an given X.509 certificate is in forbidden database (DBX).

+

+  @param[in]  Certificate       Pointer to X.509 Certificate that is searched for.

+  @param[in]  CertSize          Size of X.509 Certificate.

+  @param[in]  SignatureList     Pointer to the Signature List in forbidden database.

+  @param[in]  SignatureListSize Size of Signature List.

+  @param[out] RevocationTime    Return the time that the certificate was revoked.

+

+  @return TRUE   The certificate hash is found in the forbidden database.

+  @return FALSE  The certificate hash is not found in the forbidden database.

+

+**/

+BOOLEAN

+IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (

+  IN  UINT8               *Certificate,

+  IN  UINTN               CertSize,

+  IN  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST  *SignatureList,

+  IN  UINTN               SignatureListSize,

+  OUT EFI_TIME            *RevocationTime

+  )

+{

+  BOOLEAN             IsFound;

+  EFI_STATUS          Status;

+  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST  *DbxList;

+  UINTN               DbxSize;

+  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA  *CertHash;

+  UINTN               CertHashCount;

+  UINTN               Index;

+  UINT32              HashAlg;

+  VOID                *HashCtx;

+  UINT8               CertDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];

+  UINT8               *DbxCertHash;

+  UINTN               SiglistHeaderSize;

+

+  IsFound  = FALSE;

+  DbxList  = SignatureList;

+  DbxSize  = SignatureListSize;

+  HashCtx  = NULL;

+  HashAlg  = HASHALG_MAX;

+

+  ASSERT (RevocationTime != NULL);

+

+  while ((DbxSize > 0) && (SignatureListSize >= DbxList->SignatureListSize)) {

+    //

+    // Determine Hash Algorithm of Certificate in the forbidden database.

+    //

+    if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {

+      HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA256;

+    } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) {

+      HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA384;

+    } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) {

+      HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA512;

+    } else {

+      DbxSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;

+      DbxList  = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);

+      continue;

+    }

+

+    //

+    // Calculate the hash value of current db certificate for comparision.

+    //

+    if (mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize == NULL) {

+      goto Done;

+    }

+    ZeroMem (CertDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);

+    HashCtx = AllocatePool (mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize ());

+    if (HashCtx == NULL) {

+      goto Done;

+    }

+    Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit (HashCtx);

+    if (!Status) {

+      goto Done;

+    }

+    Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, Certificate, CertSize);

+    if (!Status) {

+      goto Done;

+    }

+    Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal (HashCtx, CertDigest);

+    if (!Status) {

+      goto Done;

+    }

+

+    SiglistHeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + DbxList->SignatureHeaderSize;

+    CertHash          = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + SiglistHeaderSize);

+    CertHashCount     = (DbxList->SignatureListSize - SiglistHeaderSize) / DbxList->SignatureSize;

+    for (Index = 0; Index < CertHashCount; Index++) {

+      //

+      // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.

+      //

+      DbxCertHash = CertHash->SignatureData;

+      if (CompareMem (DbxCertHash, CertDigest, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength) == 0) {

+        //

+        // Hash of Certificate is found in forbidden database.

+        //

+        IsFound = TRUE;

+

+        //

+        // Return the revocation time.

+        //

+        CopyMem (RevocationTime, (EFI_TIME *)(DbxCertHash + mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength), sizeof (EFI_TIME));

+        goto Done;

+      }

+      CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertHash + DbxList->SignatureSize);

+    }

+

+    DbxSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;

+    DbxList  = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);

+  }

+

+Done:

+  if (HashCtx != NULL) {

+    FreePool (HashCtx);

+  }

+

+  return IsFound;

+}

+

+/**

   Check whether signature is in specified database.

 

   @param[in]  VariableName        Name of database variable that is searched in.

@@ -831,6 +964,7 @@ IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (
   UINTN               Index;

   UINTN               CertCount;

   BOOLEAN             IsFound;

+

   //

   // Read signature database variable.

   //

@@ -890,24 +1024,296 @@ Done:
 }

 

 /**

-  Verify PKCS#7 SignedData using certificate found in Variable which formatted

-  as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. The Variable may be PK, KEK, DB or DBX.

+  Check whether the timestamp is valid by comparing the signing time and the revocation time.

 

-  @param[in]  AuthData      Pointer to the Authenticode Signature retrieved from signed image.

-  @param[in]  AuthDataSize  Size of the Authenticode Signature in bytes.

