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+1. How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand? {#how-much-surveillance-can-democracy-withstand .chapter}
+=================================================
+
+Thanks to Edward Snowden’s disclosures, we know that the current level
+of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human rights.
+The repeated harassment and prosecution of dissidents, sources, and
+journalists in the US and elsewhere provides confirmation. We need to
+reduce the level of general surveillance, but how far? Where exactly is
+the *maximum tolerable level of surveillance,* which we must ensure is
+not exceeded? It is the level beyond which surveillance starts to
+interfere with the functioning of democracy, in that whistleblowers
+(such as Snowden) are likely to be caught.
+
+Faced with government secrecy, we the people depend on whistleblowers to
+tell us what the state is doing.[(1)](#FOOT1) However, today’s
+surveillance intimidates potential whistleblowers, which means it is too
+much. To recover our democratic control over the state, we must reduce
+surveillance to the point where whistleblowers know they are safe.
+
+Using free/libre software, as I’ve advocated for 30 years, is the first
+step in taking control of our digital lives, and that includes
+preventing surveillance. We can’t trust nonfree software; the NSA
+uses[(2)](#FOOT2) and even creates[(3)](#FOOT3) security weaknesses in
+nonfree software to invade our own computers and routers. Free software
+gives us control of our own computers, but that won’t protect our
+privacy once we set foot on the internet.[(4)](#FOOT4)
+@firstcopyingnotice{{@footnoterule @smallskip Copyright © 2015 Richard
+Stallman\
+ {A version of this article was first published on the [Wired](Wired)
+web site under the same title (Wired, 14 October 2013,
+<http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/a-necessary-evil-what-it-takes-for-democracy-to-survive-surveillance>).
+This version is part of @fsfsthreecite}
+
+Bipartisan legislation to “curtail the domestic surveillance
+powers”[(5)](#FOOT5) in the US is being drawn up, but it relies on
+limiting the government’s use of our virtual dossiers. That won’t
+suffice to protect whistleblowers if “catching the whistleblower” is
+grounds for access sufficient to identify him or her. We need to go
+further.
+
+### The Upper Limit on Surveillance in a Democracy {#the-upper-limit-on-surveillance-in-a-democracy .subheading}
+
+If whistleblowers don’t dare reveal crimes and lies, we lose the last
+shred of effective control over our government and institutions. That’s
+why surveillance that enables the state to find out who has talked with
+a reporter is too much surveillance—too much for democracy to endure.
+
+An unnamed US government official ominously told journalists in 2011
+that the US would not subpoena reporters because “We know who you’re
+talking to.”[(6)](#FOOT6) Sometimes journalists’ phone call records are
+subpoenaed[(7)](#FOOT7) to find this out, but Snowden has shown us that
+in effect they subpoena all the phone call records of everyone in the
+US, all the time, from Verizon[(8)](#FOOT8) and from other companies
+too.[(9)](#FOOT9)\
+ Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from states
+that are willing to play dirty tricks on them. The ACLU has demonstrated
+the US government’s systematic practice of infiltrating peaceful
+dissident groups[(10)](#FOOT10) on the pretext that there might be
+terrorists among them. The point at which surveillance is too much is
+the point at which the state can find who spoke to a known journalist or
+a known dissident.
+
+### Information, Once Collected, Will Be Misused {#information-once-collected-will-be-misused .subheading}
+
+When people recognize that the level of general surveillance is too
+high, the first response is to propose limits on access to the
+accumulated data. That sounds nice, but it won’t fix the problem, not
+even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules. (The
+NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it was unable to effectively
+hold the NSA accountable.)[(11)](#FOOT11) Suspicion of a crime will be
+grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of “espionage,”
+finding the “spy” will provide an excuse to access the accumulated
+material.
