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1. How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand? {#how-much-surveillance-can-democracy-withstand .chapter}
=================================================

Thanks to Edward Snowden’s disclosures, we know that the current level
of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human rights.
The repeated harassment and prosecution of dissidents, sources, and
journalists in the US and elsewhere provides confirmation. We need to
reduce the level of general surveillance, but how far? Where exactly is
the *maximum tolerable level of surveillance,* which we must ensure is
not exceeded? It is the level beyond which surveillance starts to
interfere with the functioning of democracy, in that whistleblowers
(such as Snowden) are likely to be caught.

Faced with government secrecy, we the people depend on whistleblowers to
tell us what the state is doing.[(1)](#FOOT1) However, today’s
surveillance intimidates potential whistleblowers, which means it is too
much. To recover our democratic control over the state, we must reduce
surveillance to the point where whistleblowers know they are safe.

Using free/libre software, as I’ve advocated for 30 years, is the first
step in taking control of our digital lives, and that includes
preventing surveillance. We can’t trust nonfree software; the NSA
uses[(2)](#FOOT2) and even creates[(3)](#FOOT3) security weaknesses in
nonfree software to invade our own computers and routers. Free software
gives us control of our own computers, but that won’t protect our
privacy once we set foot on the internet.[(4)](#FOOT4)
@firstcopyingnotice{{@footnoterule @smallskip Copyright © 2015 Richard
Stallman\
 {A version of this article was first published on the [Wired](Wired)
web site under the same title (Wired, 14 October 2013,
<http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/a-necessary-evil-what-it-takes-for-democracy-to-survive-surveillance>).
This version is part of @fsfsthreecite}

Bipartisan legislation to “curtail the domestic surveillance
powers”[(5)](#FOOT5) in the US is being drawn up, but it relies on
limiting the government’s use of our virtual dossiers. That won’t
suffice to protect whistleblowers if “catching the whistleblower” is
grounds for access sufficient to identify him or her. We need to go
further.

### The Upper Limit on Surveillance in a Democracy {#the-upper-limit-on-surveillance-in-a-democracy .subheading}

If whistleblowers don’t dare reveal crimes and lies, we lose the last
shred of effective control over our government and institutions. That’s
why surveillance that enables the state to find out who has talked with
a reporter is too much surveillance—too much for democracy to endure.

An unnamed US government official ominously told journalists in 2011
that the US would not subpoena reporters because “We know who you’re
talking to.”[(6)](#FOOT6) Sometimes journalists’ phone call records are
subpoenaed[(7)](#FOOT7) to find this out, but Snowden has shown us that
in effect they subpoena all the phone call records of everyone in the
US, all the time, from Verizon[(8)](#FOOT8) and from other companies
too.[(9)](#FOOT9)\
 Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from states
that are willing to play dirty tricks on them. The ACLU has demonstrated
the US government’s systematic practice of infiltrating peaceful
dissident groups[(10)](#FOOT10) on the pretext that there might be
terrorists among them. The point at which surveillance is too much is
the point at which the state can find who spoke to a known journalist or
a known dissident.

### Information, Once Collected, Will Be Misused {#information-once-collected-will-be-misused .subheading}

When people recognize that the level of general surveillance is too
high, the first response is to propose limits on access to the
accumulated data. That sounds nice, but it won’t fix the problem, not
even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules. (The
NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it was unable to effectively
hold the NSA accountable.)[(11)](#FOOT11) Suspicion of a crime will be
grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of “espionage,”
finding the “spy” will provide an excuse to access the accumulated
material.

