diff options
author | czhang46 <czhang46@6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524> | 2012-07-09 08:26:35 +0000 |
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committer | czhang46 <czhang46@6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524> | 2012-07-09 08:26:35 +0000 |
commit | 25a4e71aa6a908a81bb5be7fec16da02a5c1f2a5 (patch) | |
tree | 5d8ed7b5b8a0ecd85f5c91e9a4e6b9448273c7c6 /SecurityPkg | |
parent | 627c396148c4d9942e9b65d819ae7d223cbc3dc0 (diff) | |
download | edk2-platforms-25a4e71aa6a908a81bb5be7fec16da02a5c1f2a5.tar.xz |
Add SMRAM range check to variable SMM SMI handler.
git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@13514 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
Diffstat (limited to 'SecurityPkg')
-rw-r--r-- | SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c | 129 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.inf | 1 |
2 files changed, 123 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c index 37b6f11839..8247836a63 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c +++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c @@ -28,12 +28,17 @@ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. #include <Protocol/SmmVariable.h>
#include <Protocol/SmmFirmwareVolumeBlock.h>
#include <Protocol/SmmFaultTolerantWrite.h>
+#include <Protocol/SmmAccess2.h>
+
#include <Library/SmmServicesTableLib.h>
#include <Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h>
#include <Guid/SmmVariableCommon.h>
#include "Variable.h"
+EFI_SMRAM_DESCRIPTOR *mSmramRanges;
+UINTN mSmramRangeCount;
+
extern VARIABLE_INFO_ENTRY *gVariableInfo;
EFI_HANDLE mSmmVariableHandle = NULL;
EFI_HANDLE mVariableHandle = NULL;
@@ -62,6 +67,34 @@ AtRuntime ( }
/**
+ This function check if the address is in SMRAM.
+
+ @param Buffer the buffer address to be checked.
+ @param Length the buffer length to be checked.
+
+ @retval TRUE this address is in SMRAM.
+ @retval FALSE this address is NOT in SMRAM.
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+InternalIsAddressInSmram (
+ IN EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS Buffer,
+ IN UINT64 Length
+ )
+{
+ UINTN Index;
+
+ for (Index = 0; Index < mSmramRangeCount; Index ++) {
+ if (((Buffer >= mSmramRanges[Index].CpuStart) && (Buffer < mSmramRanges[Index].CpuStart + mSmramRanges[Index].PhysicalSize)) ||
+ ((mSmramRanges[Index].CpuStart >= Buffer) && (mSmramRanges[Index].CpuStart < Buffer + Length))) {
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+
+/**
Initializes a basic mutual exclusion lock.
This function initializes a basic mutual exclusion lock to the released state
@@ -372,7 +405,6 @@ SmmVariableGetStatistics ( @retval EFI_WARN_INTERRUPT_SOURCE_PENDING The interrupt is still pending and other handlers should still
be called.
@retval EFI_INTERRUPT_PENDING The interrupt could not be quiesced.
- @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Input parameter is invalid.