+
+In addition, the state’s surveillance staff will misuse the data for
+personal reasons. Some NSA agents used US surveillance systems to track
+their lovers—past, present, or wished-for—in a practice called
+“LOVEINT.”[(12)](#FOOT12) The NSA says it has caught and punished this a
+few times; we don’t know how many other times it wasn’t caught. But
+these events shouldn’t surprise us, because police have long used their
+access to driver’s license records to track down someone attractive, a
+practice known as “running a plate for a date.”[(13)](#FOOT13)
+
+Surveillance data will always be used for other purposes, even if this
+is prohibited. Once the data has been accumulated and the state has the
+possibility of access to it, it can misuse that data in dreadful ways,
+as shown by examples from Europe[(14)](#FOOT14) and the
+US.[(15)](#FOOT15)
+
+Personal data collected by the state is also likely to be obtained by
+outside crackers that break the security of the servers, even by
+crackers working for hostile states.[(16)](#FOOT16)
+
+Governments can easily use massive surveillance capability to subvert
+democracy directly.[(17)](#FOOT17)
+
+Total surveillance accessible to the state enables the state to launch a
+massive fishing expedition against any person. To make journalism and
+democracy safe, we must limit the accumulation of data that is easily
+accessible to the state.
+
+### Robust Protection for Privacy Must Be Technical {#robust-protection-for-privacy-must-be-technical .subheading}
+
+The Electronic Frontier Foundation and other organizations propose a set
+of legal principles designed to prevent the abuses of massive
+surveillance.[(18)](#FOOT18) These principles include, crucially,
+explicit legal protection for whistleblowers; as a consequence, they
+would be adequate for protecting democratic freedoms—if adopted
+completely and enforced without exception forever.
+
+However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history shows,
+they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act), suspended, or
+ignored.[(19)](#FOOT19)
+
+Meanwhile, demagogues will cite the usual excuses as grounds for total
+surveillance; any terrorist attack, even one that kills just a handful
+of people, can be hyped to provide an opportunity.
+
+If limits on access to the data are set aside, it will be as if they had
+never existed: years’ worth of dossiers would suddenly become available
+for misuse by the state and its agents and, if collected by companies,
+for their private misuse as well. If, however, we stop the collection of
+dossiers on everyone, those dossiers won’t exist, and there will be no
+way to compile them retroactively. A new illiberal regime would have to
+implement surveillance afresh, and it would only collect data starting
+at that date. As for suspending or momentarily ignoring this law, the
+idea would hardly make sense.
+
+### First, Don’t Be Foolish {#first-dont-be-foolish .subheading}
+
+To have privacy, you must not throw it away: the first one who has to
+protect your privacy is you. Avoid identifying yourself to web sites,
+contact them with Tor, and use browsers that block the schemes they use
+to track visitors. Use the GNU Privacy Guard to encrypt the contents of
+your email. Pay for things with cash.
+
+Keep your own data; don’t store your data in a company’s “convenient”
+server. It’s safe, however, to entrust a data backup to a commercial
+service, provided you put the files in an archive and encrypt the whole
+archive, including the names of the files, with free software on your
+own computer before uploading it.
+
+For privacy’s sake, you must avoid nonfree software since, as a
+consequence of giving others control of your computing, it is likely to
+spy on you.[(20)](#FOOT20) Avoid service as a software
+substitute;[(21)](#FOOT21) as well as giving others control of your
+computing, it requires you to hand over all the pertinent data to the
+server.
+
+Protect your friends’ and acquaintances’ privacy, too. Don’t give out
+their personal information[(22)](#FOOT22) except how to contact them,
+and never give any web site your list of email or phone contacts. Don’t
+tell a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that they
+might not wish to publish in a newspaper. Better yet, don’t be used by
+Facebook at all. Reject communication systems that require users to give
+their real names, even if you are going to give yours, since they
+pressure other people to surrender their privacy.
+
+Self-protection is essential, but even the most rigorous self-protection
+is insufficient to protect your privacy on or from systems that don’t
+belong to you. When we communicate with others or move around the city,
+our privacy depends on the practices of society. We can avoid some of
+the systems that surveil our communications and movements, but not all
+of them. Clearly, the better solution is to make all these systems stop
+surveilling people other than legitimate suspects.
+
+### We Must Design Every System for Privacy {#we-must-design-every-system-for-privacy .subheading}
+
+If we don’t want a total surveillance society, we must consider
+surveillance a kind of social pollution, and limit the surveillance
+impact of each new digital system just as we limit the environmental
+impact of physical construction.