In addition, the state’s surveillance staff will misuse the data for
personal reasons. Some NSA agents used US surveillance systems to track
their lovers—past, present, or wished-for—in a practice called
“LOVEINT.”[(12)](#FOOT12) The NSA says it has caught and punished this a
few times; we don’t know how many other times it wasn’t caught. But
these events shouldn’t surprise us, because police have long used their
access to driver’s license records to track down someone attractive, a
practice known as “running a plate for a date.”[(13)](#FOOT13)

Surveillance data will always be used for other purposes, even if this
is prohibited. Once the data has been accumulated and the state has the
possibility of access to it, it can misuse that data in dreadful ways,
as shown by examples from Europe[(14)](#FOOT14) and the
US.[(15)](#FOOT15)

Personal data collected by the state is also likely to be obtained by
outside crackers that break the security of the servers, even by
crackers working for hostile states.[(16)](#FOOT16)

Governments can easily use massive surveillance capability to subvert
democracy directly.[(17)](#FOOT17)

Total surveillance accessible to the state enables the state to launch a
massive fishing expedition against any person. To make journalism and
democracy safe, we must limit the accumulation of data that is easily
accessible to the state.

### Robust Protection for Privacy Must Be Technical {#robust-protection-for-privacy-must-be-technical .subheading}

The Electronic Frontier Foundation and other organizations propose a set
of legal principles designed to prevent the abuses of massive
surveillance.[(18)](#FOOT18) These principles include, crucially,
explicit legal protection for whistleblowers; as a consequence, they
would be adequate for protecting democratic freedoms—if adopted
completely and enforced without exception forever.

However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history shows,
they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act), suspended, or
ignored.[(19)](#FOOT19)

Meanwhile, demagogues will cite the usual excuses as grounds for total
surveillance; any terrorist attack, even one that kills just a handful
of people, can be hyped to provide an opportunity.

If limits on access to the data are set aside, it will be as if they had
never existed: years’ worth of dossiers would suddenly become available
for misuse by the state and its agents and, if collected by companies,
for their private misuse as well. If, however, we stop the collection of
dossiers on everyone, those dossiers won’t exist, and there will be no
way to compile them retroactively. A new illiberal regime would have to
implement surveillance afresh, and it would only collect data starting
at that date. As for suspending or momentarily ignoring this law, the
idea would hardly make sense.

### First, Don’t Be Foolish {#first-dont-be-foolish .subheading}

To have privacy, you must not throw it away: the first one who has to
protect your privacy is you. Avoid identifying yourself to web sites,
contact them with Tor, and use browsers that block the schemes they use
to track visitors. Use the GNU Privacy Guard to encrypt the contents of
your email. Pay for things with cash.

Keep your own data; don’t store your data in a company’s “convenient”
server. It’s safe, however, to entrust a data backup to a commercial
service, provided you put the files in an archive and encrypt the whole
archive, including the names of the files, with free software on your
own computer before uploading it.

For privacy’s sake, you must avoid nonfree software since, as a
consequence of giving others control of your computing, it is likely to
spy on you.[(20)](#FOOT20) Avoid service as a software
substitute;[(21)](#FOOT21) as well as giving others control of your
computing, it requires you to hand over all the pertinent data to the
server.

Protect your friends’ and acquaintances’ privacy, too. Don’t give out
their personal information[(22)](#FOOT22) except how to contact them,
and never give any web site your list of email or phone contacts. Don’t
tell a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that they
might not wish to publish in a newspaper. Better yet, don’t be used by
Facebook at all. Reject communication systems that require users to give
their real names, even if you are going to give yours, since they
pressure other people to surrender their privacy.

Self-protection is essential, but even the most rigorous self-protection
is insufficient to protect your privacy on or from systems that don’t
belong to you. When we communicate with others or move around the city,
our privacy depends on the practices of society. We can avoid some of
the systems that surveil our communications and movements, but not all
of them. Clearly, the better solution is to make all these systems stop
surveilling people other than legitimate suspects.

### We Must Design Every System for Privacy {#we-must-design-every-system-for-privacy .subheading}

If we don’t want a total surveillance society, we must consider
surveillance a kind of social pollution, and limit the surveillance
impact of each new digital system just as we limit the environmental
impact of physical construction.

For example: “smart” meters for electricity are touted for sending the
power company moment-by-moment data about each customer’s electric
usage, including how usage compares with users in general. This is
implemented based on general surveillance, but does not require any
surveillance. It would be easy for the power company to calculate the
average usage in a residential neighborhood by dividing the total usage
by the number of subscribers, and send that to the meters. Each
customer’s meter could compare her usage, over any desired period of
time, with the average usage pattern for that period. The same benefit,
with no surveillance!

