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@@ -64,113 +64,31 @@
 
 ### 对数据采集的补救：分布式数据
 
-One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is to keep the data
-dispersed and inconvenient to access. Old-fashioned security cameras
-were no threat to privacy.[(23)](#FOOT23) The recording was stored on
-the premises, and kept for a few weeks at most. Because of the
-inconvenience of accessing these recordings, it was never done
-massively; they were accessed only in the places where someone reported
-a crime. It would not be feasible to physically collect millions of
-tapes every day and watch them or copy them.
+使监控行为不危害隐私的一种方式是保持分布式（dispersed）数据从而难于访问。老式的安保摄像头对隐私很少构成威胁[^23]，由于录像数据存储在安装这些设备的营业场所内，并且至多被保存几周。由于访问这些数据相对困难，这种数据采集行动从未被大规模部署；只有当某人报导一起犯罪行为时，这些影响数据才会被访问。每天对数以百万计的数据卡带进行人工采集再进行观看或复制几乎是不现实的。
 
-使监控行为不危害隐私的一种方式是保持分布式（dispersed）数据从而难于访问。老式的保安摄像头对于隐私很少构成威胁[(23)](#FOOT23)，由于录像数据存储在安装这些设备的营业场所内，并且至多被保存几周。由于访问这些数据相对困难，这种数据采集行动从未被大规模部署；只有当某人报导一起犯罪行为时，这些影响数据才会被访问。每天对数以百万计的数据卡带进行人工采集再进行观看或复制可能是不现实的。
+如今，老式的安保摄像头已经变成了监控摄像机：由于它们被连接到互联网，采集的影像可以传输到一所数据中心并被永久保存。这已经是很危险的了，但事情正在变得更坏。面部识别技术的发展使得这样的事情成为可能：对可疑的新闻记者在街道上进行不间断跟踪以便察看他们同何人交谈。
 
-Nowadays, security cameras have become surveillance cameras: they are
-connected to the internet so recordings can be collected in a data
-center and saved forever. This is already dangerous, but it is going to
-get worse. Advances in face recognition may bring the day when suspected
-journalists can be tracked on the street all the time to see who they
-talk with.
-
-如今，安全摄像机已经变成了监控摄像机：由于它们被连接到互联网，影像记录可以被采集到一所数据中心并被永久保存。这已经是很危险的了，但事情正在变得更坏。面部识别技术的发展使得这样的事情成为可能：对可疑的新闻记者在街道上进行不间断跟踪以便察看他们同何人交谈。
-
-Internet-connected cameras often have lousy digital security themselves,
-so anyone could watch what the camera sees.[(24)](#FOOT24) To restore
-privacy, we should ban the use of internet-connected cameras aimed where
-and when the public is admitted, except when carried by people. Everyone
-must be free to post photos and video recordings occasionally, but the
-systematic accumulation of such data on the internet must be limited.
-
-通常，联网的摄像机自身的数据安全措施极差，使得几乎任何人都能察看它所记录的内容[(24)](#FOOT24)。为了重获隐私，我们应当禁止在针对公众的场合使用联网的摄像机，除非它由人进行操作。每个人必须被允许偶尔发布照片或视频记录，但对于互联网上的相关数据的系统性采集行为必须受到限制。
-
-### Remedy for Internet Commerce Surveillance {#remedy-for-internet-commerce-surveillance .subheading}
+通常，联网摄像机的自身数据安全措施极差，使得几乎任何人都能察看它所记录的内容[^24]。为了重获隐私，我们应当禁止在针对公众的场合使用联网的摄像机，除非它由人来操作。每个人必须被允许偶尔发布照片或视频记录，但对于互联网上相关数据的系统性采集行为必须受到限制。
 
 ### 针对互联网商业监控的补救
 
-Most data collection comes from people’s own digital activities. Usually
-the data is collected first by companies. But when it comes to the
-threat to privacy and democracy, it makes no difference whether
-surveillance is done directly by the state or farmed out to a business,
-because the data that the companies collect is systematically available
-to the state.
-
-大部分数据采集行为来自于人们自身的数字活动。数据通常首先由商业公司进行采集。但是，当讨论监控行为对隐私和民主的威胁的时候，监控行为直接由国家进行或者由商业公司代为进行并无本质区别，由于商业公司所采集的数据，国家也可以系统性地获取。
-
-The NSA, through PRISM, has gotten into the databases of many large
-internet corporations.[(25)](#FOOT25) AT&T has saved all its phone call
-records since 1987 and makes them available to the DEA[(26)](#FOOT26) to
-search on request. Strictly speaking, the US government does not possess
-that data, but in practical terms it may as well possess it.
-
-NSA 通过棱镜计划（PRISM）进入了多家大型互联网公司的数据库[(25)](#FOOT25)。AT&T 自 1987 年起保存了所有通话记录并且允许美国缉毒局（DEA）对其所有数据进行搜索[(26)](#FOOT26)。严格地说，美国政府并不直接拥有这些数据，但它实际上拥有这些数据。
-
-The goal of making journalism and democracy safe therefore requires that
-we reduce the data collected about people by any organization, not just
-by the state. We must redesign digital systems so that they do not
-accumulate data about their users. If they need digital data about our
-transactions, they should not be allowed to keep them more than a short
-time beyond what is inherently necessary for their dealings with us.
-
-因此，为了保证新闻业和民主的安全，我们必须减少由任何组织采集的关于个人的数据，而不仅仅是由国家采集的数据。我们必须这样重新设计各种数字系统以使其不再采集其用户的数据。如果它们确实需要关于我们的重要数字数据，当超出处理数据所需的基本时间以后，它们不应该被允许继续保留那些数据。
-
-One of the motives for the current level of surveillance of the internet
-is that sites are financed through advertising based on tracking users’
-activities and propensities. This converts a mere annoyance—advertising
-that we can learn to ignore—into a surveillance system that harms us
-whether we know it or not. Purchases over the internet also track their
-users. And we are all aware that “privacy policies” are more excuses to
-violate privacy than commitments to uphold it.
+大部分数据采集行为来自于人们自身的数字活动。数据通常首先由商业公司进行采集。但是，当讨论监控行为对隐私和民主的威胁的时候，监控行为直接由国家进行或者由商业公司代为进行并无本质区别，由商业公司所采集的数据，国家也可以系统性地获取。
 