+
+For example: “smart” meters for electricity are touted for sending the
+power company moment-by-moment data about each customer’s electric
+usage, including how usage compares with users in general. This is
+implemented based on general surveillance, but does not require any
+surveillance. It would be easy for the power company to calculate the
+average usage in a residential neighborhood by dividing the total usage
+by the number of subscribers, and send that to the meters. Each
+customer’s meter could compare her usage, over any desired period of
+time, with the average usage pattern for that period. The same benefit,
+with no surveillance!
+
+We need to design such privacy into all our digital systems.
+
+### Remedy for Collecting Data: Leaving It Dispersed {#remedy-for-collecting-data-leaving-it-dispersed .subheading}
+
+One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is to keep the data
+dispersed and inconvenient to access. Old-fashioned security cameras
+were no threat to privacy.[(23)](#FOOT23) The recording was stored on
+the premises, and kept for a few weeks at most. Because of the
+inconvenience of accessing these recordings, it was never done
+massively; they were accessed only in the places where someone reported
+a crime. It would not be feasible to physically collect millions of
+tapes every day and watch them or copy them.
+
+Nowadays, security cameras have become surveillance cameras: they are
+connected to the internet so recordings can be collected in a data
+center and saved forever. This is already dangerous, but it is going to
+get worse. Advances in face recognition may bring the day when suspected
+journalists can be tracked on the street all the time to see who they
+talk with.
+
+Internet-connected cameras often have lousy digital security themselves,
+so anyone could watch what the camera sees.[(24)](#FOOT24) To restore
+privacy, we should ban the use of internet-connected cameras aimed where
+and when the public is admitted, except when carried by people. Everyone
+must be free to post photos and video recordings occasionally, but the
+systematic accumulation of such data on the internet must be limited.
+
+### Remedy for Internet Commerce Surveillance {#remedy-for-internet-commerce-surveillance .subheading}
+
+Most data collection comes from people’s own digital activities. Usually
+the data is collected first by companies. But when it comes to the
+threat to privacy and democracy, it makes no difference whether
+surveillance is done directly by the state or farmed out to a business,
+because the data that the companies collect is systematically available
+to the state.
+
+The NSA, through PRISM, has gotten into the databases of many large
+internet corporations.[(25)](#FOOT25) AT&T has saved all its phone call
+records since 1987 and makes them available to the DEA[(26)](#FOOT26) to
+search on request. Strictly speaking, the US government does not possess
+that data, but in practical terms it may as well possess it.
+
+The goal of making journalism and democracy safe therefore requires that
+we reduce the data collected about people by any organization, not just
+by the state. We must redesign digital systems so that they do not
+accumulate data about their users. If they need digital data about our
+transactions, they should not be allowed to keep them more than a short
+time beyond what is inherently necessary for their dealings with us.
+
+One of the motives for the current level of surveillance of the internet
+is that sites are financed through advertising based on tracking users’
+activities and propensities. This converts a mere annoyance—advertising
+that we can learn to ignore—into a surveillance system that harms us
+whether we know it or not. Purchases over the internet also track their
+users. And we are all aware that “privacy policies” are more excuses to
+violate privacy than commitments to uphold it.
+
+We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous
+payments—anonymous for the payer, that is. (We don’t want the payee to
+dodge taxes.) Bitcoin is not anonymous,[(27)](#FOOT27) though there are
+efforts to develop ways to pay anonymously with Bitcoin. However,
+technology for digital cash was first developed in the
+1980s;[(28)](#FOOT28)we need only suitable business arrangements, and
+for the state not to obstruct them.
+
+A further threat from sites’ collection of personal data is that
+security breakers might get in, take it, and misuse it. This includes
+customers’ credit card details. An anonymous payment system would end
+this danger: a security hole in the site can’t hurt you if the site
+knows nothing about you.
+
+### Remedy for Travel Surveillance {#remedy-for-travel-surveillance .subheading}
+
+We must convert digital toll collection to anonymous payment (using
+digital cash, for instance). License-plate recognition systems recognize
+all license plates, and the data can be kept
+indefinitely;[(29)](#FOOT29) they should be required by law to notice
+and record only those license numbers that are on a list of cars sought
+by court orders. A less secure alternative would record all cars locally
+but only for a few days, and not make the full data available over the
+internet; access to the data should be limited to searching for a list
+of court-ordered license numbers.