We need to design such privacy into all our digital systems.

### Remedy for Collecting Data: Leaving It Dispersed {#remedy-for-collecting-data-leaving-it-dispersed .subheading}

One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is to keep the data
dispersed and inconvenient to access. Old-fashioned security cameras
were no threat to privacy.[(23)](#FOOT23) The recording was stored on
the premises, and kept for a few weeks at most. Because of the
inconvenience of accessing these recordings, it was never done
massively; they were accessed only in the places where someone reported
a crime. It would not be feasible to physically collect millions of
tapes every day and watch them or copy them.

Nowadays, security cameras have become surveillance cameras: they are
connected to the internet so recordings can be collected in a data
center and saved forever. This is already dangerous, but it is going to
get worse. Advances in face recognition may bring the day when suspected
journalists can be tracked on the street all the time to see who they
talk with.

Internet-connected cameras often have lousy digital security themselves,
so anyone could watch what the camera sees.[(24)](#FOOT24) To restore
privacy, we should ban the use of internet-connected cameras aimed where
and when the public is admitted, except when carried by people. Everyone
must be free to post photos and video recordings occasionally, but the
systematic accumulation of such data on the internet must be limited.

### Remedy for Internet Commerce Surveillance {#remedy-for-internet-commerce-surveillance .subheading}

Most data collection comes from people’s own digital activities. Usually
the data is collected first by companies. But when it comes to the
threat to privacy and democracy, it makes no difference whether
surveillance is done directly by the state or farmed out to a business,
because the data that the companies collect is systematically available
to the state.

The NSA, through PRISM, has gotten into the databases of many large
internet corporations.[(25)](#FOOT25) AT&T has saved all its phone call
records since 1987 and makes them available to the DEA[(26)](#FOOT26) to
search on request. Strictly speaking, the US government does not possess
that data, but in practical terms it may as well possess it.

The goal of making journalism and democracy safe therefore requires that
we reduce the data collected about people by any organization, not just
by the state. We must redesign digital systems so that they do not
accumulate data about their users. If they need digital data about our
transactions, they should not be allowed to keep them more than a short
time beyond what is inherently necessary for their dealings with us.

One of the motives for the current level of surveillance of the internet
is that sites are financed through advertising based on tracking users’
activities and propensities. This converts a mere annoyance—advertising
that we can learn to ignore—into a surveillance system that harms us
whether we know it or not. Purchases over the internet also track their
users. And we are all aware that “privacy policies” are more excuses to
violate privacy than commitments to uphold it.

We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous
payments—anonymous for the payer, that is. (We don’t want the payee to
dodge taxes.) Bitcoin is not anonymous,[(27)](#FOOT27) though there are
efforts to develop ways to pay anonymously with Bitcoin. However,
technology for digital cash was first developed in the
1980s;[(28)](#FOOT28)we need only suitable business arrangements, and
for the state not to obstruct them.

A further threat from sites’ collection of personal data is that
security breakers might get in, take it, and misuse it. This includes
customers’ credit card details. An anonymous payment system would end
this danger: a security hole in the site can’t hurt you if the site
knows nothing about you.

### Remedy for Travel Surveillance {#remedy-for-travel-surveillance .subheading}

We must convert digital toll collection to anonymous payment (using
digital cash, for instance). License-plate recognition systems recognize
all license plates, and the data can be kept
indefinitely;[(29)](#FOOT29) they should be required by law to notice
and record only those license numbers that are on a list of cars sought
by court orders. A less secure alternative would record all cars locally
but only for a few days, and not make the full data available over the
internet; access to the data should be limited to searching for a list
of court-ordered license numbers.

The US “no-fly” list must be abolished because it is punishment without
trial.[(30)](#FOOT30)

It is acceptable to have a list of people whose person and luggage will
be searched with extra care, and anonymous passengers on domestic
flights could be treated as if they were on this list. It is also
acceptable to bar non-citizens, if they are not permitted to enter the
country at all, from boarding flights to the country. This ought to be
enough for all legitimate purposes.

