diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib')
-rw-r--r-- | SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 379 |
1 files changed, 204 insertions, 175 deletions
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c index 7bc3cc0ec0..91977522a9 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c @@ -2,12 +2,12 @@ Implement image verification services for secure boot service in UEFI2.3.1.
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
-This program and the accompanying materials
-are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
-which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
-THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
**/
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader;
UINTN mImageSize;
-UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset;
+UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset;
UINT8 mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
UINTN mImageDigestSize;
EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *mSecDataDir = NULL;
@@ -59,9 +59,9 @@ HASH_TABLE mHash[] = { Get the image type.
@param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
- being dispatched.
+ being dispatched.
- @return UINT32 Image Type
+ @return UINT32 Image Type
**/
UINT32
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ GetImageType ( )
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
- EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle;
+ EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle;
EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *TempDevicePath;
EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo;
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ GetImageType ( // First check to see if File is from a Firmware Volume
//
DeviceHandle = NULL;
- TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;
+ TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;
Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (
&gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,
&TempDevicePath,
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ GetImageType ( // Next check to see if File is from a Block I/O device
//
DeviceHandle = NULL;
- TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;
+ TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;
Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (
&gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,
&TempDevicePath,
@@ -136,11 +136,11 @@ GetImageType ( }
//
- // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if
+ // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if
// the device path supports the Simple File System Protocol.
//
DeviceHandle = NULL;
- TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;
+ TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;
Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (
&gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid,
&TempDevicePath,
@@ -155,12 +155,12 @@ GetImageType ( //
// File is not from an FV, Block I/O or Simple File System, so the only options
- // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC.
+ // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC.
//
- TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;
+ TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;
while (!IsDevicePathEndType (TempDevicePath)) {
switch (DevicePathType (TempDevicePath)) {
-
+
case MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH:
if (DevicePathSubType (TempDevicePath) == MEDIA_RELATIVE_OFFSET_RANGE_DP) {
return IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM;
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ GetImageType ( case MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH:
if (DevicePathSubType(TempDevicePath) == MSG_MAC_ADDR_DP) {
return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;
- }
+ }
break;
default:
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ GetImageType ( }
TempDevicePath = NextDevicePathNode (TempDevicePath);
}
- return IMAGE_UNKNOWN;
+ return IMAGE_UNKNOWN;
}
/**
@@ -186,12 +186,12 @@ GetImageType ( PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A
@param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.
-
+
@retval TRUE Successfully hash image.
@retval FALSE Fail in hash image.
**/
-BOOLEAN
+BOOLEAN
HashPeImage (
IN UINT32 HashAlg
)
@@ -208,8 +208,8 @@ HashPeImage ( UINTN Index;
UINTN Pos;
UINTN SumOfSectionBytes;
- EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionCache;
-
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionCache;
+
HashCtx = NULL;
SectionHeader = NULL;
Status = FALSE;
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ HashPeImage ( if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) {
return FALSE;
}
-
+
//
// Initialize context of hash.
//
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ HashPeImage ( }
CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();
-
+
HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);
if (HashCtx == NULL) {
return FALSE;
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ HashPeImage ( // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.
Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);
-
+
if (!Status) {
goto Done;
}
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ HashPeImage ( } else {
//
// Use PE32+ offset.
- //
+ //
HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);
}
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ HashPeImage ( for (Index = 0, SumOfSectionBytes = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++, SectionCache++) {
SumOfSectionBytes += SectionCache->SizeOfRawData;
}
-
+
//
// Sanity check for file corruption. Sections raw data size should be smaller
// than Image Size.
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ HashPeImage ( HashSize = (UINTN)(
mImageSize -
mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -
- SumOfBytesHashed);
+ SumOfBytesHashed);
}
Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
@@ -457,15 +457,15 @@ Done: }
/**
- Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of
- Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in PE/COFF Specification
+ Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of
+ Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in PE/COFF Specification
8.0 Appendix A
@retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.