+
+The US “no-fly” list must be abolished because it is punishment without
+trial.[(30)](#FOOT30)
+
+It is acceptable to have a list of people whose person and luggage will
+be searched with extra care, and anonymous passengers on domestic
+flights could be treated as if they were on this list. It is also
+acceptable to bar non-citizens, if they are not permitted to enter the
+country at all, from boarding flights to the country. This ought to be
+enough for all legitimate purposes.
+
+Many mass transit systems use some kind of smart cards or RFIDs for
+payment. These systems accumulate personal data: if you once make the
+mistake of paying with anything but cash, they associate the card
+permanently with your name. Furthermore, they record all travel
+associated with each card. Together they amount to massive surveillance.
+This data collection must be reduced.
+
+Navigation services do surveillance: the user’s computer tells the map
+service the user’s location and where the user wants to go; then the
+server determines the route and sends it back to the user’s computer,
+which displays it. Nowadays, the server probably records the user’s
+locations, since there is nothing to prevent it. This surveillance is
+not inherently necessary, and redesign could avoid it: free/libre
+software in the user’s computer could download map data for the
+pertinent regions (if not downloaded previously), compute the route, and
+display it, without ever telling anyone where the user is or wants to
+go.
+
+Systems for borrowing bicycles, etc., can be designed so that the
+borrower’s identity is known only inside the station where the item was
+borrowed. Borrowing would inform all stations that the item is “out,” so
+when the user returns it at any station (in general, a different one),
+that station will know where and when that item was borrowed. It will
+inform the other station that the item is no longer “out.” It will also
+calculate the user’s bill, and send it (after waiting some random number
+of minutes) to headquarters along a ring of stations, so that
+headquarters would not find out which station the bill came from. Once
+this is done, the return station would forget all about the transaction.
+If an item remains “out” for too long, the station where it was borrowed
+can inform headquarters; in that case, it could send the borrower’s
+identity immediately.
+
+### Remedy for Communications Dossiers {#remedy-for-communications-dossiers .subheading}
+
+Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive data
+on their users’ contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc.). With mobile
+phones, they also record the user’s physical location.[(31)](#FOOT31)
+They keep these dossiers for a long time: over 30 years, in the case of
+AT&T. Soon they will even record the user’s body
+activities.[(32)](#FOOT32) It appears that the NSA collects cell phone
+location data in bulk.[(33)](#FOOT33)\
+ Unmonitored communication is impossible where systems create such
+dossiers. So it should be illegal to create or keep them. ISPs and phone
+companies must not be allowed to keep this information for very long, in
+the absence of a court order to surveil a certain party.
+
+This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won’t physically
+stop the government from collecting all the information immediately as
+it is generated—which is what the US does with some or all phone
+companies.[(34)](#FOOT34) We would have to rely on prohibiting that by
+law. However, that would be better than the current situation, where the
+relevant law (the PAT RIOT Act) does not clearly prohibit the practice.
+In addition, if the government did resume this sort of surveillance, it
+would not get data about everyone’s phone calls made prior to that time.
+
+For privacy about who you exchange email with, a simple partial solution
+is for you and others to use email services in a country that would
+never cooperate with your own government, and which communicate with
+each other using encryption. However, Ladar Levison (owner of the mail
+service Lavabit that US surveillance sought to corrupt completely) has a
+more sophisticated idea for an encryption system through which your
+email service would know only that you sent mail to some user of my
+email service, and my email service would know only that I received mail
+from some user of your email service, but it would be hard to determine
+that you had sent mail to me.
+
+### But Some Surveillance Is Necessary {#but-some-surveillance-is-necessary .subheading}
+
+For the state to find criminals, it needs to be able to investigate
+specific crimes, or specific suspected planned crimes, under a court
+order. With the internet, the power to tap phone conversations would
+naturally extend to the power to tap internet connections. This power is
+easy to abuse for political reasons, but it is also necessary.
+Fortunately, this won’t make it possible to find whistleblowers after
+the fact, if (as I recommend) we prevent digital systems from
+accumulating massive dossiers before the fact.