Many mass transit systems use some kind of smart cards or RFIDs for
payment. These systems accumulate personal data: if you once make the
mistake of paying with anything but cash, they associate the card
permanently with your name. Furthermore, they record all travel
associated with each card. Together they amount to massive surveillance.
This data collection must be reduced.

Navigation services do surveillance: the user’s computer tells the map
service the user’s location and where the user wants to go; then the
server determines the route and sends it back to the user’s computer,
which displays it. Nowadays, the server probably records the user’s
locations, since there is nothing to prevent it. This surveillance is
not inherently necessary, and redesign could avoid it: free/libre
software in the user’s computer could download map data for the
pertinent regions (if not downloaded previously), compute the route, and
display it, without ever telling anyone where the user is or wants to
go.

Systems for borrowing bicycles, etc., can be designed so that the
borrower’s identity is known only inside the station where the item was
borrowed. Borrowing would inform all stations that the item is “out,” so
when the user returns it at any station (in general, a different one),
that station will know where and when that item was borrowed. It will
inform the other station that the item is no longer “out.” It will also
calculate the user’s bill, and send it (after waiting some random number
of minutes) to headquarters along a ring of stations, so that
headquarters would not find out which station the bill came from. Once
this is done, the return station would forget all about the transaction.
If an item remains “out” for too long, the station where it was borrowed
can inform headquarters; in that case, it could send the borrower’s
identity immediately.

### Remedy for Communications Dossiers {#remedy-for-communications-dossiers .subheading}

Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive data
on their users’ contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc.). With mobile
phones, they also record the user’s physical location.[(31)](#FOOT31)
They keep these dossiers for a long time: over 30 years, in the case of
AT&T. Soon they will even record the user’s body
activities.[(32)](#FOOT32) It appears that the NSA collects cell phone
location data in bulk.[(33)](#FOOT33)\
 Unmonitored communication is impossible where systems create such
dossiers. So it should be illegal to create or keep them. ISPs and phone
companies must not be allowed to keep this information for very long, in
the absence of a court order to surveil a certain party.

This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won’t physically
stop the government from collecting all the information immediately as
it is generated—which is what the US does with some or all phone
companies.[(34)](#FOOT34) We would have to rely on prohibiting that by
law. However, that would be better than the current situation, where the
relevant law (the PAT RIOT Act) does not clearly prohibit the practice.
In addition, if the government did resume this sort of surveillance, it
would not get data about everyone’s phone calls made prior to that time.

For privacy about who you exchange email with, a simple partial solution
is for you and others to use email services in a country that would
never cooperate with your own government, and which communicate with
each other using encryption. However, Ladar Levison (owner of the mail
service Lavabit that US surveillance sought to corrupt completely) has a
more sophisticated idea for an encryption system through which your
email service would know only that you sent mail to some user of my
email service, and my email service would know only that I received mail
from some user of your email service, but it would be hard to determine
that you had sent mail to me.

### But Some Surveillance Is Necessary {#but-some-surveillance-is-necessary .subheading}

For the state to find criminals, it needs to be able to investigate
specific crimes, or specific suspected planned crimes, under a court
order. With the internet, the power to tap phone conversations would
naturally extend to the power to tap internet connections. This power is
easy to abuse for political reasons, but it is also necessary.
Fortunately, this won’t make it possible to find whistleblowers after
the fact, if (as I recommend) we prevent digital systems from
accumulating massive dossiers before the fact.

Individuals with special state-granted power, such as police, forfeit
their right to privacy and must be monitored. (In fact, police have
their own jargon term for perjury, “testilying,”[(35)](#FOOT35) since
they do it so frequently, particularly about protesters and
photographers.[(36)](#FOOT36)) One city in California that required
police to wear video cameras all the time found their use of force fell
by 60 percent.[(37)](#FOOT37) The ACLU is in favor of this.