-  @param[in]  VariableName  Name of Variable to search for Certificate.

-  @param[in]  VendorGuid    Variable vendor GUID.

+  @param SigningTime         A pointer to the signing time.

+  @param RevocationTime      A pointer to the revocation time.

 

-  @retval TRUE         Image pass verification.

-  @retval FALSE        Image fail verification.

+  @retval  TRUE              The SigningTime is not later than the RevocationTime.

+  @retval  FALSE             The SigningTime is later than the RevocationTime.

 

 **/

 BOOLEAN

-IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (

+IsValidSignatureByTimestamp (

+  IN EFI_TIME               *SigningTime,

+  IN EFI_TIME               *RevocationTime

+  )

+{

+  if (SigningTime->Year != RevocationTime->Year) {

+    return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Year < RevocationTime->Year);

+  } else if (SigningTime->Month != RevocationTime->Month) {

+    return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Month < RevocationTime->Month);

+  } else if (SigningTime->Day != RevocationTime->Day) {

+    return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Day < RevocationTime->Day);

+  } else if (SigningTime->Hour != RevocationTime->Hour) {

+    return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Hour < RevocationTime->Hour);

+  } else if (SigningTime->Minute != RevocationTime->Minute) {

+    return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Minute < RevocationTime->Minute);

+  }

+

+  return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Second <= RevocationTime->Second);

+}

+

+/**

+  Check if the given time value is zero.

+

+  @param[in]  Time      Pointer of a time value.

+

+  @retval     TRUE      The Time is Zero.

+  @retval     FALSE     The Time is not Zero.

+

+**/

+BOOLEAN

+IsTimeZero (

+  IN EFI_TIME               *Time

+  )

+{

+  if ((Time->Year == 0) && (Time->Month == 0) &&  (Time->Day == 0) &&

+      (Time->Hour == 0) && (Time->Minute == 0) && (Time->Second == 0)) {

+    return TRUE;

+  }

+

+  return FALSE;

+}

+

+/**

+  Check whether the timestamp signature is valid and the signing time is also earlier than 

+  the revocation time.

+

+  @param[in]  AuthData        Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.

+  @param[in]  AuthDataSize    Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.

+  @param[in]  RevocationTime  The time that the certificate was revoked.

+

+  @retval TRUE      Timestamp signature is valid and signing time is no later than the 

+                    revocation time.

+  @retval FALSE     Timestamp signature is not valid or the signing time is later than the

+                    revocation time.

+

+**/

+BOOLEAN

+PassTimestampCheck (

+  IN UINT8                  *AuthData,

+  IN UINTN                  AuthDataSize,

+  IN EFI_TIME               *RevocationTime

+  )

+{

+  EFI_STATUS                Status;

+  BOOLEAN                   VerifyStatus;

+  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST        *CertList;

+  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA        *Cert;

+  UINT8                     *DbtData;

+  UINTN                     DbtDataSize;

+  UINT8                     *RootCert;

+  UINTN                     RootCertSize;

+  UINTN                     Index;

+  UINTN                     CertCount;

+  EFI_TIME                  SigningTime;

+

+  //

+  // Variable Initialization

+  //

+  VerifyStatus      = FALSE;

+  DbtData           = NULL;

+  CertList          = NULL;

+  Cert              = NULL;

+  RootCert          = NULL;

+  RootCertSize      = 0;

+

+  //

+  // If RevocationTime is zero, the certificate shall be considered to always be revoked.

+  //

+  if (IsTimeZero (RevocationTime)) {

+    return FALSE;

+  }

+

+  //

+  // RevocationTime is non-zero, the certificate should be considered to be revoked from that time and onwards.

+  // Using the dbt to get the trusted TSA certificates.

+  //

+  DbtDataSize = 0;

+  Status   = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbtDataSize, NULL);

+  if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {

+    DbtData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DbtDataSize);

+    if (DbtData == NULL) {

+      goto Done;

+    }

+    Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbtDataSize, (VOID *) DbtData);

+    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+      goto Done;

+    }

+  }

+

+  CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) DbtData;

+  while ((DbtDataSize > 0) && (DbtDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {

+    if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {

+      Cert      = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);

+      CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;

+      for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {

+        //

+        // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.

+        //

+        RootCert     = Cert->SignatureData;

+        RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);

+        //

+        // Get the signing time if the timestamp signature is valid.