**/
-EFI_STATUS
+EFI_STATUS
HashPeImageByType (
VOID
)
@@ -475,10 +475,10 @@ HashPeImageByType ( PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);
- for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {
+ for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {
//
// Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.
- // According to PKCS#7 Definition:
+ // According to PKCS#7 Definition:
// SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
// version Version,
// digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ HashPeImageByType ( // .... }
// The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing
// This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.
- //
+ //
if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {
break;
}
@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ HashPeImageByType ( ImageExeInfoTable. If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL, then 0 is returned.
@param ImageExeInfoTable A pointer to a image execution info table structure.
-
+
@retval 0 If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL.
@retval Others The size of a image execution info table in bytes.
@@ -550,12 +550,12 @@ GetImageExeInfoTableSize ( @param[in] DevicePath Input device path pointer.
@param[in] Signature Input signature info in EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST data structure.
@param[in] SignatureSize Size of signature.
-
+
**/
VOID
AddImageExeInfo (
- IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action,
- IN CHAR16 *Name OPTIONAL,
+ IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action,
+ IN CHAR16 *Name OPTIONAL,
IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath,
IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *Signature OPTIONAL,
IN UINTN SignatureSize
@@ -577,13 +577,13 @@ AddImageExeInfo ( if (DevicePath == NULL) {
return ;
}
-
+
if (Name != NULL) {
NameStringLen = StrSize (Name);
}
ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;
- EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID**)&ImageExeInfoTable);
+ EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID **) &ImageExeInfoTable);
if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {
//
// The table has been found!
@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ AddImageExeInfo ( // Update/replace the image execution table.
//
gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) NewImageExeInfoTable);
-
+
//
// Free Old table data!
//
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ AddImageExeInfo ( /**
Discover if the UEFI image is authorized by user's policy setting.
- @param[in] Policy Specify platform's policy setting.
+ @param[in] Policy Specify platform's policy setting.
@retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED Image is not allowed to run.
@retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image is deferred.
@@ -667,7 +667,7 @@ ImageAuthorization ( Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
switch (Policy) {
-
+
case QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
do {
CreatePopUp (EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE, &Key, mNotifyString1, mNotifyString2, NULL);
@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ ImageAuthorization ( BOOLEAN
IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (
IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
- IN UINT8 *Signature,
+ IN UINT8 *Signature,
IN EFI_GUID *CertType,
IN UINTN SignatureSize
)
@@ -786,16 +786,20 @@ Done: }
/**
- Verify certificate in WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA format .
+ Verify PKCS#7 SignedData using certificate found in Variable which formatted
+ as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. The Variable may be PK, KEK, DB or DBX.
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image pass verification.
- @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image fail verification.
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCE Fail to allocate memory.
+ @param VariableName Name of Variable to search for Certificate.
+ @param VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
+
+ @retval TRUE Image pass verification.
+ @retval FALSE Image fail verification.
**/
-EFI_STATUS
-VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (
- VOID
+BOOLEAN
+IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
@@ -804,55 +808,50 @@ VerifyCertPkcsSignedData ( EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;
UINTN DataSize;
- UINT8 *KekData;
- UINT8 *DbData;
+ UINT8 *Data;
UINT8 *RootCert;
UINTN RootCertSize;
UINTN Index;
UINTN CertCount;
- KekData = NULL;
- DbData = NULL;
- CertList = NULL;
- Cert = NULL;
- RootCert = NULL;
- RootCertSize = 0;
- VerifyStatus = FALSE;
- PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);
+ Data = NULL;
+ CertList = NULL;
+ Cert = NULL;
+ RootCert = NULL;
+ RootCertSize = 0;
+ VerifyStatus = FALSE;
+ PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);
- //
- // 1: Find certificate from KEK database and try to verify authenticode struct.
- //
DataSize = 0;
- Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- KekData = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
- if (KekData == NULL) {
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
+ if (Data == NULL) {
+ return VerifyStatus;
}
- Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *)KekData);
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto Done;
}
-
+
+ //
+ // Find X509 certificate in Signature List to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.