Corporations are not people, and not entitled to human
rights.[(38)](#FOOT38) It is legitimate to require businesses to publish
the details of processes that might cause chemical, biological, nuclear,
fiscal, computational (e.g., DRM[(39)](#FOOT39)) or political (e.g.,
lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for public
well-being. The danger of these operations (consider the BP oil spill,
the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs that of
terrorism.

However, journalism must be protected from surveillance even when it is
carried out as part of a business.

Digital technology has brought about a tremendous increase in the level
of surveillance of our movements, actions, and communications. It is far
more than we experienced in the 1990s, and far more than people behind
the Iron Curtain experienced in the 1980s,[(40)](#FOOT40) and proposed
legal limits on state use of the accumulated data would not alter that.

Companies are designing even more intrusive surveillance. Some project
that pervasive surveillance, hooked to companies such as Facebook, could
have deep effects on how people think.[(41)](#FOOT41)Such possibilities
are imponderable; but the threat to democracy is not speculation. It
exists and is visible today.

Unless we believe that our free countries previously suffered from a
grave surveillance deficit, and ought to be surveilled more than the
Soviet Union and East Germany were, we must reverse this increase. That
requires stopping the accumulation of big data about people.

<div class="footnote">

------------------------------------------------------------------------

### Footnotes

### [(1)](#DOCF1)

@raggedright Maira Sutton, “We’re TPP Activists: Reddit Asked Us
Everything,” 21 November 2013,
<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/reddit-tpp-ama>. @end raggedright

### [(2)](#DOCF2)

@raggedright Glyn Moody, “How Can Any Company Ever Trust Microsoft
Again?” 17 June 2013,
<http://www.computerworlduk.com/blogs/open-enterprise/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again-3569376/>.
@end raggedright

### [(3)](#DOCF3)

@raggedright James Ball, Julian Borger and Glenn Greenwald, “Revealed:
How US and UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security,”
6 September 2013,
<http://theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security>.
@end raggedright

### [(4)](#DOCF4)

@raggedright Bruce Schneier, “Want to Evade NSA Spying? Don’t Connect to
the Internet,” 7 October 2013, <http://www.wired.com/2013/10/149481/>.
@end raggedright

### [(5)](#DOCF5)

@raggedright Dan Roberts, “Patriot Act Author Prepares Bill to Put NSA
Bulk Collection ’Out of Business,’” 10 October 2013,
<http://theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill>.
@end raggedright

### [(6)](#DOCF6)

@raggedright Lucy Dalglish, “Lessons from Wye River,” The News Media &
the Law (Summer 2011): p. 1,
[http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/\
news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river](http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/%3Cbr%3Enews-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river).
@end raggedright

### [(7)](#DOCF7)

@raggedright Washington Agencies, “Yemen leak: former FBI man admits
passing information to Associated Press,” 24 September 2013,
[http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/\
sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press](http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/%3Cbr%3Esep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press).
@end raggedright

### [(8)](#DOCF8)

@raggedright See “Verizon forced to hand over telephone data—full court
ruling” (6 June 2013), at
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order>,
for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under which the US
government “is collecting the phone records of millions of US customers
of Verizon.” @end raggedright

### [(9)](#DOCF9)

@raggedright Siobhan Gorman, Evan Perez, and Janet Hook, “NSA
Data-Mining Digs into Networks Beyond Verizon,” 7 June 2013,
<http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07>.
@end raggedright

### [(10)](#DOCF10)

@raggedright ACLU, “Policing Free Speech: Police Surveillance And
Obstruction of First Amendment-Protected Activity,” 29 June 2010,
<https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf>. @end raggedright

### [(11)](#DOCF11)

@raggedright David Kravets, Kim Zetter, Kevin Poulsen, “NSA Illegally
Gorged on U.S. Phone Records for Three Years,” 10 September 2013,
<http://www.wired.com/2013/09/nsa-violations/>. @end raggedright

