From e678f9db899adbc986e68b5e400f465c00529121 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: jljusten Date: Tue, 28 May 2013 17:21:37 +0000 Subject: OvmfPkg/SerializeVariablesLib: ignore secure variable restore errors OvmfPkg's file-based NvVar storage is read back as follows at boot (all paths under OvmfPkg/Library/): PlatformBdsPolicyBehavior() [PlatformBdsLib/BdsPlatform.c] PlatformBdsRestoreNvVarsFromHardDisk() VisitAllInstancesOfProtocol for each simple file system: VisitingFileSystemInstance() ConnectNvVarsToFileSystem() [NvVarsFileLib/NvVarsFileLib.c] LoadNvVarsFromFs() [NvVarsFileLib/FsAccess.c] ReadNvVarsFile() +-------------> SerializeVariablesSetSerializedVariables() [SerializeVariablesLib/SerializeVariablesLib.c] | SerializeVariablesIterateInstanceVariables() | +-------------> IterateVariablesInBuffer() | | for each loaded / deserialized variable: | +-|-----------------> IterateVariablesCallbackSetSystemVariable() | | | gRT->SetVariable() | | | | | IterateVariablesInBuffer() stops processing variables as soon as the | | first error is encountered from the callback function. | | | | In this case the callback function is | IterateVariablesCallbackSetSystemVariable(), selected by SerializeVariablesSetSerializedVariables(). The result is that no NvVar is restored from the file after the first gRT->SetVariable() failure. On my system such a failure - never happens in an OVMF build with secure boot disabled, - happens *immediately* with SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE, because the first variable to restore is "AuthVarKeyDatabase". "AuthVarKeyDatabase" has the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set. Since the loop tries to restore it before any keys (PK, KEK etc) are enrolled, gRT->SetVariable() rejects it with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION. Consequently the NvVar restore loop terminates immediately, and we never reach non-authenticated variables such as Boot#### and BootOrder. Until work on KVM-compatible flash emulation converges between qemu and OvmfPkg, improve the SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE boot experience by masking EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION in the callback: - authenticated variables continue to be rejected same as before, but - at least we allow the loop to progress and restore non-authenticated variables, for example boot options. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@14390 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524 --- .../SerializeVariablesLib/SerializeVariablesLib.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'OvmfPkg/Library') diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/SerializeVariablesLib/SerializeVariablesLib.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/SerializeVariablesLib/SerializeVariablesLib.c index 112f20e052..19569b2ae0 100644 --- a/OvmfPkg/Library/SerializeVariablesLib/SerializeVariablesLib.c +++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/SerializeVariablesLib/SerializeVariablesLib.c @@ -284,13 +284,26 @@ IterateVariablesCallbackSetSystemVariable ( IN VOID *Data ) { - return gRT->SetVariable ( - VariableName, - VendorGuid, - Attributes, - DataSize, - Data - ); + EFI_STATUS Status; + STATIC CONST UINT32 AuthMask = + EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | + EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; + + Status = gRT->SetVariable ( + VariableName, + VendorGuid, + Attributes, + DataSize, + Data + ); + + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION && (Attributes & AuthMask) != 0) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_WARN, "%a: setting authenticated variable \"%s\" " + "failed with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION, ignoring\n", __FUNCTION__, + VariableName)); + Status = EFI_SUCCESS; + } + return Status; } -- cgit v1.2.3