**/
EFI_STATUS
@@ -392,14 +424,39 @@ SmmVariableHandler ( VARIABLE_INFO_ENTRY *VariableInfo;
UINTN InfoSize;
- if (CommBuffer == NULL) {
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ //
+ // If input is invalid, stop processing this SMI
+ //
+ if (CommBuffer == NULL || CommBufferSize == NULL) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
+ if (*CommBufferSize < sizeof(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER) - 1) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ if (InternalIsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)CommBuffer, *CommBufferSize)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communication buffer size is in SMRAM!\n"));
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
SmmVariableFunctionHeader = (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER *)CommBuffer;
+
switch (SmmVariableFunctionHeader->Function) {
case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_VARIABLE:
- SmmVariableHeader = (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE *) SmmVariableFunctionHeader->Data;
+ SmmVariableHeader = (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE *) SmmVariableFunctionHeader->Data;
+ InfoSize = OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_ACCESS_VARIABLE, Name)
+ + SmmVariableHeader->DataSize + SmmVariableHeader->NameSize;
+
+ //
+ // SMRAM range check already covered before
+ //
+ if (InfoSize > *CommBufferSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER, Data)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Data size exceed communication buffer size limit!\n"));
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ goto EXIT;
+ }
+
Status = VariableServiceGetVariable (
SmmVariableHeader->Name,
&SmmVariableHeader->Guid,
@@ -411,6 +468,17 @@ SmmVariableHandler ( case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME:
GetNextVariableName = (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME *) SmmVariableFunctionHeader->Data;
+ InfoSize = OFFSET_OF(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME, Name) + GetNextVariableName->NameSize;
+
+ //
+ // SMRAM range check already covered before
+ //
+ if (InfoSize > *CommBufferSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER, Data)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Data size exceed communication buffer size limit!\n"));
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ goto EXIT;
+ }
+
Status = VariableServiceGetNextVariableName (
&GetNextVariableName->NameSize,
GetNextVariableName->Name,
@@ -431,6 +499,17 @@ SmmVariableHandler ( case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_QUERY_VARIABLE_INFO:
QueryVariableInfo = (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_QUERY_VARIABLE_INFO *) SmmVariableFunctionHeader->Data;
+ InfoSize = sizeof(SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_QUERY_VARIABLE_INFO);
+
+ //
+ // SMRAM range check already covered before
+ //
+ if (InfoSize > *CommBufferSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER, Data)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Data size exceed communication buffer size limit!\n"));
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ goto EXIT;
+ }
+
Status = VariableServiceQueryVariableInfo (
QueryVariableInfo->Attributes,
&QueryVariableInfo->MaximumVariableStorageSize,
@@ -452,17 +531,29 @@ SmmVariableHandler ( case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_STATISTICS:
VariableInfo = (VARIABLE_INFO_ENTRY *) SmmVariableFunctionHeader->Data;
InfoSize = *CommBufferSize - OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER, Data);
+
+ //
+ // Do not need to check SmmVariableFunctionHeader->Data in SMRAM here.
+ // It is covered by previous CommBuffer check
+ //
+
+ if (InternalIsAddressInSmram ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)CommBufferSize, sizeof(UINTN))) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SMM communication buffer size is in SMRAM!\n"));
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ goto EXIT;
+ }
+
Status = SmmVariableGetStatistics (VariableInfo, &InfoSize);
*CommBufferSize = InfoSize + OFFSET_OF (SMM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_HEADER, Data);
break;
default:
- ASSERT (FALSE);
Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
- SmmVariableFunctionHeader->ReturnStatus = Status;
+EXIT:
+ SmmVariableFunctionHeader->ReturnStatus = Status;
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
@@ -560,7 +651,9 @@ VariableServiceInitialize ( EFI_STATUS Status;
EFI_HANDLE VariableHandle;
VOID *SmmFtwRegistration;
-
+ EFI_SMM_ACCESS2_PROTOCOL *SmmAccess;
+ UINTN Size;
+
//
// Variable initialize.
//
@@ -579,6 +672,28 @@ VariableServiceInitialize ( );
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ //
+ // Get SMRAM information
+ //
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiSmmAccess2ProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&SmmAccess);
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+
+ Size = 0;
+ Status = SmmAccess->GetCapabilities (SmmAccess, &Size, NULL);
+ ASSERT (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+
+ Status = gSmst->SmmAllocatePool (
+ EfiRuntimeServicesData,
+ Size,
+ (VOID **)&mSmramRanges
+ );
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+
+ Status = SmmAccess->GetCapabilities (SmmAccess, &Size, mSmramRanges);
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+
+ mSmramRangeCount = Size / sizeof (EFI_SMRAM_DESCRIPTOR);
+
///
/// Register SMM variable SMI handler
///
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.inf b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.inf index a6343dbbbd..e0aa40ac6d 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.inf +++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.inf @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ gEfiSmmFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
gEfiSmmVariableProtocolGuid ## ALWAYS_PRODUCES
gEfiSmmFaultTolerantWriteProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
+ gEfiSmmAccess2ProtocolGuid ## ALWAYS_CONSUMES
[Guids]
gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid ## PRODUCES ## Configuration Table Guid
|