### [(12)](#DOCF12)

@raggedright Adam Gabbatt and agencies, “NSA Analysts ‘Wilfully
Violated’ Surveillance Systems, Agency Admits,” 24 August 2013,
<http://theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems>.
@end raggedright

### [(13)](#DOCF13)

@raggedright M. L. Elrick, “Cops Tap Database to Harass, Intimidate,”
31 July 2001,
<http://sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm#.VeQiuxcpDow>. @end
raggedright

### [(14)](#DOCF14)

@raggedright Rick Falkvinge, “Collected Personal Data Will Always Be
Used against the Citizens,” 17 March 2012,
<http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/>.
@end raggedright

### [(15)](#DOCF15)

@raggedright Consider, for instance, the US internment of Japanese
Americans during WWII. @end raggedright

### [(16)](#DOCF16)

@raggedright Mike Masnick, “Second OPM Hack Revealed: Even Worse Than
the First,” 12 June 2015,
<https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150612/16334231330/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first.shtml>.
@end raggedright

### [(17)](#DOCF17)

@raggedright Joanna Berendt, “Macedonia Government Is Blamed for
Wiretapping Scandal,” 21 June 2015,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html?_r=0>.
@end raggedright

### [(18)](#DOCF18)

@raggedright “International Principles on the Application of Human
Rights to Communications Surveillance,” last modified May 2014,\
 <https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text>. @end raggedright

### [(19)](#DOCF19)

@raggedright Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, “Officials Say U.S.
Wiretaps Exceeded Law,” 15 April 2009,
<http://nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html>. @end raggedright

### [(20)](#DOCF20)

@raggedright For decades, the free software movement has been denouncing
the abusive surveillance machine of proprietary software companies such
as Microsoft and Apple. For a growing list of the ways in which
surveillance has spread across industries, not only in the software
business, but also in the hardware and—away from the keyboard—in the
mobile computing industry, in the office, at home, in transportation
systems, and in the classroom, see
<http://gnu.org/philosophy/proprietary/proprietary-surveillance.html>.
@end raggedright

### [(21)](#DOCF21)

@raggedright See “Who Does That Server Really Serve?” (@pageref{Server})
for more information on this issue. @end raggedright

### [(22)](#DOCF22)

@raggedright Nicole Perlroth, “In Cybersecurity, Sometimes the Weakest
Link Is a Family Member,” 21 May 2014,
[http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/\
in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/](http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/%3Cbr%3Ein-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/).
@end raggedright

### [(23)](#DOCF23)

@raggedright I assume here that the security camera points at the inside
of a store, or at the street. Any camera pointed at someone’s private
space by someone else violates privacy, but that is another issue. @end
raggedright

### [(24)](#DOCF24)

@raggedright Ms. Smith, “CIA Wants to Spy On You through Your
Appliances,” 18 March 2012, [http://networkworld.com/article/2221934/\
microsoft-subnet/cia-wants-to-spy-on-you-through-your-appliances.html](http://networkworld.com/article/2221934/%3Cbr%3Emicrosoft-subnet/cia-wants-to-spy-on-you-through-your-appliances.html).
@end raggedright

### [(25)](#DOCF25)

@raggedright Jon Queally, “Latest Docs Show Financial Ties between NSA
and Internet Companies,” 23 August 2013,
<http://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/08/23/latest-docs-show-financial-ties-between-nsa-and-internet-companies>.
@end raggedright

### [(26)](#DOCF26)

@raggedright Scott Shane and Colin Moynihan, “Drug Agents Use Vast Phone
Trove, Eclipsing N.S.A.’s,” 1 September 2013,
[http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/\
drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/%3Cbr%3Edrug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0).
@end raggedright

### [(27)](#DOCF27)

@raggedright Dan Kaminsky, “Let’s Cut through the Bitcoin Hype: A
Hacker-Entrepreneur’s Take,” 3 May 2013,
[http://wired.com/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-\
bitcoin-hype/](http://wired.com/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-%3Cbr%3Ebitcoin-hype/).
@end raggedright

### [(28)](#DOCF28)

@raggedright Steven Levy, “E-Money (That’s What I Want),” Wired, 2.12
(December 1994),
<http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html>. @end
raggedright