+
+Individuals with special state-granted power, such as police, forfeit
+their right to privacy and must be monitored. (In fact, police have
+their own jargon term for perjury, “testilying,”[(35)](#FOOT35) since
+they do it so frequently, particularly about protesters and
+photographers.[(36)](#FOOT36)) One city in California that required
+police to wear video cameras all the time found their use of force fell
+by 60 percent.[(37)](#FOOT37) The ACLU is in favor of this.
+
+Corporations are not people, and not entitled to human
+rights.[(38)](#FOOT38) It is legitimate to require businesses to publish
+the details of processes that might cause chemical, biological, nuclear,
+fiscal, computational (e.g., DRM[(39)](#FOOT39)) or political (e.g.,
+lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for public
+well-being. The danger of these operations (consider the BP oil spill,
+the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs that of
+terrorism.
+
+However, journalism must be protected from surveillance even when it is
+carried out as part of a business.
+
+Digital technology has brought about a tremendous increase in the level
+of surveillance of our movements, actions, and communications. It is far
+more than we experienced in the 1990s, and far more than people behind
+the Iron Curtain experienced in the 1980s,[(40)](#FOOT40) and proposed
+legal limits on state use of the accumulated data would not alter that.
+
+Companies are designing even more intrusive surveillance. Some project
+that pervasive surveillance, hooked to companies such as Facebook, could
+have deep effects on how people think.[(41)](#FOOT41)Such possibilities
+are imponderable; but the threat to democracy is not speculation. It
+exists and is visible today.
+
+Unless we believe that our free countries previously suffered from a
+grave surveillance deficit, and ought to be surveilled more than the
+Soviet Union and East Germany were, we must reverse this increase. That
+requires stopping the accumulation of big data about people.
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+### Footnotes
+
+### [(1)](#DOCF1)
+
+@raggedright Maira Sutton, “We’re TPP Activists: Reddit Asked Us
+Everything,” 21 November 2013,
+<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/reddit-tpp-ama>. @end raggedright
+
+### [(2)](#DOCF2)
+
+@raggedright Glyn Moody, “How Can Any Company Ever Trust Microsoft
+Again?” 17 June 2013,
+<http://www.computerworlduk.com/blogs/open-enterprise/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again-3569376/>.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(3)](#DOCF3)
+
+@raggedright James Ball, Julian Borger and Glenn Greenwald, “Revealed:
+How US and UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security,”
+6 September 2013,
+<http://theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security>.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(4)](#DOCF4)
+
+@raggedright Bruce Schneier, “Want to Evade NSA Spying? Don’t Connect to
+the Internet,” 7 October 2013, <http://www.wired.com/2013/10/149481/>.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(5)](#DOCF5)
+
+@raggedright Dan Roberts, “Patriot Act Author Prepares Bill to Put NSA
+Bulk Collection ’Out of Business,’” 10 October 2013,
+<http://theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill>.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(6)](#DOCF6)
+
+@raggedright Lucy Dalglish, “Lessons from Wye River,” The News Media &
+the Law (Summer 2011): p. 1,
+[http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/\
+news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river](http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/%3Cbr%3Enews-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river).
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(7)](#DOCF7)
+
+@raggedright Washington Agencies, “Yemen leak: former FBI man admits
+passing information to Associated Press,” 24 September 2013,
+[http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/\
+sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press](http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/%3Cbr%3Esep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press).
