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diff --git a/docs/misinterpreting-copyright.md b/docs/misinterpreting-copyright.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7f2d387 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/misinterpreting-copyright.md @@ -0,0 +1,637 @@ +--- +Generator: 'texi2html 1.82' +description: Untitled Document +distribution: global +keywords: Untitled Document +resource-type: document +title: Untitled Document +... + +1. Misinterpreting Copyright—A Series of Errors {#misinterpreting-copyrighta-series-oferrors .chapter} +=============================================== + +@begingroup @advance@vsize by 6pt Something strange and dangerous is +happening in copyright law. Under the US Constitution, copyright exists +to benefit users—those who read books, listen to music, watch movies, or +run software—not for the sake of publishers or authors. Yet even as +people tend increasingly to reject and disobey the copyright +restrictions imposed on them “for their own benefit,” the US government +is adding more restrictions, and trying to frighten the public into +obedience with harsh new penalties. + +How did copyright policies come to be diametrically opposed to their +stated purpose? And how can we bring them back into alignment with that +purpose? To understand, we should start by looking at the root of United +States copyright law: the US Constitution. + +### Copyright in the US Constitution {#copyright-in-the-us-constitution .subheading} + +When the US Constitution was drafted, the idea that authors were +entitled to a copyright monopoly was proposed—and rejected. The founders +of our country adopted a different premise, that copyright is not a +natural right of authors, but an artificial concession made to them for +the sake of progress. The Constitution gives permission for a copyright +system with this clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 8): + +> \[Congress shall have the power\] to promote the Progress of Science +> and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and +> Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and +> Discoveries. + +The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that promoting progress means +benefit for the users of copyrighted works. For example, in *Fox Film v. +Doyal,*[(1)](#FOOT1) the court said, + +> The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in +> conferring the \[copyright\] monopoly lie in the general benefits +> derived by the public from the labors of authors. + +This fundamental decision explains why copyright is not *required* by +the Constitution, only *permitted* as an option—and why it is supposed +to last for “limited times.” If copyright were a natural right, +something that authors have because they deserve it, nothing could +justify terminating this right after a certain period of time, any more +than everyone’s house should become public property after a certain +lapse of time from its construction. + +@firstcopyingnotice{{@footnoterule@smallskip Copyright © 2002, 2003, +2007, 2009–2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.\ + {This essay was first published on <http://gnu.org>, in 2002. This +version is part of @fsfsthreecite} + +### The “Copyright Bargain” {#the-copyright-bargain .subheading} + +The copyright system works by providing privileges and thus benefits to +publishers and authors; but it does not do this for their sake. Rather, +it does this to modify their behavior: to provide an incentive for +authors to write more and publish more. In effect, the government spends +the public’s natural rights, on the public’s behalf, as part of a deal +to bring the public more published works. Legal scholars call this +concept the “copyright bargain.” It is like a government purchase of a +highway or an airplane using taxpayers’ money, except that the +government spends our freedom instead of our money. + +But is the bargain as it exists actually a good deal for the public? +Many alternative bargains are possible; which one is best? Every issue +of copyright policy is part of this question. If we misunderstand the +nature of the question, we will tend to decide the issues badly. + +The Constitution authorizes granting copyright powers to authors. In +practice, authors typically cede them to publishers; it is usually the +publishers, not the authors, who exercise these powers and get most of +the benefits, though authors may get a small portion. Thus it is usually +the publishers that lobby to increase copyright powers. To better +reflect the reality of copyright rather than the myth, this article +refers to publishers rather than authors as the holders of copyright +powers. It also refers to the users of copyrighted works as “readers,” +even though using them does not always mean reading, because “the users” +is remote and abstract. + +### The First Error: “Striking a Balance” {#the-first-error-striking-a-balance .subheading} + +The copyright bargain places the public first: benefit for the reading +public is an end in itself; benefits (if any) for publishers are just a +means toward that end. Readers’ interests and publishers’ interests are +thus qualitatively unequal in priority. The first step in +misinterpreting the purpose of copyright is the elevation of the +publishers to the same level of importance as the readers. + +It is often said that US copyright law is meant to “strike a balance” +between the interests of publishers and readers. Those who cite this +interpretation present it as a restatement of the basic position stated +in the Constitution; in other words, it is supposed to be equivalent to +the copyright bargain. + +But the two