-当前的互联网监控级别的动机之一是网站通过跟踪用户的活动和偏好的广告行为而获得经济支持。这使得广告，作为一种我们可以学会无视之的行为，从一种仅仅是恼人的行为变成了一种对我们造成伤害的监控系统，不论我们是否了解它的内情。互联网购物同样会跟踪用户，我们都已经意识到，所谓的“隐私条款”与其说是维护用户隐私的承诺，不如说是它们用于侵犯用户隐私的借口。
+NSA 通过棱镜计划（PRISM）进入了多家大型互联网公司的数据库[^25]。AT&T 自 1987 年起保存了所有通话记录并且允许美国缉毒局（DEA）搜索其所有数据[^26]。严格地说，美国政府并不直接拥有这些数据，但它实际上确实拥有了这些数据。
 
-We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous
-payments—anonymous for the payer, that is. (We don’t want the payee to
-dodge taxes.) Bitcoin is not anonymous,[(27)](#FOOT27) though there are
-efforts to develop ways to pay anonymously with Bitcoin. However,
-technology for digital cash was first developed in the
-1980s;[(28)](#FOOT28)we need only suitable business arrangements, and
-for the state not to obstruct them.
+因此，为了保证新闻业和民主的安全，我们必须减少由任何组织采集的关于个人的数据，而不仅仅减少由国家采集的数据。我们必须这样重新设计各种数字系统以使其不再采集其用户的数据。如果它们确实需要关于我们的重要数字资料，当超出处理数据所需的基本时间以后，这些机构和个人就不应该被允许继续保留那些数据。
 
-我们可以通过采用一种匿名支付系统——即隐藏付款人的身份——来解决以上两个问题。（我们并不想协助收款人避税。）比特币不是匿名的[(27)](#FOOT27)，尽管有人试图开发出允许使用比特币进行匿名支付的方式。然而，数字货币技术的开发始于 20 世纪 80 年代[(28)](#FOOT28)；我们只需要对商业规则进行适当调整，并且使得国家不会阻止它们。
+当前，互联网监控级别的动机之一是经济支持，即网站通过跟踪用户的活动和偏好而进行的广告行为。这使得广告，作为一种我们可以学会无视之的行为，从一种仅仅是恼人的行为变成了一种对我们造成伤害的监控系统，不论我们是否了解它的内情。互联网购物同样会跟踪用户，我们都已经意识到，所谓的“隐私条款”与其说是维护用户隐私的承诺，不如说是它们用于侵犯用户隐私的借口。
 
-A further threat from sites’ collection of personal data is that
-security breakers might get in, take it, and misuse it. This includes
-customers’ credit card details. An anonymous payment system would end
-this danger: a security hole in the site can’t hurt you if the site
-knows nothing about you.
+我们可以通过采用一种匿名支付系统——即隐藏付款人的身份——来解决以上两个问题（我们并不想协助收款人避税）。比特币不是匿名的[^27]，尽管有人试图开发出允许使用比特币进行匿名支付的方式。然而，数字货币技术的开发始于 20 世纪 80 年代[^28]；我们只需要对商业规则进行适当调整，并且使得国家不会阻止它们。
 
-网站对个人数据的采集的更大的威胁在于破解者可以攻陷安全措施，获取并滥用个人数据。这可能还包括用户的信用卡信息。而匿名支付系统可以终结这种威胁：网站的安全漏洞不会危害您，如果网站并不知道您的任何信息。
-
-### Remedy for Travel Surveillance {#remedy-for-travel-surveillance .subheading}
+网站对个人数据的采集的更大的威胁在于破解者可以攻陷安全措施，获取并滥用个人数据。这可能还包括用户的信用卡信息。而匿名支付系统可以终结这种威胁：如果网站不知道您的任何信息，那么网站的安全漏洞就不会危害到您。
 
 ### 针对旅行监控的补救
 
-We must convert digital toll collection to anonymous payment (using
-digital cash, for instance). License-plate recognition systems recognize
-all license plates, and the data can be kept
-indefinitely;[(29)](#FOOT29) they should be required by law to notice
-and record only those license numbers that are on a list of cars sought
-by court orders. A less secure alternative would record all cars locally
-but only for a few days, and not make the full data available over the
-internet; access to the data should be limited to searching for a list
-of court-ordered license numbers.
-
-我们必须将数字收费系统改为匿名支付系统（例如使用数字货币）。牌照识别系统将会识别各种牌照，而这些数据可以被无限期保存[(29)](#FOOT29)；应该由法律要求它们仅仅记录那些由法庭命令要求追查的牌照号码。另一种不太安全的措施是在本地记录所有车辆牌照，但仅保存几天时间，并且不允许从网络访问所有数据；对数据的访问应该限于搜索一系列由法庭命令要求追查的牌照号码之中。
-
-The US “no-fly” list must be abolished because it is punishment without
-trial.[(30)](#FOOT30)
+我们必须将数字收费系统改为匿名支付系统（例如使用数字货币）。车辆牌照识别系统将会识别各种牌照，而这些数据可以被无限期保存[^29]；应该由法律要求它们仅仅记录那些由法庭命令要求追查的牌照号码。另一种不太安全的措施是在本地记录所有车辆牌照，但仅保存几天时间，并且不允许从网络访问所有数据；对数据的访问应该限于搜索一系列由法庭命令要求追查的牌照号码之中。
 
-美国“禁飞黑名单”必须被废除，由于这是一种未经审判的刑罚[(30)](#FOOT30)。
+美国“禁飞黑名单”必须被废除，由于这是一种未经审判的刑罚[^30]。
 
 It is acceptable to have a list of people whose person and luggage will
 be searched with extra care, and anonymous passengers on domestic
@@ -179,329 +97,119 @@ acceptable to bar non-citizens, if they are not permitted to enter the
 country at all, from boarding flights to the country. This ought to be
 enough for all legitimate purposes.
 