### [(29)](#DOCF29)

@raggedright Richard Bilton, “Camera Grid to Log Number Plates,” last
updated on 22 May 2009,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/whos_watching_you/8064333.stm>.
@end raggedright

### [(30)](#DOCF30)

@raggedright Nusrat Choudhury, “Victory! Federal Court Recognizes
Constitutional Rights of Americans on the No-Fly List,” 29 August 2013,
[https://www.aclu.org/blog/victory-federal-court-recognizes-constitutional-rights-americans-\
no-fly-list](https://www.aclu.org/blog/victory-federal-court-recognizes-constitutional-rights-americans-%3Cbr%3Eno-fly-list).
@end raggedright

### [(31)](#DOCF31)

@raggedright Kai Biermann, “Betrayed by Our Own Data,” 26 March 2011,
<http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz>.
@end raggedright

### [(32)](#DOCF32)

@raggedright Sara M. Watson, “The Latest Smartphones Could Turn Us All
into Activity Trackers,” 10 October 2013,
[http://wired.com/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-\
of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-\
activity-trackers/](http://wired.com/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-%3Cbr%3Eof-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-%3Cbr%3Eactivity-trackers/).
@end raggedright

### [(33)](#DOCF33)

@raggedright Patrick Toomey, “It Sure Sounds Like the NSA Is Tracking
Our Locations,” 30 September 2013, [https://aclu.org/blog/it-\
sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-our-locations](https://aclu.org/blog/it-%3Cbr%3Esure-sounds-nsa-tracking-our-locations).
@end raggedright

### [(34)](#DOCF34)

@raggedright Glenn Greenwald, “NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions
of Verizon Customers Daily,” 6 June 2013,
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order>.
@end raggedright

### [(35)](#DOCF35)

@raggedright See, for instance, the articles “Testilying: Cops Are Liars
Who Get Away with Perjury” (Nick Malinowski, 3 February 2013,
[http://vice.com/read/\
testilying-cops-are-liars-who-get-away-with-perjury](http://vice.com/read/%3Cbr%3Etestilying-cops-are-liars-who-get-away-with-perjury))
and “Detective Is Found Guilty of Planting Drugs” (Tim Stelloh,
1 November 2011,
[http://nytimes.com/2011/11/02/nyregion/brooklyn-detective-convicted-of-\
planting-drugs-on-innocent-people.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0](http://nytimes.com/2011/11/02/nyregion/brooklyn-detective-convicted-of-%3Cbr%3Eplanting-drugs-on-innocent-people.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)),
for examples of the extent to which this practice has been normalized.
@end raggedright

### [(36)](#DOCF36)

@raggedright See the Photography Is Not a Crime web site, at\
 <http://photographyisnotacrime.com/>, for more on this issue. @end
raggedright

### [(37)](#DOCF37)

@raggedright Kevin Drum,“Ubiquitous Surveillance, Police Edition,”
22 August 2013,\
 [http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-\
police-edition](http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-%3Cbr%3Epolice-edition).
@end raggedright

### [(38)](#DOCF38)

@raggedright Public Citizen, “Call Your Representative: Tell Her or Him
to Co-Sponsor a Constitutional Amendment to Overturn Citizens United and
Restore Democracy to the People,” accessed August 2015,
<http://action.citizen.org/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=12266>.
@end raggedright

### [(39)](#DOCF39)

@raggedright See the related section in “Words to Avoid (or User with
Care)” (@pageref{DRM}) for more on this. @end raggedright

### [(40)](#DOCF40)

@raggedright James Allworth, “Your Smartphone Works for the Surveillance
State,” 7 June 2013,
<https://hbr.org/2013/06/your-iphone-works-for-the-secret-police>. @end
raggedright

### [(41)](#DOCF41)

@raggedright Evan Selinger and Brett Frischmann, “Will the Internet of
Things Result in Predictable People?” 10 August 2015,
<http://theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/10/internet-of-things-predictable-people>.
@end raggedright

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