+        //

+        if (ImageTimestampVerify (AuthData, AuthDataSize, RootCert, RootCertSize, &SigningTime)) {

+          //

+          // The signer signature is valid only when the signing time is earlier than revocation time.

+          //

+          if (IsValidSignatureByTimestamp (&SigningTime, RevocationTime)) {

+            VerifyStatus = TRUE;

+            goto Done;

+          }

+        }

+        Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);

+      }

+    }

+    DbtDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;

+    CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);

+  }

+

+Done:

+  if (DbtData != NULL) {

+    FreePool (DbtData);

+  }

+

+  return VerifyStatus;

+}

+

+/**

+  Check whether the image signature is forbidden by the forbidden database (dbx).

+  The image is forbidden to load if any certificates for signing are revoked before signing time.

+

+  @param[in]  AuthData      Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from the signed image.

+  @param[in]  AuthDataSize  Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.

+

+  @retval TRUE              Image is forbidden by dbx.

+  @retval FALSE             Image is not forbidden by dbx.

+

+**/

+BOOLEAN

+IsForbiddenByDbx (

+  IN UINT8                  *AuthData,

+  IN UINTN                  AuthDataSize

+  )

+{

+  EFI_STATUS                Status;

+  BOOLEAN                   IsForbidden;

+  UINT8                     *Data;

+  UINTN                     DataSize;

+  UINTN                     Index;

+  UINT8                     *CertBuffer;

+  UINTN                     BufferLength;

+  UINT8                     *TrustedCert;

+  UINTN                     TrustedCertLength;

+  UINT8                     CertNumber;

+  UINT8                     *CertPtr;

+  UINT8                     *Cert;

+  UINTN                     CertSize;

+  EFI_TIME                  RevocationTime;

+

+  //

+  // Variable Initialization

+  //

+  IsForbidden       = FALSE;

+  Data              = NULL;

+  Cert              = NULL;

+  CertBuffer        = NULL;

+  BufferLength      = 0;

+  TrustedCert       = NULL;

+  TrustedCertLength = 0;

+

+  //

+  // The image will not be forbidden if dbx can't be got.

+  //

+  DataSize = 0;

+  Status   = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);

+  if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {

+    Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);

+    if (Data == NULL) {

+      return IsForbidden;

+    }

+

+    Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);

+  }

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    return IsForbidden;

+  }

+

+  //

+  // Retrieve the certificate stack from AuthData

+  // The output CertStack format will be:

+  //       UINT8  CertNumber;

+  //       UINT32 Cert1Length;

+  //       UINT8  Cert1[];

+  //       UINT32 Cert2Length;

+  //       UINT8  Cert2[];

+  //       ...

+  //       UINT32 CertnLength;

+  //       UINT8  Certn[];

+  //

+  Pkcs7GetSigners (AuthData, AuthDataSize, &CertBuffer, &BufferLength, &TrustedCert, &TrustedCertLength);

+  if (BufferLength == 0) {

+    IsForbidden = TRUE;

+    goto Done;

+  }

+

+  //

+  // Check if any certificates in AuthData is in the forbidden database.

+  //

+  CertNumber = (UINT8) (*CertBuffer);

+  CertPtr    = CertBuffer + 1;

+  for (Index = 0; Index < CertNumber; Index++) {

+    CertSize = (UINTN) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)CertPtr);

+    Cert     = (UINT8 *)CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32);

+    if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, Cert, &gEfiCertX509Guid, CertSize)) {

+      //

+      // Raw certificate in dbx means the image signed by the certificate is forbidden.

+      //

+      IsForbidden = TRUE;

+      goto Done;

+    }

+

+    if (IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (Cert, CertSize, (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data, DataSize, &RevocationTime)) {

+      //

+      // Check the timestamp signature and signing time to determine if the image can be trusted.

+      //

+      IsForbidden = TRUE;

+      if (PassTimestampCheck (AuthData, AuthDataSize, &RevocationTime)) {

+        IsForbidden = FALSE;

+      }

+      goto Done;

+    }

+

+    CertPtr = CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32) + CertSize;

+  }

+

+Done:

+  if (Data != NULL) {

+    FreePool (Data);

+  }

+

+  Pkcs7FreeSigners (CertBuffer);

+  Pkcs7FreeSigners (TrustedCert);

+

+  return IsForbidden;

+}

+

+/**

+  Check whether the image signature can be verified by the trusted certificates in DB database.

+

+  @param[in]  AuthData      Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.