-要求对某个黑名单上的乘客的行李进行额外的搜查是可以接受的，国内航班上的匿名乘客可以被视为在此黑名单之上。禁止非某国公民登上飞往该国的航班也是可以接受的，如果他们甚至未被批准入境。这些措施对于任何法律目的都是足够的。
-
-Many mass transit systems use some kind of smart cards or RFIDs for
-payment. These systems accumulate personal data: if you once make the
-mistake of paying with anything but cash, they associate the card
-permanently with your name. Furthermore, they record all travel
-associated with each card. Together they amount to massive surveillance.
-This data collection must be reduced.
+要求对黑名单上某个乘客的行李进行额外的搜查是可以接受的，国内航班上的匿名乘客可以视为在此黑名单上。禁止非某国公民登上飞往该国的航班也是可以接受的，如果他们根本没被批准入境。这些措施对于任何法律目的都是足够的。
 
 很多公共交通系统使用某种智能卡或者射频识别（RFID）设备进行支付。这些系统将会采集个人数据：只要您错误地使用现金以外的任何方式进行支付，它们将会将此卡片和您的姓名永久关联起来。接下来，它们将会记录与每块卡片相关联的所有出行信息。这些行为加起来已经构成了大规模监控，这样的数据采集必须被限制。
 
-Navigation services do surveillance: the user’s computer tells the map
-service the user’s location and where the user wants to go; then the
-server determines the route and sends it back to the user’s computer,
-which displays it. Nowadays, the server probably records the user’s
-locations, since there is nothing to prevent it. This surveillance is
-not inherently necessary, and redesign could avoid it: free/libre
-software in the user’s computer could download map data for the
-pertinent regions (if not downloaded previously), compute the route, and
-display it, without ever telling anyone where the user is or wants to
-go.
-
 导航服务也会进行监控：用户的计算机将用户的所在地和目的地告知地图服务；而后服务器确定路线，返回用户的计算机并且显示出来。现在，服务器很可能会记录用户的位置信息，由于没有什么措施能够阻止它们这样做。这种监控行为本质上并不必要，并且可以通过重新设计来解决：用户计算机中的自由软件将会下载相关地区的地图数据（如果之前从未下载），计算出最佳路线并且显示出来，而无需告知任何人用户的所在地或目的地。
 
-Systems for borrowing bicycles, etc., can be designed so that the
-borrower’s identity is known only inside the station where the item was
-borrowed. Borrowing would inform all stations that the item is “out,” so
-when the user returns it at any station (in general, a different one),
-that station will know where and when that item was borrowed. It will
-inform the other station that the item is no longer “out.” It will also
-calculate the user’s bill, and send it (after waiting some random number
-of minutes) to headquarters along a ring of stations, so that
-headquarters would not find out which station the bill came from. Once
-this is done, the return station would forget all about the transaction.
-If an item remains “out” for too long, the station where it was borrowed
-can inform headquarters; in that case, it could send the borrower’s
-identity immediately.
-
 用于诸如自行车租借等目的的系统可以这样设计：租借者的身份仅在其借出物品的站点内可知。物品借出时，将会通知所有站点某件物品处于借出状态，这样，当用户将物品返还回任何站点（通常是另一处站点）的时候，该站点将会获知该物品被借出的时间和地点，同时将会告知所有其他站点该物品不再处于借出状态。站点还会计算用户的账单并将账单信息（等待随机长度的时间之后）沿着一系列环形拓扑结构的站点之间的线路发送至总部。这样，总部将不会获知账单信息来自哪个站点。当这一操作完成后，归还站点将会忘记所有与这笔已完成的业务有关的信息。如果某一物品长时间处于借出状态，借出该物品的站点将会告知总部。此时，它可以立即发送借用者的身份信息。
 
-### Remedy for Communications Dossiers {#remedy-for-communications-dossiers .subheading}
-
 ### 关于通讯档案的补救
 
-Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive data
-on their users’ contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc.). With mobile
-phones, they also record the user’s physical location.[(31)](#FOOT31)
-They keep these dossiers for a long time: over 30 years, in the case of
-AT&T. Soon they will even record the user’s body
-activities.[(32)](#FOOT32) It appears that the NSA collects cell phone
-location data in bulk.[(33)](#FOOT33)\
-
-互联网服务供应商（ISP）和电信公司保存着它们的用户的联系人的海量数据（浏览、通话记录等）。对于移动电话，还会记录用户的物理位置[(31)](#FOOT31)，例如 AT&T 已保存了超过 30 年。不久以后它们甚至还会记录用户的身体活动[(32)](#FOOT32)。并且 NSA 很可能正在大规模采集移动电话的物理位置数据[(33)](#FOOT33)。
-
-Unmonitored communication is impossible where systems create such
-dossiers. So it should be illegal to create or keep them. ISPs and phone
-companies must not be allowed to keep this information for very long, in
-the absence of a court order to surveil a certain party.
+互联网服务供应商（ISP）和电信公司保存着海量的用户联系人信息（浏览、通话记录等）。对于移动电话，还会记录用户的物理位置[^31]，例如 AT&T 已保存了超过 30 年。不久以后它们甚至还会记录用户的身体活动[^32]。并且 NSA 很可能正在大规模采集移动电话的物理位置数据[^33]。
 
