diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec | 260 |
1 files changed, 153 insertions, 107 deletions
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec index 1d44095af4..47a96a954d 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec +++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ ## @file SecurityPkg.dec
-# This package includes the security drivers, defintions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs
-# and library classes) and libraries instances.
+# Provides security features that conform to TCG/UEFI industry standards
+#
+# The security features include secure boot, measured boot and user identification.
+# It also provides the definitions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs and library classes)
+# and libraries instances, which are used for those features.
#
# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
# This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available under
@@ -16,6 +19,7 @@ [Defines]
DEC_SPECIFICATION = 0x00010005
PACKAGE_NAME = SecurityPkg
+ PACKAGE_UNI_FILE = SecurityPkg.uni
PACKAGE_GUID = 24369CAC-6AA6-4fb8-88DB-90BF061668AD
PACKAGE_VERSION = 0.93
@@ -64,10 +68,10 @@ TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib.h
[Guids]
- ## Security package token space guid
+ ## Security package token space guid.
# Include/Guid/SecurityPkgTokenSpace.h
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid = { 0xd3fb176, 0x9569, 0x4d51, { 0xa3, 0xef, 0x7d, 0x61, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0xea, 0xba }}
-
+
## Guid acted as the authenticated variable store header's signature, and to specify the variable list entries put in the EFI system table.
# Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h
gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid = { 0xaaf32c78, 0x947b, 0x439a, { 0xa1, 0x80, 0x2e, 0x14, 0x4e, 0xc3, 0x77, 0x92 } }
@@ -87,7 +91,7 @@ gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid = { 0xc076ec0c, 0x7028, 0x4399, { 0xa0, 0x72, 0x71, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x9f } }
## GUID used to "VendorKeysNv" variable to record the out of band secure boot keys modification.
- # This variable is a read-only NV varaible that indicates whether someone other than the platform vendor has used a
+ # This variable is a read-only NV variable that indicates whether someone other than the platform vendor has used a
# mechanism not defined by the UEFI Specification to transition the system to setup mode or to update secure boot keys.
# Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h
gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid = { 0x9073e4e0, 0x60ec, 0x4b6e, { 0x99, 0x3, 0x4c, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x26, 0xf, 0x3c } }
@@ -157,150 +161,190 @@ gTrEEConfigFormSetGuid = {0xc54b425f, 0xaa79, 0x48b4, { 0x98, 0x1f, 0x99, 0x8b, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x64, 0x1c }}
[Ppis]
- ## Include/Ppi/LockPhysicalPresence.h
+ ## The PPI GUID for that TPM physical presence should be locked.
+ # Include/Ppi/LockPhysicalPresence.h
gPeiLockPhysicalPresencePpiGuid = { 0xef9aefe5, 0x2bd3, 0x4031, { 0xaf, 0x7d, 0x5e, 0xfe, 0x5a, 0xbb, 0x9a, 0xd } }
- ## Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h
+ ## The PPI GUID for that TPM is initialized.
+ # Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h
gPeiTpmInitializedPpiGuid = { 0xe9db0d58, 0xd48d, 0x47f6, { 0x9c, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x40, 0xe8, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x41 }}
## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcluded.h
gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcludedPpiGuid = { 0x6e056ff9, 0xc695, 0x4364, { 0x9e, 0x2c, 0x61, 0x26, 0xf5, 0xce, 0xea, 0xae } }
-[PcdsFixedAtBuild]
- ## Pcd for OptionRom.
- # Image verification policy settings:
- # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000
- # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001
- # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002
- # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003
- # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004
- # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005
- # NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since
- # it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.
+#
+# [Error.gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid]
+# 0x80000001 | Invalid value provided.
+# 0x80000002 | Reserved bits must be set to zero.
+#
+
+[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule]
+ ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>
+ # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>
+ # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>
+ # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>
+ # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>
+ # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>
+ # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>
+ # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>
+ # @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001
-
- ## Pcd for removable media.
- # Removable media include CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.
- # Image verification policy settings:
- # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000
- # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001
- # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002
- # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003
- # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004
- # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005
- # NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since
- # it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.
+
+ ## Image verification policy for removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.
+ # Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>
+ # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>
+ # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>
+ # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>
+ # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>
+ # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>
+ # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>
+ # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>
+ # @Prompt Set policy for the image from removable media.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000002
-
- ## Pcd for fixed media.