interpretations are far from equivalent; they are different +conceptually, and different in their implications. The balance concept +assumes that the readers’ and publishers’ interests differ in importance +only quantitatively, in *how much weight* we should give them, and in +what actions they apply to. The term “stakeholders” is often used to +frame the issue in this way; it assumes that all kinds of interest in a +policy decision are equally important. This view rejects the qualitative +distinction between the readers’ and publishers’ interests which is at +the root of the government’s participation in the copyright bargain. + +The consequences of this alteration are far-reaching, because the great +protection for the public in the copyright bargain—the idea that +copyright privileges can be justified only in the name of the readers, +never in the name of the publishers—is discarded by the “balance” +interpretation. Since the interest of the publishers is regarded as an +end in itself, it can justify copyright privileges; in other words, the +“balance” concept says that privileges can be justified in the name of +someone other than the public. + +As a practical matter, the consequence of the “balance” concept is to +reverse the burden of justification for changes in copyright law. The +copyright bargain places the burden on the publishers to convince the +readers to cede certain freedoms. The concept of balance reverses this +burden, practically speaking, because there is generally no doubt that +publishers will benefit from additional privilege. Unless harm to the +readers can be proved, sufficient to “outweigh” this benefit, we are led +to conclude that the publishers are entitled to almost any privilege +they request. + +Since the idea of “striking a balance” between publishers and readers +denies the readers the primacy they are entitled to, we must reject it. + +### Balancing against What? {#balancing-against-what .subheading} + +When the government buys something for the public, it acts on behalf of +the public; its responsibility is to obtain the best possible deal—best +for the public, not for the other party in the agreement. + +For example, when signing contracts with construction companies to build +highways, the government aims to spend as little as possible of the +public’s money. Government agencies use competitive bidding to push the +price down. + +As a practical matter, the price cannot be zero, because contractors +will not bid that low. Although not entitled to special consideration, +they have the usual rights of citizens in a free society, including the +right to refuse disadvantageous contracts; even the lowest bid will be +high enough for some contractor to make money. So there is indeed a +balance, of a kind. But it is not a deliberate balancing of two +interests each with claim to special consideration. It is a balance +between a public goal and market forces. The government tries to obtain +for the taxpaying motorists the best deal they can get in the context of +a free society and a free market. + +In the copyright bargain, the government spends our freedom instead of +our money. Freedom is more precious than money, so government’s +responsibility to spend our freedom wisely and frugally is even greater +than its responsibility to spend our money thus. Governments must never +put the publishers’ interests on a par with the public’s freedom. + +### Not “Balance” but “Trade-Off” {#not-balance-but-trade-off .subheading} + +The idea of balancing the readers’ interests against the publishers’ is +the wrong way to judge copyright policy, but there are indeed two +interests to be weighed: two interests *of the readers.* Readers have an +interest in their own freedom in using published works; depending on +circumstances, they may also have an interest in encouraging publication +through some kind of incentive system. + +The word “balance,” in discussions of copyright, has come to stand as +shorthand for the idea of “striking a balance” between the readers and +the publishers. Therefore, to use the word “balance” in regard to the +readers’ two interests would be confusing.[(2)](#FOOT2) We need another +term. + +In general, when one party has two goals that partly conflict, and +cannot completely achieve both of them, we call this a “trade-off.” +Therefore, rather than speaking of “striking the right balance” between +parties, we should speak of “finding the right trade-off between +spending our freedom and keeping it.” + +### The Second Error: Maximizing One Output {#the-second-error-maximizing-one-output .subheading} + +The second mistake in copyright policy consists of adopting the goal of +maximizing—not just increasing—the number of published works. The +erroneous concept of “striking a balance” elevated the publishers to +parity with the readers; this second error places them far above the +readers. + +When we purchase something, we do not generally buy the whole quantity +in stock or the most expensive model. Instead we conserve funds for +other purchases, by buying only what we need of any particular good, and +choosing a model of sufficient rather than highest quality. The +principle of diminishing returns suggests that spending all our money on +one particular good is likely to be an inefficient allocation of +resources; we generally choose to keep some money for another use. + +Diminishing returns applies to copyright just as to any other purchase. +The first freedoms we should trade away are those we miss the least, and +whose sacrifice gives the largest encouragement to publication. As we +trade additional freedoms that cut closer to home, we find that each +trade is a