 只要通讯系统创建这样的通讯档案，不受监视的通讯就不可能实现。因此创建或记录这些通讯档案应该被判定为非法。ISP 和电信公司必须不被允许长期保存这些信息，或者在没有法庭命令的情况下长期监控某一特定人群。
 
-This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won’t physically
-stop the government from collecting all the information immediately as
-it is generated—which is what the US does with some or all phone
-companies.[(34)](#FOOT34) We would have to rely on prohibiting that by
-law. However, that would be better than the current situation, where the
-relevant law (the PAT RIOT Act) does not clearly prohibit the practice.
-In addition, if the government did resume this sort of surveillance, it
-would not get data about everyone’s phone calls made prior to that time.
+这种解决方案并不完全令人满意，由于这实际上并不能阻止政府在通讯信息生成的时候立即对其进行采集——这正是美国政府对部分或全部电信公司所做的[^34]。我们可能必须依靠法律禁止这种行为。但是，这种假设比现实的状况好得多，现实中的相关法律（美国爱国者法案，我称之为 PAT RIOT Act）并不明确禁止这种行为。此外，如果政府重启这种监控，它不应得到重启监控的时间点之前发生的每位用户的通话记录数据。
 
-这种解决方案并不是完全令人满意，由于这并不能实际上阻止政府在通讯信息生成的时候立即对其进行采集——这正是美国政府对部分或全部电信公司所做的[(34)](#FOOT34)。我们可能想要依靠法律禁止这种行为。但是，这种假设比现实的状况好得多，现实中的相关法律（美国爱国者法案，我称之为 PAT RIOT Act）并不明确禁止这种行为。此外，如果政府重启这种监控，它不应得到重启监控的时间点之前发生的每位用户的通话记录数据。
-
-For privacy about who you exchange email with, a simple partial solution
-is for you and others to use email services in a country that would
-never cooperate with your own government, and which communicate with
-each other using encryption. However, Ladar Levison (owner of the mail
-service Lavabit that US surveillance sought to corrupt completely) has a
-more sophisticated idea for an encryption system through which your
-email service would know only that you sent mail to some user of my
-email service, and my email service would know only that I received mail
-from some user of your email service, but it would be hard to determine
-that you had sent mail to me.
-
-为了保护您的电子邮件联系人的隐私，一种简单的方式是您和他人都使用某个不会与您所在国家政府进行合作的国家提供的邮件服务，并且在通讯过程中使用加密。然而，Ladar Levison（Lavabit 的拥有者，美国监控系统试图对其邮件服务实现完全控制）提出了一种更为高级的加密系统设想：您向我的邮件服务的某位客户发送邮件，我的邮件服务所知道的只是我收到了来自您所使用的邮件服务的某位用户的邮件，但难以确认是您向我发送了邮件。
-
-### But Some Surveillance Is Necessary {#but-some-surveillance-is-necessary .subheading}
+为了保护您的电子邮件联系人的隐私，一种简单的方式是您和他人都使用某个不会与您所在国家政府进行合作的国家提供的邮件服务，并且在通讯过程中使用加密。然而，Ladar Levison（Lavabit 的拥有者，美国监控系统试图对其邮件服务实现完全控制）提出了一种更为高级的加密系统设想：您向我的邮件服务的某位用户发送邮件，我的邮件服务所知道的只是我收到了来自您所使用的邮件服务的某位用户的邮件，但难以确认是您向我发送了邮件。
 
 ### 但是，适度的监控是必需的
 
-For the state to find criminals, it needs to be able to investigate
-specific crimes, or specific suspected planned crimes, under a court
-order. With the internet, the power to tap phone conversations would
-naturally extend to the power to tap internet connections. This power is
-easy to abuse for political reasons, but it is also necessary.
-Fortunately, this won’t make it possible to find whistleblowers after
-the fact, if (as I recommend) we prevent digital systems from
-accumulating massive dossiers before the fact.
-
 国家为了缉捕罪犯，它需要能够在法庭命令下调查特定的犯罪行为或者疑似犯罪预谋。在互联网时代，监听通话的权力自然延伸到监听互联网连接的权力。这种权力容易出于政治原因而被滥用，但这也是必需的。幸运的是，这并不会使得在案件发生之后找到揭露者变为可能，如果（如我所建议的）能够阻止数字系统在事件发生之前进行大规模档案信息采集。
 
-Individuals with special state-granted power, such as police, forfeit
-their right to privacy and must be monitored. (In fact, police have
-their own jargon term for perjury, “testilying,”[(35)](#FOOT35) since
-they do it so frequently, particularly about protesters and
-photographers.[(36)](#FOOT36)) One city in California that required
-police to wear video cameras all the time found their use of force fell
-by 60 percent.[(37)](#FOOT37) The ACLU is in favor of this.
-
-拥有国家赋予的权力的个人，例如警察，将被收回个人的隐私权并且必须被监视。（事实上，警察拥有属于他们自己的伪证罪的别名 testilying[(35)](#FOOT35)。由于他们经常做出这样的事情，特别是对于抗议者和摄影师[(36)](#FOOT36)。）加州的某个城市要求警察随时随身携带摄像机之后，他们的武力使用下降了 60% [(37)](#FOOT37)。ACLU 对此表示欢迎。
+拥有国家赋予权力的个人，例如警察，将被收回个人的隐私权并且必须被监视（事实上，警察拥有属于他们自己的伪证罪别名“testilying”[^35]。由于他们经常做出这样的事情，特别是对抗议者和摄影师[^36]。加州的某个城市要求警察随时随身携带摄像机之后，他们的武力使用下降了 60% [^37]。ACLU 对此表示欢迎。
 