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(8)](#DOCF8)
+
+@raggedright See “Verizon forced to hand over telephone data—full court
+ruling” (6 June 2013), at
+<http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order>,
+for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under which the US
+government “is collecting the phone records of millions of US customers
+of Verizon.” @end raggedright
+
+### [(9)](#DOCF9)
+
+@raggedright Siobhan Gorman, Evan Perez, and Janet Hook, “NSA
+Data-Mining Digs into Networks Beyond Verizon,” 7 June 2013,
+<http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07>.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(10)](#DOCF10)
+
+@raggedright ACLU, “Policing Free Speech: Police Surveillance And
+Obstruction of First Amendment-Protected Activity,” 29 June 2010,
+<https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf>. @end raggedright
+
+### [(11)](#DOCF11)
+
+@raggedright David Kravets, Kim Zetter, Kevin Poulsen, “NSA Illegally
+Gorged on U.S. Phone Records for Three Years,” 10 September 2013,
+<http://www.wired.com/2013/09/nsa-violations/>. @end raggedright
+
+### [(12)](#DOCF12)
+
+@raggedright Adam Gabbatt and agencies, “NSA Analysts ‘Wilfully
+Violated’ Surveillance Systems, Agency Admits,” 24 August 2013,
+<http://theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems>.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(13)](#DOCF13)
+
+@raggedright M. L. Elrick, “Cops Tap Database to Harass, Intimidate,”
+31 July 2001,
+<http://sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm#.VeQiuxcpDow>. @end
+raggedright
+
+### [(14)](#DOCF14)
+
+@raggedright Rick Falkvinge, “Collected Personal Data Will Always Be
+Used against the Citizens,” 17 March 2012,
+<http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/>.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(15)](#DOCF15)
+
+@raggedright Consider, for instance, the US internment of Japanese
+Americans during WWII. @end raggedright
+
+### [(16)](#DOCF16)
+
+@raggedright Mike Masnick, “Second OPM Hack Revealed: Even Worse Than
+the First,” 12 June 2015,
+<https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150612/16334231330/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first.shtml>.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(17)](#DOCF17)
+
+@raggedright Joanna Berendt, “Macedonia Government Is Blamed for
+Wiretapping Scandal,” 21 June 2015,
+<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html?_r=0>.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(18)](#DOCF18)
+
+@raggedright “International Principles on the Application of Human
+Rights to Communications Surveillance,” last modified May 2014,\
+ <https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text>. @end raggedright
+
+### [(19)](#DOCF19)
+
+@raggedright Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, “Officials Say U.S.
+Wiretaps Exceeded Law,” 15 April 2009,
+<http://nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html>. @end raggedright
+
+### [(20)](#DOCF20)
+
+@raggedright For decades, the free software movement has been denouncing
+the abusive surveillance machine of proprietary software companies such
+as Microsoft and Apple. For a growing list of the ways in which
+surveillance has spread across industries, not only in the software
+business, but also in the hardware and—away from the keyboard—in the
+mobile computing industry, in the office, at home, in transportation
+systems, and in the classroom, see
+<http://gnu.org/philosophy/proprietary/proprietary-surveillance.html>.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(21)](#DOCF21)
+
+@raggedright See “Who Does That Server Really Serve?” (@pageref{Server})
+for more information on this issue. @end raggedright
+
+### [(22)](#DOCF22)
+
+@raggedright Nicole Perlroth, “In Cybersecurity, Sometimes the Weakest
+Link Is a Family Member,” 21 May 2014,
+[http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/\
+in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/](http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/%3Cbr%3Ein-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/).
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(23)](#DOCF23)
+
+@raggedright I assume here that the security camera points at the inside
+of a store, or at the street. Any camera pointed at someone’s private
+space by someone else violates privacy, but that is another issue. @end
+raggedright
+
+### [(24)](#DOCF24)
+
+@raggedright Ms. Smith, “CIA Wants to Spy On You through Your
+Appliances,” 18 March 2012, [http://networkworld.com/article/2221934/\
+microsoft-subnet/cia-wants-to-spy-on-you-through-your-appliances.html](http://networkworld.com/article/2221934/%3Cbr%3Emicrosoft-subnet/cia-wants-to-spy-on-you-through-your-appliances.html).
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(25)](#DOCF25)
+
+@raggedright Jon Queally, “Latest Docs Show Financial Ties between NSA
+and Internet Companies,” 23 August 2013,
+<http://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/08/23/latest-docs-show-financial-ties-between-nsa-and-internet-companies>.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(26)](#DOCF26)
+
+@raggedright Scott Shane and Colin Moynihan, “Drug Agents Use Vast Phone
+Trove, Eclipsing N.S.A.’s,” 1 September 2013,
+[http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/\
+drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/%3Cbr%3Edrug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0).
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(27)](#DOCF27)
+
+@raggedright Dan Kaminsky, “Let’s Cut through the Bitcoin Hype: A
+Hacker-Entrepreneur’s Take,” 3 May 2013,
+[http://wired.com/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-\
+bitcoin-hype/](http://wired.com/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-%3Cbr%3Ebitcoin-hype/).