bigger sacrifice than the last, while bringing a smaller +increment in literary activity. Well before the increment becomes zero, +we may well say it is not worth its incremental price; we would then +settle on a bargain whose overall result is to increase the amount of +publication, but not to the utmost possible extent. + +Accepting the goal of maximizing publication rejects all these wiser, +more advantageous bargains in advance—it dictates that the public must +cede nearly all of its freedom to use published works, for just a little +more publication. + +### The Rhetoric of Maximization {#the-rhetoric-of-maximization .subheading} + +In practice, the goal of maximizing publication regardless of the cost +to freedom is supported by widespread rhetoric which asserts that public +copying is illegitimate, unfair, and intrinsically wrong. For instance, +the publishers call people who copy “pirates,” a smear term designed to +equate sharing information with your neighbor with attacking a ship. +(This smear term was formerly used by authors to describe publishers who +found lawful ways to publish unauthorized editions; its modern use by +the publishers is almost the reverse.) This rhetoric directly rejects +the constitutional basis for copyright, but presents itself as +representing the unquestioned tradition of the American legal system. + +The “pirate” rhetoric is typically accepted because it so pervades the +media that few people realize how radical it is. It is effective because +if copying by the public is fundamentally illegitimate, we can never +object to the publishers’ demand that we surrender our freedom to do so. +In other words, when the public is challenged to show why publishers +should not receive some additional power, the most important reason of +all—“We want to copy”—is disqualified in advance. + +This leaves no way to argue against increasing copyright power except +using side issues. Hence, opposition to stronger copyright powers today +almost exclusively cites side issues, and never dares cite the freedom +to distribute copies as a legitimate public value. + +As a practical matter, the goal of maximization enables publishers to +argue that “A certain practice is reducing our sales—or we think it +might—so we presume it diminishes publication by some unknown amount, +and therefore it should be prohibited.” We are led to the outrageous +conclusion that the public good is measured by publishers’ sales: What’s +good for General Media is good for the USA. + +### The Third Error: Maximizing Publishers’ Power {#the-third-error-maximizing-publishers-power .subheading} + +Once the publishers have obtained assent to the policy goal of +maximizing publication output at any cost, their next step is to infer +that this requires giving them the maximum possible powers—making +copyright cover every imaginable use of a work, or applying some other +legal tool such as “shrink wrap” licenses to equivalent effect. This +goal, which entails the abolition of “fair use” and the “right of first +sale,” is being pressed at every available level of government, from +states of the US to international bodies. + +This step is erroneous because strict copyright rules obstruct the +creation of useful new works. For instance, Shakespeare borrowed the +plots of some of his plays from works others had published a few decades +before, so if today’s copyright law had been in effect, his plays would +have been illegal. + +Even if we wanted the highest possible rate of publication, regardless +of cost to the public, maximizing publishers’ power is the wrong way to +get it. As a means of promoting progress, it is self-defeating. + +### The Results of the Three Errors {#the-results-of-the-three-errors .subheading} + +The current trend in copyright legislation is to hand publishers broader +powers for longer periods of time. The conceptual basis of copyright, as +it emerges distorted from the series of errors, rarely offers a basis +for saying no. Legislators give lip service to the idea that copyright +serves the public, while in fact giving publishers whatever they ask +for. + +For example, here is what Senator Hatch said when introducing S. +483,[(3)](#FOOT3) a 1995 bill to increase the term of copyright by 20 +years: + +> I believe we are now at such a point with respect to the question of +> whether the current term of copyright adequately protects the +> interests of authors and the related question of whether the term of +> protection continues to provide a sufficient incentive for the +> creation of new works of authorship.[(4)](#FOOT4) + +This bill extended the copyright on already published works written +since the 1920s. This change was a giveaway to publishers with no +possible benefit to the public, since there is no way to retroactively +increase now the number of books published back then. Yet it cost the +public a freedom that is meaningful today—the freedom to redistribute +books from that era. Note the use of the propaganda term, +“protect,”[(5)](#FOOT5) which embodies the second of the three errors. + +The bill also extended the copyrights of works yet to be written. For +works made for hire, copyright would last 95 years instead of the +present 75 years. Theoretically this would increase the incentive to +write new works; but any publisher that claims to need this extra +incentive should be required to substantiate the claim with projected +balance sheets for 75 years in the future. + +Needless to say, Congress did not question the publishers’ arguments: a +law extending copyright was enacted in 1998. It was officially called +the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, named after one of its +sponsors who died earlier that year. We usually call it the Mickey Mouse +Copyright Act, since we presume its real motive was to prevent the +copyright on the appearance of Mickey Mouse from expiring. Bono’s widow, +who served the rest of his term, made this statement: + +> Actually, Sonny wanted the term of copyright protection to last +> forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the +> Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our +> copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As you know, there +> is also Jack Valenti’s[(6)](#FOOT6) proposal for term to last forever +> less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next +> Congress.