-Corporations are not people, and not entitled to human
-rights.[(38)](#FOOT38) It is legitimate to require businesses to publish
-the details of processes that might cause chemical, biological, nuclear,
-fiscal, computational (e.g., DRM[(39)](#FOOT39)) or political (e.g.,
-lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for public
-well-being. The danger of these operations (consider the BP oil spill,
-the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs that of
-terrorism.
-
-商业公司不是自然人，因此不应被赋予自然人的权利[(38)](#FOOT38)。要求商业公司公开其行为的细节是正当合理的，这些行为可能会造成对社会的化学、生物、核、财政、计算机相关（例如数字版权管理 DRM [(39)](#FOOT39)）或者政治（例如游说拉票行为）等方面的危害，这些危害级别必须被控制在公众幸福所要求的范围以内。这些行为造成的危害（考虑诸如墨西哥湾漏油事件、福岛核电站事故、2008 年财政危机等）更甚于恐怖主义。
-
-However, journalism must be protected from surveillance even when it is
-carried out as part of a business.
+商业公司不是自然人，因此不应被赋予自然人的权利[^38]。要求商业公司公开其行为的细节是正当合理的，这些行为可能会造成对社会的化学、生物、核、财政、计算机相关（例如数字版权管理 DRM[^39]）或者政治（例如游说拉票行为）等方面的危害，这些危害必须被控制在公众福祉所要求的范围以内。这些行为所造成的危害（考虑诸如墨西哥湾漏油事件、福岛核电站事故、2008 年财政危机等）更甚于恐怖主义。
 
 然而，新闻业必须被保护免遭监控，即使这种监控行为是作为某项业务的一部分而被执行的。
 
-Digital technology has brought about a tremendous increase in the level
-of surveillance of our movements, actions, and communications. It is far
-more than we experienced in the 1990s, and far more than people behind
-the Iron Curtain experienced in the 1980s,[(40)](#FOOT40) and proposed
-legal limits on state use of the accumulated data would not alter that.
-
-数字技术的进展极大地提高了我们的出行、活动和通讯所受的监控水平。这种监控水平远远超过了 20 世纪 90 年代我们所经历过的，也远远超过了 20 世纪 80 年代生活在铁幕笼罩之下的人们所经历的[(40)](#FOOT40)。而提议对国家使用采集到的数据进行法律限制并不能改变这种状况。
-
-Companies are designing even more intrusive surveillance. Some project
-that pervasive surveillance, hooked to companies such as Facebook, could
-have deep effects on how people think.[(41)](#FOOT41)Such possibilities
-are imponderable; but the threat to democracy is not speculation. It
-exists and is visible today.
-
-商业公司正在设计更具侵略性的监控设施。一些充斥着监控行为的工程依附于诸如 Facebook 之类的公司，它们可能对人们的思考方式产生深远的影响[(41)](#FOOT41)。这样的可能性是不可预测的；然而它对民主的威胁已经不是推测。这种威胁无处不在，随时可见。
-
-Unless we believe that our free countries previously suffered from a
-grave surveillance deficit, and ought to be surveilled more than the
-Soviet Union and East Germany were, we must reverse this increase. That
-requires stopping the accumulation of big data about people.
-
-除非我们坚信我们的自由国家之前的监控行为严重欠缺，并且我们理应受到更甚于苏联和联邦德国那样的监控。否则我们必须逆转这种监控升级的趋势，这依赖于阻止对民众的大数据进行大规模采集。
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-### Footnotes
-
-### [(1)](#DOCF1)
-
-@raggedright Maira Sutton, “We’re TPP Activists: Reddit Asked Us Everything,” 21 November 2013, <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/reddit-tpp-ama>. @end raggedright
-
-### [(2)](#DOCF2)
-
-@raggedright Glyn Moody, “How Can Any Company Ever Trust Microsoft Again?” 17 June 2013, <http://www.computerworlduk.com/blogs/open-enterprise/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again-3569376/>. @end raggedright
-
-### [(3)](#DOCF3)
-
-@raggedright James Ball, Julian Borger and Glenn Greenwald, “Revealed: How US and UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security,” 6 September 2013, <http://theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security>. @end raggedright
-
-### [(4)](#DOCF4)
-
-@raggedright Bruce Schneier, “Want to Evade NSA Spying? Don’t Connect to the Internet,” 7 October 2013, <http://www.wired.com/2013/10/149481/>. @end raggedright
-
-### [(5)](#DOCF5)
-
-@raggedright Dan Roberts, “Patriot Act Author Prepares Bill to Put NSA Bulk Collection ’Out of Business,’” 10 October 2013, <http://theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill>. @end raggedright
-
-### [(6)](#DOCF6)
-
-@raggedright Lucy Dalglish, “Lessons from Wye River,” The News Media & the Law (Summer 2011): p. 1, [http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river](http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/%3Cbr%3Enews-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river). @end raggedright
-
-### [(7)](#DOCF7)
-
-@raggedright Washington Agencies, “Yemen leak: former FBI man admits passing information to Associated Press,” 24 September 2013, [http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press](http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/%3Cbr%3Esep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press). @end raggedright
-
-### [(8)](#DOCF8)
-
-@raggedright 参见 “Verizon forced to hand over telephone data—full court ruling” (6 June 2013) 位于 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order>，以获得关于美国外国情报监控法庭（FISA）之下美国政府采集 Verizon 旗下数以百万计的美国客户的通话记录的信息。 @end raggedright
-
-### [(9)](#DOCF9)
-
-@raggedright Siobhan Gorman, Evan Perez, and Janet Hook, “NSA Data-Mining Digs into Networks Beyond Verizon,” 7 June 2013, <http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07>. @end raggedright
-
-### [(10)](#DOCF10)
-
-@raggedright ACLU, “Policing Free Speech: Police Surveillance And Obstruction of First Amendment-Protected Activity,” 29 June 2010, <https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf>. @end raggedright
-
-### [(11)](#DOCF11)
-
-@raggedright David Kravets, Kim Zetter, Kevin Poulsen, “NSA Illegally Gorged on U.S. Phone Records for Three Years,” 10 September 2013, <http://www.wired.com/2013/09/nsa-violations/>. @end raggedright
-
-### [(12)](#DOCF12)
-
-@raggedright Adam Gabbatt and agencies, “NSA Analysts ‘Wilfully Violated’ Surveillance Systems, Agency Admits,” 24 August 2013, <http://theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems>. @end raggedright
-
-### [(13)](#DOCF13)
-
-@raggedright M. L. Elrick, “Cops Tap Database to Harass, Intimidate,” 31 July 2001, <http://sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm#.VeQiuxcpDow>. @end raggedright
-
-### [(14)](#DOCF14)
-
-@raggedright Rick Falkvinge, “Collected Personal Data Will Always Be Used against the Citizens,” 17 March 2012, <http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/>. @end raggedright
-
-### [(15)](#DOCF15)
-
-@raggedright 考虑二战期间被收容的日裔美国人。 @end raggedright
-
-### [(16)](#DOCF16)
-
-@raggedright Mike Masnick, “Second OPM Hack Revealed: Even Worse Than the First,” 12 June 2015, <https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150612/16334231330/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first.shtml>. @end raggedright
-
-### [(17)](#DOCF17)
-
-@raggedright Joanna Berendt, “Macedonia Government Is Blamed for Wiretapping Scandal,” 21 June 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html?_r=0>. @end raggedright
-
-### [(18)](#DOCF18)
-
-@raggedright “International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance,” last modified May 2014, <https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text>. @end raggedright
-
-### [(19)](#DOCF19)
-
-@raggedright Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, “Officials Say U.S. Wiretaps Exceeded Law,” 15 April 2009, <http://nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html>. @end raggedright
-
-### [(20)](#DOCF20)
-
-@raggedright 几十年来，自由软件运动一直致力于揭露私有软件公司诸如微软和苹果的专权的监控机制。监控行为已经在各行业之间蔓延，而不再限于软件产业，并且——离开键盘的限制——进入移动计算业界，在办公室、家庭、交通工具、教室内等。如需获知监控行为进入这些领域的不断增加的方式，参见<http://gnu.org/philosophy/proprietary/proprietary-surveillance.html>. @end raggedright
-
-### [(21)](#DOCF21)
-
-@raggedright 参见 “Who Does That Server Really Serve?” (@pageref{Server})一文以获取更多信息。 @end raggedright
+数字技术的发展极大地提高了我们的出行、活动和通讯所受的监控水平。这种监控水平远远超过了 20 世纪 90 年代我们所经历过的，也远远超过了 20 世纪 80 年代生活在铁幕笼罩之下的人们所经历的[^40]。而提议国家对使用采集到的数据进行法律限制并不能改变这种状况。
 