+  @param[in]  AuthDataSize  Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.

+

+  @retval TRUE         Image passed verification using certificate in db.

+  @retval FALSE        Image didn't pass verification using certificate in db.

+

+**/

+BOOLEAN

+IsAllowedByDb (

   IN UINT8              *AuthData,

-  IN UINTN              AuthDataSize,

-  IN CHAR16             *VariableName,

-  IN EFI_GUID           *VendorGuid

+  IN UINTN              AuthDataSize

   )

 {

   EFI_STATUS                Status;

@@ -929,14 +1335,14 @@ IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (
   VerifyStatus = FALSE;

 

   DataSize = 0;

-  Status   = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);

+  Status   = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);

   if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {

     Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);

     if (Data == NULL) {

       return VerifyStatus;

     }

 

-    Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);

+    Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);

     if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

       goto Done;

     }

@@ -947,14 +1353,15 @@ IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (
     CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;

     while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {

       if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {

-        Cert          = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);

-        CertCount     = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;

+        Cert       = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);

+        CertCount  = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;

+

         for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {

           //

           // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.

           //

-          RootCert      = Cert->SignatureData;

-          RootCertSize  = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);

+          RootCert     = Cert->SignatureData;

+          RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);

 

           //

           // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.

@@ -968,12 +1375,14 @@ IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (
                            mImageDigestSize

                            );

           if (VerifyStatus) {

-            SecureBootHook (VariableName, VendorGuid, CertList->SignatureSize, Cert);

+            SecureBootHook (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, CertList->SignatureSize, Cert);

             goto Done;

           }

+

           Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);

         }

       }

+

       DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;

       CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);

     }

@@ -1108,7 +1517,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
   }

 

   //

-  // The policy QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 

+  // The policy QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION

   // violates the UEFI spec and has been removed.

   //

   ASSERT (Policy != QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION && Policy != ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION);

@@ -1183,8 +1592,8 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
 

   if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {

     //

-    // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value 

-    //       in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the 

+    // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value

+    //       in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the

     //       Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC

     //       then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC

     //

@@ -1195,7 +1604,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
     //

     Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;

   }

-  

+

   if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {

     //

     // Use PE32 offset.

@@ -1203,7 +1612,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
     NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;

     if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {

       SecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];

-    }        

+    }

   } else {

     //

     // Use PE32+ offset.

@@ -1219,7 +1628,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
   //

   if (SecDataDir == NULL || SecDataDir->Size == 0) {

     //

-    // This image is not signed. The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db", 

+    // This image is not signed. The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db",

     // and not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".

     //

     if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {

@@ -1247,7 +1656,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
   }

 

   //

-  // Verify the signature of the image, multiple signatures are allowed as per PE/COFF Section 4.7 

+  // Verify the signature of the image, multiple signatures are allowed as per PE/COFF Section 4.7

   // "Attribute Certificate Table".

   // The first certificate starts at offset (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress) from the start of the file.

   //

@@ -1259,13 +1668,13 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
         (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) < WinCertificate->dwLength) {

       break;

     }

-    

+

     //

     // Verify the image's Authenticode signature, only DER-encoded PKCS#7 signed data is supported.

     //

     if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {

       //

-      // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS which is described in the 

+      // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS which is described in the

       // Authenticode specification.

       //

       PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) WinCertificate;

@@ -1298,11 +1707,11 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
     if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

       continue;

     }

-    

+

     //

     // Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in forbidden database (dbx).

     //

-    if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (AuthData, AuthDataSize, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {

+    if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {

       Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;

       VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

       break;

@@ -1312,7 +1721,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
     // Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed database (db).

     //

     if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {

-      if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (AuthData, AuthDataSize, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {

+      if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {

         VerifyStatus = EFI_SUCCESS;

       }

     }

@@ -1337,7 +1746,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
     //

     VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

   }

-  

+

   if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {

     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   } else {

@@ -1407,7 +1816,7 @@ OnReadyToBoot (
     return ;

   }

 

-  ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;  

+  ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;

   gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) ImageExeInfoTable);

 

 }

@@ -1434,10 +1843,10 @@ DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor (
   //

   EfiCreateEventReadyToBootEx (

     TPL_CALLBACK,

-    OnReadyToBoot, 

-    NULL, 

+    OnReadyToBoot,

+    NULL,

     &Event

-    ); 

+    );

 

   return RegisterSecurity2Handler (

           DxeImageVerificationHandler,