[(7)](#FOOT7) + +The Supreme Court later heard a case that sought to overturn the law on +the grounds that the retroactive extension fails to serve the +Constitution’s goal of promoting progress. The court responded by +abdicating its responsibility to judge the question; on copyright, the +Constitution requires only lip service. + +Another law, passed in 1997, made it a felony to make sufficiently many +copies of any published work, even if you give them away to friends just +to be nice. Previously this was not a crime in the US at all. + +An even worse law, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), was +designed to bring back what was then called “copy protection”—now known +as DRM (Digital Restrictions Management)[(8)](#FOOT8)—which users +already detested, by making it a crime to defeat the restrictions, or +even publish information about how to defeat them. This law ought to be +called the “Domination by Media Corporations Act” because it effectively +offers publishers the chance to write their own copyright law. It says +they can impose any restrictions whatsoever on the use of a work, and +these restrictions take the force of law provided the work contains some +sort of encryption or license manager to enforce them. + +One of the arguments offered for this bill was that it would implement a +recent treaty to increase copyright powers. The treaty was promulgated +by the World “Intellectual Property”[(9)](#FOOT9) Organization, an +organization dominated by copyright- and patent-holding interests, with +the aid of pressure from the Clinton administration; since the treaty +only increases copyright power, whether it serves the public interest in +any country is doubtful. In any case, the bill went far beyond what the +treaty required. + +Libraries were a key source of opposition to this bill, especially to +the aspects that block the forms of copying that are considered fair +use. How did the publishers respond? Former representative Pat +Schroeder, now a lobbyist for the Association of American Publishers, +said that the publishers “could not live with what \[the libraries +were\] asking for.” Since the libraries were asking only to preserve +part of the status quo, one might respond by wondering how the +publishers had survived until the present day. + +Congressman Barney Frank, in a meeting with me and others who opposed +this bill, showed how far the US Constitution’s view of copyright has +been disregarded. He said that new powers, backed by criminal penalties, +were needed urgently because the “movie industry is worried,” as well as +the “music industry” and other “industries.” I asked him, “But is this +in the public interest?” His response was telling: “Why are you talking +about the public interest? These creative people don’t have to give up +their rights for the public interest!” The “industry” has been +identified with the “creative people” it hires, copyright has been +treated as its entitlement, and the Constitution has been turned upside +down. + +The DMCA was enacted in 1998. As enacted, it says that fair use remains +nominally legitimate, but allows publishers to prohibit all software or +hardware that you could practice it with. Effectively, fair use is +prohibited. + +Based on this law, the movie industry has imposed censorship on free +software for reading and playing DVDs, and even on the information about +how to read them. In April 2001, Professor Edward Felten of Princeton +University was intimidated by lawsuit threats from the Recording +Industry Association of America (RIAA) into withdrawing a scientific +paper stating what he had learned about a proposed encryption system for +restricting access to recorded music. + +We are also beginning to see e-books that take away many of readers’ +traditional freedoms—for instance, the freedom to lend a book to your +friend, to sell it to a used book store, to borrow it from a library, to +buy it without giving your name to a corporate data bank, even the +freedom to read it twice. Encrypted e-books generally restrict all these +activities—you can read them only with special secret software designed +to restrict you. + +I will never buy one of these encrypted, restricted e-books, and I hope +you will reject them too. If an e-book doesn’t give you the same +freedoms as a traditional paper book, don’t accept it! + +Anyone independently releasing software that can read restricted e-books +risks prosecution. A Russian programmer, Dmitry Sklyarov, was arrested +in 2001 while visiting the US to speak at a conference, because he had +written such a program in Russia, where it was lawful to do so. Now +Russia is preparing a law to prohibit it too, and the European Union +recently adopted one. + +Mass-market e-books have been a commercial failure so far, but not +because readers chose to defend their freedom; they were unattractive +for other reasons, such as that computer display screens are not easy +surfaces to read from. We can’t rely on this