-### [(22)](#DOCF22)
+商业公司正在设计更具侵略性的监控设施。一些充斥着监控行为的项目依附于诸如 Facebook 之类的公司，它们可能对人们的思考方式产生深远的影响[^41]。这样的可能性是不可预测的；然而它对民主的威胁已经不是推测。这种威胁无处不在，随时可见。
 
-@raggedright Nicole Perlroth, “In Cybersecurity, Sometimes the Weakest Link Is a Family Member,” 21 May 2014, [http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/](http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/%3Cbr%3Ein-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/). @end raggedright
+除非我们坚信我们自由的国家之前的监控行为严重欠缺，并且我们理应受到更甚于苏联和民主德国（东德）那样的监控。否则我们必须逆转这种监控升级的趋势，这依赖于阻止对民众的大数据进行大规模采集。
 
-### [(23)](#DOCF23)
+[^1]: Maira Sutton, “We’re TPP Activists: Reddit Asked Us Everything,” 21 November 2013, <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/reddit-tpp-ama>. 
 
-@raggedright 我在此假定安全摄像机用于诸如商店内部或大街上。任何由其他人架设的对准某人私人空间的摄像机侵犯了隐私，但这是另一个问题。 @end raggedright
+[^2]: Glyn Moody, “How Can Any Company Ever Trust Microsoft Again?” 17 June 2013, <http://www.computerworlduk.com/blogs/open-enterprise/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again-3569376/>. 
 
-### [(24)](#DOCF24)
+[^3]: James Ball, Julian Borger and Glenn Greenwald, “Revealed: How US and UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security,” 6 September 2013, <http://theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security>. 
 
-@raggedright Ms. Smith, “CIA Wants to Spy On You through Your Appliances,” 18 March 2012, [http://networkworld.com/article/2221934/microsoft-subnet/cia-wants-to-spy-on-you-through-your-appliances.html](http://networkworld.com/article/2221934/%3Cbr%3Emicrosoft-subnet/cia-wants-to-spy-on-you-through-your-appliances.html). @end raggedright
+[^4]: Bruce Schneier, “Want to Evade NSA Spying? Don’t Connect to the Internet,” 7 October 2013, <http://www.wired.com/2013/10/149481/>. 
 
-### [(25)](#DOCF25)
+[^5]: Dan Roberts, “Patriot Act Author Prepares Bill to Put NSA Bulk Collection ’Out of Business,’” 10 October 2013, <http://theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill>. 
 
-@raggedright Jon Queally, “Latest Docs Show Financial Ties between NSA and Internet Companies,” 23 August 2013, <http://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/08/23/latest-docs-show-financial-ties-between-nsa-and-internet-companies>. @end raggedright
+[^6]: Lucy Dalglish, “Lessons from Wye River,” The News Media & the Law (Summer 2011): p. 1, [http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river](http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/%3Cbr%3Enews-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river). 
 
-### [(26)](#DOCF26)
+[^7]:  Washington Agencies, “Yemen leak: former FBI man admits passing information to Associated Press,” 24 September 2013, [http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press](http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/%3Cbr%3Esep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press). 
 