- # Fixed media include hard disk.
- # Image verification policy settings:
- # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000
- # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001
- # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002
- # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003
- # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004
- # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005
- # NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since
- # it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.
+
+ ## Image verification policy for fixed media which includes hard disk.
+ # Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>
+ # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>
+ # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>
+ # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>
+ # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>
+ # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>
+ # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>
+ # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>
+ # @Prompt Set policy for the image from fixed media.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000003
-
- ## Defer Image Load policy settings.
- # The policy is bitwise.
- # If bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trust when loading.
- #
- # IMAGE_UNKNOWN 0x00000001
- # IMAGE_FROM_FV 0x00000002
- # IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM 0x00000004
- # IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA 0x00000008
- # IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA 0x00000010
- gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x0000004
-
- ## The size of Append variable buffer. This buffer is reserved for runtime use, OS can append data into one existing variable.
- gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize|0x2000|UINT32|0x30000005
- ## This PCD specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip.
- # This PCD is only avaiable when PcdTpmPhysicalPresence is TRUE.
- # If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.
- # If 1, TCG platform type is server.
- gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPlatformClass|0|UINT8|0x00000006
+ ## Defer Image Load policy settings. The policy is bitwise.
+ # If a bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trusted when loading. Or
+ # the image will be deferred. The deferred image will be checked after user is identified.<BR><BR>
+ # BIT0 - Image from unknown device. <BR>
+ # BIT1 - Image from firmware volume.<BR>
+ # BIT2 - Image from OptionRom.<BR>
+ # BIT3 - Image from removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.<BR>
+ # BIT4 - Image from fixed media device which includes hard disk.<BR>
+ # @Prompt Set policy whether trust image before user identification.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000002 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000001F
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x0000004
-[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule]
## Null-terminated Unicode string of the file name that is the default name to save USB credential.
# The specified file should be saved at the root directory of USB storage disk.
# @Prompt File name to save credential.
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedUsbCredentialProviderTokenFileName|L"Token.bin"|VOID*|0x00000005
-
+
+ ## The size of Append variable buffer. This buffer is reserved for runtime use, OS can append data into one existing variable.
+ # Note: This PCD is not been used.
+ # @Prompt Max variable size for append operation.
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize|0x2000|UINT32|0x30000005
+
+ ## Specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip.<BR><BR>
+ # If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.<BR>
+ # If 1, TCG platform type is PC server.<BR>
+ # @Prompt Select platform type.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPlatformClass|0|UINT8|0x00000006
+
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
- ## This PCD indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator.
+ ## Indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator during firmware booting.
+ # If platform operator is not physical presence during boot. TPM will be locked and the TPM commands
+ # that required operator physical presence can not run.<BR><BR>
+ # TRUE - The platform operator is physically present.<BR>
+ # FALSE - The platform operator is not physically present.<BR>
+ # @Prompt Physical presence of the platform operator.
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPhysicalPresence|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010001
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
- ## This PCD indicates whether to set TPM physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.
- # Once this bit is set, it can not be cleared (It is locked for TPM life time).
+ ## Indicates whether TPM physical presence is locked during platform initialization.
+ # Once it is locked, it can not be unlocked for TPM life time.<BR><BR>
+ # TRUE - Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>
+ # FALSE - Not lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>
+ # @Prompt Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceLifetimeLock|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010003
-
+
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
- ## This PCD is used to specify the default value for physicalPresenceCMDEnable bit when setting physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.
- # If PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable is set to TRUE, physicalPresenceCMDEnable bit will be set, else this bit will be cleared.
+ ## Indicates whether the platform supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>
+ # TRUE - Supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>
+ # FALSE - Does not support the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>
+ # @Prompt Enable software method of asserting physical presence.
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010004
-
+
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
- ## This PCD is used to specify the default value for physicalPresenceHWEnable bit when setting physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.
- # If PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable is set to TRUE, physicalPresenceHWEnable bit will be set, else this bit will be cleared.
+ ## Indicates whether the platform supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>
+ # TRUE - Supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>
+ # FALSE - Does not support the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>
+ # @Prompt Enable hardware method of asserting physical presence.
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010005
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
- ## This PCD indicates if debugger exists.
+ ## This PCD indicates if debugger exists. <BR><BR>
+ # TRUE - Firmware debugger exists.<BR>
+ # FALSE - Firmware debugger doesn't exist.<BR>
+ # @Prompt Firmware debugger status.
