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authorhhuan13 <hhuan13@6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524>2011-09-21 05:23:55 +0000
committerhhuan13 <hhuan13@6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524>2011-09-21 05:23:55 +0000
commit570b3d1a7278df29878da87990e8366bd42d0ec5 (patch)
treec190217fafb3a9535642a718cba3ef20fdeb567d /SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib
parent648f98d15b5811ff9cf649bda8b762d50b735798 (diff)
downloadedk2-platforms-570b3d1a7278df29878da87990e8366bd42d0ec5.tar.xz
1. Enhance DxeImageVerificationLib to avoid some corrupted input.
Signed-off-by: hhuan13 Reviewed-by: qlong git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@12399 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
Diffstat (limited to 'SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib')
-rw-r--r--SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c140
1 files changed, 105 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
index 148dbd5a89..dab35d5f6c 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
@@ -207,7 +207,9 @@ HashPeImage (
EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;
UINTN Index;
UINTN Pos;
-
+ UINTN SumOfSectionBytes;
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionCache;
+
HashCtx = NULL;
SectionHeader = NULL;
Status = FALSE;
@@ -234,7 +236,9 @@ HashPeImage (
CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();
HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);
- ASSERT (HashCtx != NULL);
+ if (HashCtx == NULL) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
// 1. Load the image header into memory.
@@ -259,11 +263,17 @@ HashPeImage (
// Use PE32 offset.
//
HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);
- } else {
+ } else if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {
//
// Use PE32+ offset.
//
HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Invalid header magic number.
+ //
+ Status = FALSE;
+ goto Done;
}
Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
@@ -330,6 +340,29 @@ HashPeImage (
SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;
}
+
+ Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (
+ mImageBase +
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset +
+ sizeof (UINT32) +
+ sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +
+ mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader
+ );
+
+ SectionCache = Section;
+ for (Index = 0, SumOfSectionBytes = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++, SectionCache++) {
+ SumOfSectionBytes += SectionCache->SizeOfRawData;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Sanity check for file corruption. Sections raw data size should be smaller
+ // than Image Size.
+ //
+ if (SumOfSectionBytes >= mImageSize) {
+ Status = FALSE;
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
//
// 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
// structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image
@@ -337,20 +370,16 @@ HashPeImage (
// IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.
//
SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);
- ASSERT (SectionHeader != NULL);
+ if (SectionHeader == NULL) {
+ Status = FALSE;
+ goto Done;
+ }
//
// 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as
// a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other
// words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of
// the section.
//
- Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (
- mImageBase +
- mPeCoffHeaderOffset +
- sizeof (UINT32) +
- sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +
- mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader
- );
for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {
Pos = Index;
while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {
@@ -532,7 +561,6 @@ AddImageExeInfo (
IN UINTN SignatureSize
)
{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable;
EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *NewImageExeInfoTable;
EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *ImageExeInfoEntry;
@@ -541,12 +569,15 @@ AddImageExeInfo (
UINTN NameStringLen;
UINTN DevicePathSize;
- ASSERT (DevicePath != NULL);
ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;
NewImageExeInfoTable = NULL;
ImageExeInfoEntry = NULL;
NameStringLen = 0;
+ if (DevicePath == NULL) {
+ return ;
+ }
+
if (Name != NULL) {
NameStringLen = StrSize (Name);
}
@@ -570,7 +601,9 @@ AddImageExeInfo (
DevicePathSize = GetDevicePathSize (DevicePath);
NewImageExeInfoEntrySize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize + SignatureSize;
NewImageExeInfoTable = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize + NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);
- ASSERT (NewImageExeInfoTable != NULL);
+ if (NewImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {
+ return ;
+ }
if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {
CopyMem (NewImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTableSize);
@@ -603,8 +636,8 @@ AddImageExeInfo (
//
// Update/replace the image execution table.
//
- Status = gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) NewImageExeInfoTable);
- ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) NewImageExeInfoTable);
+
//
// Free Old table data!
//
@@ -707,7 +740,9 @@ IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (
}
Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
- ASSERT (Data != NULL);
+ if (Data == NULL) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
@@ -755,7 +790,7 @@ Done:
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Image pass verification.
@retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image fail verification.
- @retval other error value
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCE Fail to allocate memory.
**/
EFI_STATUS
@@ -769,13 +804,15 @@ VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (
EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;
UINTN DataSize;
- UINT8 *Data;
+ UINT8 *KekData;
+ UINT8 *DbData;
UINT8 *RootCert;
UINTN RootCertSize;
UINTN Index;
UINTN CertCount;
- Data = NULL;
+ KekData = NULL;
+ DbData = NULL;
CertList = NULL;
Cert = NULL;
RootCert = NULL;
@@ -789,10 +826,12 @@ VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (
DataSize = 0;
Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- Data = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
- ASSERT (Data != NULL);
+ KekData = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
+ if (KekData == NULL) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
- Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *)Data);
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *)KekData);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto Done;
}
@@ -800,7 +839,7 @@ VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (
//
// Find Cert Enrolled in KEK database to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.
//
- CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) KekData;
while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
@@ -843,10 +882,12 @@ VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (
DataSize = 0;
Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- Data = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
- ASSERT (Data != NULL);
+ DbData = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
+ if (DbData == NULL) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
- Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *)Data);
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *)DbData);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto Done;
}
@@ -854,7 +895,7 @@ VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (
//
// Find Cert Enrolled in DB database to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.
//
- CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) DbData;
while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
@@ -890,8 +931,12 @@ VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (
}
Done:
- if (Data != NULL) {
- FreePool (Data);
+ if (KekData != NULL) {
+ FreePool (KekData);
+ }
+
+ if (DbData != NULL) {
+ FreePool (DbData);
}
if (VerifyStatus) {
@@ -992,7 +1037,11 @@ VerifyCertUefiGuid (
// Verify the data payload.
//
Rsa = RsaNew ();
- ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);
+ if (Rsa == NULL) {
+ Status = FALSE;
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
//
// Set RSA Key Components.
// NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.
@@ -1048,7 +1097,8 @@ Done:
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by File did authenticate, and the
platform policy dictates that the DXE Core may use File.
- @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER File is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Input argument is incorrect.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_RESOURCE Fail to allocate memory.
@retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and
the platform policy dictates that File should be placed
in the untrusted state. A file may be promoted from
@@ -1143,7 +1193,10 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
//
// Read the Dos header.
//
- ASSERT (FileBuffer != NULL);
+ if (FileBuffer == NULL) {
+ FreePool (SetupMode);
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
mImageBase = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer;
mImageSize = FileSize;
DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) (mImageBase);
@@ -1173,11 +1226,25 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
// Use PE32 offset.
//
mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *)&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
- } else {
+ } else if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {
//
// Use PE32+ offset.
//
mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *)&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Invalid header magic number.
+ //
+ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ if (mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress >= mImageSize) {
+ //
+ // Sanity check to see if this file is corrupted.
+ //
+ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ goto Done;
}
if (mSecDataDir->Size == 0) {
@@ -1233,7 +1300,10 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
//
SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize;
SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize);
- ASSERT (SignatureList != NULL);
+ if (SignatureList == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto Done;
+ }
SignatureList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;
SignatureList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;
SignatureList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;