-@raggedright Scott Shane and Colin Moynihan, “Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove, Eclipsing N.S.A.’s,” 1 September 2013,
-[http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/%3Cbr%3Edrug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0). @end raggedright
+[^8]:  参见 “Verizon forced to hand over telephone data—full court ruling” (6 June 2013) 位于 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order>，以获得关于美国外国情报监控法庭（FISA）之下美国政府采集 Verizon 旗下数以百万计的美国客户的通话记录的信息。 
 
-### [(27)](#DOCF27)
+[^9]: Siobhan Gorman, Evan Perez, and Janet Hook, “NSA Data-Mining Digs into Networks Beyond Verizon,” 7 June 2013, <http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07>. 
 
-@raggedright Dan Kaminsky, “Let’s Cut through the Bitcoin Hype: A Hacker-Entrepreneur’s Take,” 3 May 2013, [http://wired.com/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/](http://wired.com/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-%3Cbr%3Ebitcoin-hype/). @end raggedright
+[^10]: ACLU, “Policing Free Speech: Police Surveillance And Obstruction of First Amendment-Protected Activity,” 29 June 2010, <https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf>. 
 
-### [(28)](#DOCF28)
+[^11]:  David Kravets, Kim Zetter, Kevin Poulsen, “NSA Illegally Gorged on U.S. Phone Records for Three Years,” 10 September 2013, <http://www.wired.com/2013/09/nsa-violations/>. 
 
-@raggedright Steven Levy, “E-Money (That’s What I Want),” Wired, 2.12 (December 1994), <http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html>. @end raggedright
+[^12]:  Adam Gabbatt and agencies, “NSA Analysts ‘Wilfully Violated’ Surveillance Systems, Agency Admits,” 24 August 2013, <http://theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems>. 
 
-### [(29)](#DOCF29)
+[^13]:  M. L. Elrick, “Cops Tap Database to Harass, Intimidate,” 31 July 2001, <http://sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm#.VeQiuxcpDow>. 
 
-@raggedright Richard Bilton, “Camera Grid to Log Number Plates,” last updated on 22 May 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/whos_watching_you/8064333.stm>. @end raggedright
+[^14]:  Rick Falkvinge, “Collected Personal Data Will Always Be Used against the Citizens,” 17 March 2012, <http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/>. 
 
-### [(30)](#DOCF30)
+ [^15]: 考虑二战期间被收容的日裔美国人。 
 
-@raggedright Nusrat Choudhury, “Victory! Federal Court Recognizes Constitutional Rights of Americans on the No-Fly List,” 29 August 2013, [https://www.aclu.org/blog/victory-federal-court-recognizes-constitutional-rights-americans-no-fly-list](https://www.aclu.org/blog/victory-federal-court-recognizes-constitutional-rights-americans-%3Cbr%3Eno-fly-list). @end raggedright
+ [^16]: Mike Masnick, “Second OPM Hack Revealed: Even Worse Than the First,” 12 June 2015, <https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150612/16334231330/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first.shtml>. 
 
-### [(31)](#DOCF31)
+ [^17]: Joanna Berendt, “Macedonia Government Is Blamed for Wiretapping Scandal,” 21 June 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html?_r=0>. 
 
-@raggedright Kai Biermann, “Betrayed by Our Own Data,” 26 March 2011, <http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz>. @end raggedright
+ [^18]: “International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance,” last modified May 2014, <https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text>. 
 
-### [(32)](#DOCF32)
+ [^19]: Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, “Officials Say U.S. Wiretaps Exceeded Law,” 15 April 2009, <http://nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html>. 
 
-@raggedright Sara M. Watson, “The Latest Smartphones Could Turn Us All into Activity Trackers,” 10 October 2013, [http://wired.com/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/](http://wired.com/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-%3Cbr%3Eof-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-%3Cbr%3Eactivity-trackers/). @end raggedright
+ [^20]: 几十年来，自由软件运动一直致力于揭露私有软件公司诸如微软和苹果的专权的监控机制。监控行为已经在各行业之间蔓延，而不再限于软件产业，并且——离开键盘的限制——进入移动计算领域，在办公室、家庭、交通工具、教室内等。如需获知监控行为进入这些领域的不断增加的方式，参见<http://gnu.org/philosophy/proprietary/proprietary-surveillance.html>. 
 
-### [(33)](#DOCF33)
+ [^21]: 参见《服务器真正是在为谁服务？》一文以获取更多信息。
 
-@raggedright Patrick Toomey, “It Sure Sounds Like the NSA Is Tracking Our Locations,” 30 September 2013, [https://aclu.org/blog/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-our-locations](https://aclu.org/blog/it-%3Cbr%3Esure-sounds-nsa-tracking-our-locations). @end raggedright
+ [^22]: Nicole Perlroth, “In Cybersecurity, Sometimes the Weakest Link Is a Family Member,” 21 May 2014, [http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/](http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/%3Cbr%3Ein-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/). 
 
-### [(34)](#DOCF34)
+ [^23]: 我在此假定安保摄像头用于诸如商店内部或大街上。任何由其他人架设的对准某人私人空间的摄像机侵犯了隐私，但这是另一个问题。 
 
-@raggedright Glenn Greenwald, “NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily,” 6 June 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order>. @end raggedright
+ [^24]: Ms. Smith, “CIA Wants to Spy On You through Your Appliances,” 18 March 2012, [http://networkworld.com/article/2221934/microsoft-subnet/cia-wants-to-spy-on-you-through-your-appliances.html](http://networkworld.com/article/2221934/%3Cbr%3Emicrosoft-subnet/cia-wants-to-spy-on-you-through-your-appliances.html). 
 
-### [(35)](#DOCF35)
+ [^25]: Jon Queally, “Latest Docs Show Financial Ties between NSA and Internet Companies,” 23 August 2013, <http://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/08/23/latest-docs-show-financial-ties-between-nsa-and-internet-companies>. 
 