//
- // Find Cert Enrolled in KEK database to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.
- //
- CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) KekData;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
//
- // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify
- //
+ // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
+ //
RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;
-
+
//
- // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.
+ // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.
//
VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (
PkcsCertData->CertData,
@@ -862,84 +861,59 @@ VerifyCertPkcsSignedData ( mImageDigest,
mImageDigestSize
);
-
if (VerifyStatus) {
goto Done;
}
Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
- }
+ }
}
DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
}
}
-
+Done:
+ if (Data != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Data);
+ }
- //
- // 2: Find certificate from DB database and try to verify authenticode struct.
- //
- DataSize = 0;
- Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
- if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- DbData = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
- if (DbData == NULL) {
- goto Done;
- }
+ return VerifyStatus;
+}
- Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *)DbData);
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- goto Done;
- }
+/**
+ Verify certificate in WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA format.
- //
- // Find Cert Enrolled in DB database to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.
- //
- CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) DbData;
- while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
- if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
- Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
- CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
- for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
- //
- // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify
- //
- RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
- RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;
-
- //
- // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.
- //
- VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (
- PkcsCertData->CertData,
- mSecDataDir->Size - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr),
- RootCert,
- RootCertSize,
- mImageDigest,
- mImageDigestSize
- );
-
- if (VerifyStatus) {
- goto Done;
- }
- Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
- }
- }
- DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
- CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
- }
- }
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image pass verification.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image fail verification.
-Done:
- if (KekData != NULL) {
- FreePool (KekData);
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ //
+ // 1: Find certificate from DBX forbidden database for revoked certificate.
+ //
+ if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {
+ //
+ // DBX is forbidden database, if Authenticode verification pass with
+ // one of the certificate in DBX, this image should be rejected.
+ //
+ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
}
- if (DbData != NULL) {
- FreePool (DbData);
+ //
+ // 2: Find certificate from KEK database and try to verify authenticode struct.
+ //
+ if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid)) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
- if (VerifyStatus) {
+ //
+ // 3: Find certificate from DB database and try to verify authenticode struct.
+ //
+ if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {
return EFI_SUCCESS;
} else {
return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
@@ -947,14 +921,14 @@ Done: }
/**
- Verify certificate in WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID format.
+ Verify certificate in WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID format.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Image pass verification.
@retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image fail verification.
@retval other error value
**/
-EFI_STATUS
+EFI_STATUS
VerifyCertUefiGuid (
VOID
)
@@ -1004,7 +978,7 @@ VerifyCertUefiGuid ( if (KekList == NULL) {
return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
}
-
+
//
// Enumerate all Kek items in this list to verify the variable certificate data.
// If anyone is authenticated successfully, it means the variable is correct!
@@ -1024,7 +998,7 @@ VerifyCertUefiGuid ( KekDataSize -= KekList->SignatureListSize;
KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + KekList->SignatureListSize);
}
-
+
if (!IsFound) {
//
// Signed key is not a trust one.
@@ -1041,8 +1015,8 @@ VerifyCertUefiGuid ( Status = FALSE;
goto Done;
}
-
- //
+
+ //
// Set RSA Key Components.
// NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.
//
@@ -1058,13 +1032,13 @@ VerifyCertUefiGuid ( // Verify the signature.
//
Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (
- Rsa,
- mImageDigest,
- mImageDigestSize,
- CertBlock->Signature,
+ Rsa,
+ mImageDigest,
+ mImageDigestSize,
+ CertBlock->Signature,
EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE
);
-
+
Done:
if (KekList != NULL) {
FreePool (KekList);
@@ -1081,13 +1055,31 @@ Done: /**
Provide verification service for signed images, which include both signature validation
- and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and
+ and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and
MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.
-
- In this implementation, only verify external executables when in USER MODE.
- Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored.
- @param[in] AuthenticationStatus
+ In this implementation, only verify external executables when in USER MODE.
+ Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored.
+
+ The image verification process is:
+ Is the Image signed?
+ If yes,
+ Does the image verify against a certificate (root or intermediate) in the allowed db?
+ Run it
+ Image verification fail
+ Is the Image's Hash not in forbidden database and the Image's Hash in allowed db?
+ Run it
+ If no,
+ Is the Image's Hash in the forbidden database (DBX)?
+ if yes,
+ Error out
+ Is the Image's Hash in the allowed database (DB)?
+ If yes,
+ Run it
+ If no,
+ Error out
+
+ @param[in] AuthenticationStatus
This is the authentication status returned from the security
measurement services for the input file.
@param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
@@ -1144,7 +1136,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( // Check the image type and get policy setting.
//
switch (GetImageType (File)) {
-
+
case IMAGE_FROM_FV:
Policy = ALWAYS_EXECUTE;
break;
@@ -1162,7 +1154,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( break;
default:
- Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
break;
}
//
@@ -1188,8 +1180,8 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( if (*SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE) {
FreePool (SecureBootEnable);
return EFI_SUCCESS;
- }
-
+ }
+
SetupMode = GetEfiGlobalVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME);
//
@@ -1216,10 +1208,10 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( }
mImageBase = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer;
mImageSize = FileSize;
- DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) (mImageBase);
+ DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) mImageBase;
if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {
//
- // DOS image header is present,
+ // DOS image header is present,
// so read the PE header after the DOS image header.
//
mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;
@@ -1242,12 +1234,12 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( //
// Use PE32 offset.
//
- mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *)&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
+ mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
} else if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {
//
// Use PE32+ offset.
//
- mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *)&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
+ mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
} else {
//
// Invalid header magic number.
@@ -1268,21 +1260,45 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( //
// This image is not signed.
//
+ if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+ //
+ // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX).
+ //
+ Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+ //
+ // Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).
+ //
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Image Hash is not found in both forbidden and allowed database.
+ //
Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;
- Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
- goto Done;
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ goto Done;
}
+
//
// Verify signature of executables.
//
WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);
switch (WinCertificate->wCertificateType) {
-
+
case WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID:
//
// Verify UEFI GUID type.
- //
+ //
if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {
goto Done;
}
@@ -1295,7 +1311,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( // Verify Pkcs signed data type.
//
Status = HashPeImageByType();
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto Done;
}
@@ -1306,11 +1322,15 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( // no need to check image's hash in the allowed database.
//
if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
}
+ break;
default:
- return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ goto Done;
}
//
// Get image hash value as executable's signature.
@@ -1334,8 +1354,17 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( //
// Verification failure.
//
- Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;
- Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize) &&
+ IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+ //
+ // Verification fail, Image Hash is not in forbidden database (DBX),
+ // and Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).
+ //
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ }
} else if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, Signature->SignatureData, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
//
// Executable signature verification passes, but is found in forbidden signature database.
@@ -1375,10 +1404,10 @@ Done: /**
When VariableWriteArchProtocol install, create "SecureBoot" variable.
-
+
@param[in] Event Event whose notification function is being invoked.
@param[in] Context Pointer to the notification function's context.
-
+
**/
VOID
EFIAPI
@@ -1396,7 +1425,7 @@ VariableWriteCallBack ( if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return;
}
-
+
//
// Check whether "SecureBoot" variable exists.
// If this library is built-in, it means firmware has capability to perform
@@ -1418,7 +1447,7 @@ VariableWriteCallBack ( } else {
FreePool (SecureBootModePtr);
}
-}
+}
/**
Register security measurement handler.
@@ -1439,7 +1468,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor ( //
// Register callback function upon VariableWriteArchProtocol.
- //
+ //
EfiCreateProtocolNotifyEvent (
&gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid,
TPL_CALLBACK,
@@ -1451,5 +1480,5 @@ DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor ( return RegisterSecurityHandler (
DxeImageVerificationHandler,
EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED
- );
+ );
}
|