happy accident to protect +us in the long term; the next attempt to promote e-books will use +“electronic paper”—book-like objects into which an encrypted, restricted +e-book can be downloaded. If this paper-like surface proves more +appealing than today’s display screens, we will have to defend our +freedom in order to keep it. Meanwhile, e-books are making inroads in +niches: NYU and other dental schools require students to buy their +textbooks in the form of restricted e-books. + +The media companies are not satisfied yet. In 2001, Disney-funded +Senator Hollings proposed a bill called the “Security Systems Standards +and Certification Act” (SSSCA),[(10)](#FOOT10) which would require all +computers (and other digital recording and playback devices) to have +government-mandated copy-restriction systems. That is their ultimate +goal, but the first item on their agenda is to prohibit any equipment +that can tune digital HDTV unless it is designed to be impossible for +the public to “tamper with” (i.e., modify for their own purposes). Since +free software is software that users can modify, we face here for the +first time a proposed law that explicitly prohibits free software for a +certain job. Prohibition of other jobs will surely follow. If the FCC +adopts this rule, existing free software such as GNU Radio would be +censored. + +To block these bills and rules requires political action.[(11)](#FOOT11) + +### Finding the Right Bargain {#finding-the-right-bargain .subheading} + +What is the proper way to decide copyright policy? If copyright is a +bargain made on behalf of the public, it should serve the public +interest above all. The government’s duty when selling the public’s +freedom is to sell only what it must, and sell it as dearly as possible. +At the very least, we should pare back the extent of copyright as much +as possible while maintaining a comparable level of publication. + +Since we cannot find this minimum price in freedom through competitive +bidding, as we do for construction projects, how can we find it? + +One possible method is to reduce copyright privileges in stages, and +observe the results. By seeing if and when measurable diminutions in +publication occur, we will learn how much copyright power is really +necessary to achieve the public’s purposes. We must judge this by actual +observation, not by what publishers say will happen, because they have +every incentive to make exaggerated predictions of doom if their powers +are reduced in any way. + +Copyright policy includes several independent dimensions, which can be +adjusted separately. After we find the necessary minimum for one policy +dimension, it may still be possible to reduce other dimensions of +copyright while maintaining the desired publication level. + +One important dimension of copyright is its duration, which is now +typically on the order of a century. Reducing the monopoly on copying to +ten years, starting from the date when a work is published, would be a +good first step. Another aspect of copyright, which covers the making of +derivative works, could continue for a longer period. + +Why count from the date of publication? Because copyright on unpublished +works does not directly limit readers’ freedom; whether we are free to +copy a work is moot when we do not have copies. So giving authors a +longer time to get a work published does no harm. Authors (who generally +do own the copyright prior to publication) will rarely choose to delay +publication just to push back the end of the copyright term. + +Why ten years? Because that is a safe proposal; we can be confident on +practical grounds that this reduction would have little impact on the +overall viability of publishing today. In most media and genres, +successful works are very profitable in just a few years, and even +successful works are usually out of print well before ten. Even for +reference works, whose useful life may be many decades, ten-year +copyright should suffice: updated editions are issued regularly, and +many readers will buy the copyrighted current edition rather than copy a +ten-year-old public domain version. + +Ten years may still be longer than necessary; once things settle down, +we could try a further reduction to tune the system. At a panel on +copyright at a literary convention, where I proposed the ten-year term, +a noted fantasy author sitting beside me objected vehemently, saying +that anything beyond five years was intolerable. + +But we don’t have to apply the same time span to all kinds of works. +Maintaining the utmost uniformity of copyright policy is not crucial to +the public interest, and copyright law already has many exceptions for +specific uses and media. It would be foolish to pay for every highway +project at the rates necessary for the most difficult projects in the +most expensive regions of the country; it is equally foolish to “pay” +for all kinds of art with the greatest price in freedom that we find +necessary for any one kind. + +So perhaps novels, dictionaries, computer programs, songs, symphonies, +and movies should have different durations of copyright, so that we can +reduce the duration for each kind of work to what is necessary for many +such works to be published. Perhaps movies over one hour long could have +a 20-year copyright, because of the expense of producing them. In my own +field, computer programming, three years should suffice, because product +cycles are even shorter than that. + +Another dimension of copyright policy is the extent of fair use: some +ways of reproducing all or part of a published work that are legally +permitted even though it is copyrighted. The natural first step in +reducing this dimension of copyright power is to permit occasional +private small-quantity noncommercial copying and distribution among +individuals. This would eliminate the intrusion of the copyright police +into people’s private lives, but would probably have little effect on +the sales of published works. (It may be necessary to take other legal +steps to ensure that shrink-wrap licenses cannot be used to substitute +for copyright in restricting such copying.) The experience of Napster +shows that we should also permit noncommercial verbatim redistribution +to the general public—when so many of the public want to copy and share, +and find it so useful, only draconian measures will stop them, and the +public deserves to get what it wants. + +For novels, and in general for works that are used for entertainment, +noncommercial verbatim redistribution may be sufficient freedom for the +readers. Computer programs, being used for functional purposes (to get +jobs done), call for additional freedoms beyond that, including the +freedom to publish an improved version. See “The Free Software +Definition,” in this book, for an explanation of the freedoms that +software users should have. But it may be an acceptable compromise for +these freedoms to be universally available only after a delay of two or +three years from the program’s publication. + +Changes like these could bring copyright into line with the public’s +wish to use digital technology to copy. Publishers will no doubt find +these proposals “unbalanced”; they may threaten to take their marbles +and go home, but they won’t really do it, because the game will remain +profitable and it will be the only game in town. + +As we consider reductions in copyright power, we must make sure media +companies do not simply replace it with end-user license agreements. It +would be necessary to prohibit the use of contracts to apply +restrictions on copying that go beyond those of copyright. Such +limitations on what mass-market nonnegotiated contracts can require are +a standard part of the US legal system. + +### A Personal Note {#a-personal-note .subheading} + +I am a software designer, not a legal scholar. I’ve become concerned +with copyright issues because there’s no avoiding them in the world of +computer networks, such as the Internet. As a user of computers and +networks for 30 years, I value the freedoms that we have lost, and the +ones we may lose next. As an author, I can reject the romantic mystique +of the author as semidivine creator, often cited by publishers to +justify increased copyright powers for authors—powers which these +authors will then sign away to publishers. + +Most of this article consists of facts and reasoning that you can check, +and proposals on which you can form your own opinions. But I ask you to +accept one thing on my word alone: that authors like me don’t deserve +special power over you. If you wish to reward me further for the +software or books I have written, I would gratefully accept a check—but +please don’t surrender your freedom in my name. @endgroup + +<div class="footnote"> + +------------------------------------------------------------------------ + +### Footnotes + +### [(1)](#DOCF1) + +@raggedright Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 US 123, 1932. @end raggedright + +### [(2)](#DOCF2) + +@raggedright See Julian Sanchez’s article “The Trouble with ‘Balance’ +Metaphors” (4 February 2011, +[http://juliansanchez.com/2011/02/04/the-trouble-with-balance-\ +metaphors/](http://juliansanchez.com/2011/02/04/the-trouble-with-balance-%3Cbr%3Emetaphors/)) +for an examination of “how the analogy between sound judgment and +balancing weights may constrain our thinking in unhealthy ways.” @end +raggedright + +### [(3)](#DOCF3) + +@raggedright Congressional Record, S. 483, “The Copyright Term Extension +Act of 1995,” 2 March 1995, pp. S3390–4. @end raggedright + +### [(4)](#DOCF4) + +@raggedright Congressional Record, “Statement on Introduced Bills and +Joint Resolutions,” 2 March 1995, p. S3390, +<http://gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1995-03-02/pdf/CREC-1995-03-02-pt1-PgS3390-2.pdf>. +@end raggedright + +### [(5)](#DOCF5) + +@raggedright See @pageref{Protection} for why use the term “protect” +should be avoided in connection with copyright. @end raggedright + +### [(6)](#DOCF6) + +@raggedright Jack Valenti was a longtime president of the Motion Picture +Association of America. @end raggedright + +### [(7)](#DOCF7) + +@raggedright Congressional Record, remarks of Rep. Bono, 7 October 1998, +p. H9952, +<http://gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1998-10-07/pdf/CREC-1998-10-07-pt1-PgH9946.pdf>. +@end raggedright + +### [(8)](#DOCF8) + +@raggedright See <http://gnu.org/proprietary/proprietary-drm.html> for +more on this issue. @end raggedright + +### [(9)](#DOCF9) + +@raggedright See “Did You Say “Intellectual Property”? It’s a Seductive +Mirage”( @pageref{Not IPR}) for an explanation of why this term is +problematic. @end raggedright + +### [(10)](#DOCF10) + +@raggedright Since renamed to the unpronounceable CBDTPA, for which a +good mnemonic is “Consume, But Don’t Try Programming Anything,” but it +really stands for the “Consumer Broadband and Digital Television +Promotion Act.” @end raggedright + +### [(11)](#DOCF11) + +If you would like to help, I recommend the web sites +<http://defectivebydesign.org>, <http://publicknowledge.org>, and +<http://eff.org>. + +</div> + +------------------------------------------------------------------------ + +This document was generated by *tonghuix* on *March 25, 2016* using +[*texi2html 1.82*](http://www.nongnu.org/texi2html/).\ |