-@raggedright See, for instance, the articles “Testilying: Cops Are Liars Who Get Away with Perjury” (Nick Malinowski, 3 February 2013, [http://vice.com/read/testilying-cops-are-liars-who-get-away-with-perjury](http://vice.com/read/%3Cbr%3Etestilying-cops-are-liars-who-get-away-with-perjury)) and “Detective Is Found Guilty of Planting Drugs” (Tim Stelloh, 1 November 2011, [http://nytimes.com/2011/11/02/nyregion/brooklyn-detective-convicted-of-planting-drugs-on-innocent-people.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0](http://nytimes.com/2011/11/02/nyregion/brooklyn-detective-convicted-of-%3Cbr%3Eplanting-drugs-on-innocent-people.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)), for examples of the extent to which this practice has been normalized. @end raggedright
+ [^26]: Scott Shane and Colin Moynihan, “Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove, Eclipsing N.S.A.’s,” 1 September 2013,
+[http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/%3Cbr%3Edrug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0). 
 
-### [(36)](#DOCF36)
+ [^27]: Dan Kaminsky, “Let’s Cut through the Bitcoin Hype: A Hacker-Entrepreneur’s Take,” 3 May 2013, [http://wired.com/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/](http://wired.com/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-%3Cbr%3Ebitcoin-hype/). 
 
-@raggedright See the Photography Is Not a Crime web site, at <http://photographyisnotacrime.com/>, for more on this issue. @end raggedright
+ [^28]: Steven Levy, “E-Money (That’s What I Want),” Wired, 2.12 (December 1994), <http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html>. 
 
-### [(37)](#DOCF37)
+ [^29]: Richard Bilton, “Camera Grid to Log Number Plates,” last updated on 22 May 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/whos_watching_you/8064333.stm>. 
 
-@raggedright Kevin Drum,“Ubiquitous Surveillance, Police Edition,” 22 August 2013, [http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition](http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-%3Cbr%3Epolice-edition). @end raggedright
+ [^30]: Nusrat Choudhury, “Victory! Federal Court Recognizes Constitutional Rights of Americans on the No-Fly List,” 29 August 2013, [https://www.aclu.org/blog/victory-federal-court-recognizes-constitutional-rights-americans-no-fly-list](https://www.aclu.org/blog/victory-federal-court-recognizes-constitutional-rights-americans-%3Cbr%3Eno-fly-list). 
 
-### [(38)](#DOCF38)
+ [^31]: Kai Biermann, “Betrayed by Our Own Data,” 26 March 2011, <http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz>. 
 
-@raggedright Public Citizen, “Call Your Representative: Tell Her or Him to Co-Sponsor a Constitutional Amendment to Overturn Citizens United and Restore Democracy to the People,” accessed August 2015, <http://action.citizen.org/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=12266>. @end raggedright
+ [^32]: Sara M. Watson, “The Latest Smartphones Could Turn Us All into Activity Trackers,” 10 October 2013, [http://wired.com/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/](http://wired.com/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-%3Cbr%3Eof-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-%3Cbr%3Eactivity-trackers/). 
 
-### [(39)](#DOCF39)
+ [^33]: Patrick Toomey, “It Sure Sounds Like the NSA Is Tracking Our Locations,” 30 September 2013, [https://aclu.org/blog/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-our-locations](https://aclu.org/blog/it-%3Cbr%3Esure-sounds-nsa-tracking-our-locations). 
 
-@raggedright See the related section in “Words to Avoid (or User with Care)” (@pageref{DRM}) for more on this. @end raggedright
+ [^34]: Glenn Greenwald, “NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily,” 6 June 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order>. 
 
-### [(40)](#DOCF40)
+ [^35]: 一些例子“Testilying: Cops Are Liars Who Get Away with Perjury” (Nick Malinowski, 3 February 2013, [http://vice.com/read/testilying-cops-are-liars-who-get-away-with-perjury](http://vice.com/read/%3Cbr%3Etestilying-cops-are-liars-who-get-away-with-perjury)) 以及 “Detective Is Found Guilty of Planting Drugs” (Tim Stelloh, 1 November 2011, [http://nytimes.com/2011/11/02/nyregion/brooklyn-detective-convicted-of-planting-drugs-on-innocent-people.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0](http://nytimes.com/2011/11/02/nyregion/brooklyn-detective-convicted-of-%3Cbr%3Eplanting-drugs-on-innocent-people.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0))
 
-@raggedright James Allworth, “Your Smartphone Works for the Surveillance State,” 7 June 2013, <https://hbr.org/2013/06/your-iphone-works-for-the-secret-police>. @end raggedright
+ [^36]: 关于这一点参见“摄影不是犯罪”网站 <http://photographyisnotacrime.com/> 
 
-### [(41)](#DOCF41)
+ [^37]: Kevin Drum,“Ubiquitous Surveillance, Police Edition,” 22 August 2013, [http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition](http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-%3Cbr%3Epolice-edition). 
 
-@raggedright Evan Selinger and Brett Frischmann, “Will the Internet of Things Result in Predictable People?” 10 August 2015, <http://theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/10/internet-of-things-predictable-people>. @end raggedright
+ [^38]: Public Citizen, “Call Your Representative: Tell Her or Him to Co-Sponsor a Constitutional Amendment to Overturn Citizens United and Restore Democracy to the People,” August 2015, <http://action.citizen.org/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=12266>. 
 
-</div>
+ [^39]: 参见《应避免使用（或慎用）的词语》一文中有关 DRM 的叙述。
 
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+ [^40]: James Allworth, “Your Smartphone Works for the Surveillance State,” 7 June 2013, <https://hbr.org/2013/06/your-iphone-works-for-the-secret-police>. 
 
-This document was generated by *tonghuix* on *March 25, 2016* using
-[*texi2html 1.82*](http://www.nongnu.org/texi2html/).\
+ [^41]: Evan Selinger and Brett Frischmann, “Will the Internet of Things Result in Predictable People?” 10 August 2015, <http://theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/10/internet-of-things-predictable-people>.