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(28)](#DOCF28)
+
+@raggedright Steven Levy, “E-Money (That’s What I Want),” Wired, 2.12
+(December 1994),
+<http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html>. @end
+raggedright
+
+### [(29)](#DOCF29)
+
+@raggedright Richard Bilton, “Camera Grid to Log Number Plates,” last
+updated on 22 May 2009,
+<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/whos_watching_you/8064333.stm>.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(30)](#DOCF30)
+
+@raggedright Nusrat Choudhury, “Victory! Federal Court Recognizes
+Constitutional Rights of Americans on the No-Fly List,” 29 August 2013,
+[https://www.aclu.org/blog/victory-federal-court-recognizes-constitutional-rights-americans-\
+no-fly-list](https://www.aclu.org/blog/victory-federal-court-recognizes-constitutional-rights-americans-%3Cbr%3Eno-fly-list).
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(31)](#DOCF31)
+
+@raggedright Kai Biermann, “Betrayed by Our Own Data,” 26 March 2011,
+<http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz>.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(32)](#DOCF32)
+
+@raggedright Sara M. Watson, “The Latest Smartphones Could Turn Us All
+into Activity Trackers,” 10 October 2013,
+[http://wired.com/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-\
+of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-\
+activity-trackers/](http://wired.com/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-%3Cbr%3Eof-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-%3Cbr%3Eactivity-trackers/).
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(33)](#DOCF33)
+
+@raggedright Patrick Toomey, “It Sure Sounds Like the NSA Is Tracking
+Our Locations,” 30 September 2013, [https://aclu.org/blog/it-\
+sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-our-locations](https://aclu.org/blog/it-%3Cbr%3Esure-sounds-nsa-tracking-our-locations).
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(34)](#DOCF34)
+
+@raggedright Glenn Greenwald, “NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions
+of Verizon Customers Daily,” 6 June 2013,
+<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order>.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(35)](#DOCF35)
+
+@raggedright See, for instance, the articles “Testilying: Cops Are Liars
+Who Get Away with Perjury” (Nick Malinowski, 3 February 2013,
+[http://vice.com/read/\
+testilying-cops-are-liars-who-get-away-with-perjury](http://vice.com/read/%3Cbr%3Etestilying-cops-are-liars-who-get-away-with-perjury))
+and “Detective Is Found Guilty of Planting Drugs” (Tim Stelloh,
+1 November 2011,
+[http://nytimes.com/2011/11/02/nyregion/brooklyn-detective-convicted-of-\
+planting-drugs-on-innocent-people.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0](http://nytimes.com/2011/11/02/nyregion/brooklyn-detective-convicted-of-%3Cbr%3Eplanting-drugs-on-innocent-people.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)),
+for examples of the extent to which this practice has been normalized.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(36)](#DOCF36)
+
+@raggedright See the Photography Is Not a Crime web site, at\
+ <http://photographyisnotacrime.com/>, for more on this issue. @end
+raggedright
+
+### [(37)](#DOCF37)
+
+@raggedright Kevin Drum,“Ubiquitous Surveillance, Police Edition,”
+22 August 2013,\
+ [http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-\
+police-edition](http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-%3Cbr%3Epolice-edition).
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(38)](#DOCF38)
+
+@raggedright Public Citizen, “Call Your Representative: Tell Her or Him
+to Co-Sponsor a Constitutional Amendment to Overturn Citizens United and
+Restore Democracy to the People,” accessed August 2015,
+<http://action.citizen.org/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=12266>.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(39)](#DOCF39)
+
+@raggedright See the related section in “Words to Avoid (or User with
+Care)” (@pageref{DRM}) for more on this. @end raggedright
+
+### [(40)](#DOCF40)
+
+@raggedright James Allworth, “Your Smartphone Works for the Surveillance
+State,” 7 June 2013,
+<https://hbr.org/2013/06/your-iphone-works-for-the-secret-police>. @end
+raggedright
+
+### [(41)](#DOCF41)
+
+@raggedright Evan Selinger and Brett Frischmann, “Will the Internet of
+Things Result in Predictable People?” 10 August 2015,
+<http://theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/10/internet-of-things-predictable-people>.
+@end raggedright
+
+</div>
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+This document was generated by *tonghuix* on *March 25, 2016* using
+[*texi2html 1.82*](http://www.nongnu.org/texi2html/).\