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFirmwareDebuggerInitialized|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010009
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 initialization policy.
- # 0: No initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.
- # 1: Initialization needed.
+ ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>
+ # If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>
+ # If 1, initialization needed.<BR>
+ # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device initialization policy.<BR>
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2InitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000A
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM initialization policy.
- # 0: No initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.
- # 1: Initialization needed.
+ ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>
+ # If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>
+ # If 1, initialization needed.<BR>
+ # @Prompt TPM 1.2 device initialization policy.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000B
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 SelfTest policy.
- # 0: No SelfTest needed - most likely used for fTPM, because it might already be tested.
- # 1: SelfTest needed.
+ ## This PCD indicates the TPM 2.0 SelfTest policy.<BR><BR>
+ # if 0, no SelfTest needed - most likely used for fTPM, because it might already be tested.<BR>
+ # if 1, SelfTest needed.<BR>
+ # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device selftest.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2SelfTestPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000C
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 SCRTM policy.
- # 0: No SCRTM needed - In this case, it is already done.
- # 1: SCRTM done by BIOS.
+ ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>
+ # if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>
+ # if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>
+ # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 2.0 device.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2ScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000D
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM SCRTM policy.
- # 0: No SCRTM needed - In this case, it is already done.
- # 1: SCRTM done by BIOS.
+ ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>
+ # if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>
+ # if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>
+ # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 1.2 device
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000E
- ## Guid name to identify TPM instance
- # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NONE means disable
- # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_TPM12 means TPM1.2 DTPM
- # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_DTPM2 means TPM2 DTPM
+ ## Guid name to identify TPM instance.<BR><BR>
+ # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NONE means disable.<BR>
+ # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_TPM12 means TPM 1.2 DTPM.<BR>
+ # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_DTPM2 means TPM 2.0 DTPM.<BR>
+ # @Prompt TPM device type identifier
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInstanceGuid |{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }|VOID*|0x0001000F
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 Hash mask.
- # BIT0: SHA1
- # BIT1: SHA256
- # BIT2: SHA384
- # BIT3: SHA512
- # If this bit is set, that means this algorithm is needed to extend to PCR.
- # If this bit is clear, that means this algorithm is NOT needed to extend to PCR.
- # 0xFFFFFFFF means extend all.
- gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2HashMask|0xFFFFFFFF|UINT32|0x00010010
-
- ## This PCD indicates if BIOS auto detect TPM1.2 or dTPM2.0.
- # 0: No auto detection.
- # 1: Auto detection.
+ ## This PCD indicates Hash mask for TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>
+ # If this bit is set, that means this algorithm is needed to extend to PCR.<BR>
+ # If this bit is clear, that means this algorithm is NOT needed to extend to PCR.<BR>
+ # BIT0 - SHA1.<BR>
+ # BIT1 - SHA256.<BR>
+ # BIT2 - SHA384.<BR>
+ # BIT3 - SHA512.<BR>
+ # @Prompt Hash mask for TPM 2.0
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000000F
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2HashMask|0x0000000F|UINT32|0x00010010
+
+ ## This PCD indicates if BIOS auto detect TPM1.2 or dTPM2.0.<BR><BR>
+ # FALSE - No auto detection.<BR>
+ # TRUE - Auto detection.<BR>
+ # @Prompt TPM type detection.
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmAutoDetection|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010011
- ## This PCD indicates TPM base address.
+ ## This PCD indicates TPM base address.<BR><BR>
+ # @Prompt TPM device address.
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmBaseAddress|0xFED40000|UINT64|0x00010012
## Provides one or more SHA 256 Hashes of the RSA 2048 public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images
@@ -308,4 +352,6 @@ # @Prompt One or more SHA 256 Hashes of RSA 2048 bit public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images
#
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRsa2048Sha256PublicKeyBuffer|{0x91, 0x29, 0xc4, 0xbd, 0xea, 0x6d, 0xda, 0xb3, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0x50, 0x16, 0xfc, 0xdb, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x3c, 0xd6, 0xdc, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x0e, 0xdd, 0xe6, 0x15, 0x8c, 0x73, 0x96, 0xa2, 0xd4, 0xa6, 0x4d}|VOID*|0x00010013
-
\ No newline at end of file +
+[UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]
+ SecurityPkgExtra.uni
|