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1. How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand? {#how-much-surveillance-can-democracy-withstand .chapter}
=================================================

1. 民主可以承受多少监控？ {#how-much-surveillance-can-democracy-withstand .chapter}
=========================

Thanks to Edward Snowden’s disclosures, we know that the current level
of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human rights.
The repeated harassment and prosecution of dissidents, sources, and
journalists in the US and elsewhere provides confirmation. We need to
reduce the level of general surveillance, but how far? Where exactly is
the *maximum tolerable level of surveillance,* which we must ensure is
not exceeded? It is the level beyond which surveillance starts to
interfere with the functioning of democracy, in that whistleblowers
(such as Snowden) are likely to be caught.

多亏了爱德华•斯诺登的揭露，我们才知道当今社会中的普遍监控级别已经与人权
不相容。在美国和世界其他地区持续发生的针对持不同政见者、信息来源和新闻工
作者的骚扰和指控确认了这一点。我们需要适当降低普遍监控的级别，但是到底应
当在多大程度上？我们所必须保证其不被超越的，可接受的最大监控级别到底是多
少？这种监控级别应当这样定义：一旦超过了这样的级别，监控行为将会干涉民主
的运行。此时揭露者（例如斯诺登）很可能因此而被逮捕。

Faced with government secrecy, we the people depend on whistleblowers to
tell us what the state is doing.[(1)](#FOOT1) However, today’s
surveillance intimidates potential whistleblowers, which means it is too
much. To recover our democratic control over the state, we must reduce
surveillance to the point where whistleblowers know they are safe.

面对政府的保密政策，我们作为人民只能依靠揭露者告知国家正在做什么[(1)](#FOOT1)。
然而，当今的监控对潜在的揭露者进行了威迫，也就是说监控程度过高。为了重获
我们对于国家的民主控制，我们必须设法降低监控级别使得揭露者能够确信他们是
安全的。

Using free/libre software, as I’ve advocated for 30 years, is the first
step in taking control of our digital lives, and that includes
preventing surveillance. We can’t trust nonfree software; the NSA
uses[(2)](#FOOT2) and even creates[(3)](#FOOT3) security weaknesses in
nonfree software to invade our own computers and routers. Free software
gives us control of our own computers, but that won’t protect our
privacy once we set foot on the internet.[(4)](#FOOT4)

如同我们所倡导了 30 多年的，使用自由软件是掌控我们自己的数字生活的第一步。
这也包括了避免被监控。我们不可能信任任何私有软件；由于美国国家安全局（NSA）
通过利用[(2)](#FOOT2)甚至还有制造[(3)](#FOOT3)私有软件中的安全漏洞用于入
侵我们自己的计算机和路由器。自由软件赋予了我们控制自己的计算机的权利，但
仅凭这一点并不足以在我们涉足互联网的时候保护我们的隐私[(4)](#FOOT4)。

@firstcopyingnotice{{@footnoterule @smallskip 著作权所有 (C) 2015 Richard
Stallman\
 {本文的一个版本最初以相同的标题发表于 [Wired](Wired) (Wired, 14 October 2013,
<http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/a-necessary-evil-what-it-takes-for-democracy-to-survive-surveillance>)。
此版本是 @fsfsthreecite 的一部分。}

Bipartisan legislation to “curtail the domestic surveillance
powers”[(5)](#FOOT5) in the US is being drawn up, but it relies on
limiting the government’s use of our virtual dossiers. That won’t
suffice to protect whistleblowers if “catching the whistleblower” is
grounds for access sufficient to identify him or her. We need to go
further.

美国国内“限制国内监控权力”(#FOOT5)的两党立法已经被提出，但它依赖于限制政
府对我们的虚拟档案的使用。这不足以保护揭露者，如果“逮捕揭露者”是获取足够
信息以确认此人身份的基础。

### The Upper Limit on Surveillance in a Democracy {#the-upper-limit-on-surveillance-in-a-democracy .subheading}

### 民主社会中的监控程度上限 {#the-upper-limit-on-surveillance-in-a-democracy .subheading}

If whistleblowers don’t dare reveal crimes and lies, we lose the last
shred of effective control over our government and institutions. That’s
why surveillance that enables the state to find out who has talked with
a reporter is too much surveillance—too much for democracy to endure.

如果揭露者不敢揭发罪行和谎言，我们将会失去对我们的政府和制度的仅存的有效
控制。这可以解释为何那种使得国家可以知道谁同记者进行交谈的监控行为是过分
的——超出了民主所能承受的范围。

An unnamed US government official ominously told journalists in 2011
that the US would not subpoena reporters because “We know who you’re
talking to.”[(6)](#FOOT6) Sometimes journalists’ phone call records are
subpoenaed[(7)](#FOOT7) to find this out, but Snowden has shown us that
in effect they subpoena all the phone call records of everyone in the
US, all the time, from Verizon[(8)](#FOOT8) and from other companies
too.[(9)](#FOOT9)\

在 2011 年，一位匿名的美国政府官员不怀好意地告诉新闻工作者：美国政府在传
唤记者时，并不会以“我们知道你同谁交谈”作为理由[(6)](#FOOT6)。有时，记者
的通话记录将会被传唤以获知这个问题的答案[(7)](#FOOT7)。但是，斯诺登已经
向我们展示，它们实际上将会在任何时刻传唤美国境内的任何人的所有通话记录，
通过 Verizon [(8)](#FOOT8)或其他通讯公司[(9)](#FOOT9)。\

 Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from states
that are willing to play dirty tricks on them. The ACLU has demonstrated
the US government’s systematic practice of infiltrating peaceful
dissident groups[(10)](#FOOT10) on the pretext that there might be
terrorists among them. The point at which surveillance is too much is
the point at which the state can find who spoke to a known journalist or
a known dissident.

反对者和持不同政见者的活动需要对国家保密，由于国家将会主动对他们施展阴谋
诡计。美国公民自由联盟（ACLU）已经指出美国政府对和平的持不同政见者和组织
所进行的系统性渗透行为，理由是他们当中可能潜伏着恐怖分子[(10)](#FOOT10)。

### Information, Once Collected, Will Be Misused {#information-once-collected-will-be-misused .subheading}

### 信息，一旦被采集，将会被滥用 {#information-once-collected-will-be-misused .subheading}

When people recognize that the level of general surveillance is too
high, the first response is to propose limits on access to the
accumulated data. That sounds nice, but it won’t fix the problem, not
even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules. (The
NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it was unable to effectively
hold the NSA accountable.)[(11)](#FOOT11) Suspicion of a crime will be
grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of “espionage,”
finding the “spy” will provide an excuse to access the accumulated
material.

当人们认识到普遍监控的级别过高的时候，他们的第一反应可能会是提议限制对所
采集到的数据的访问。这听起来很好，但这甚至丝毫不能解决问题，即使假定政府
遵守这条规则。（美国国家安全局（NSA）曾经欺骗美国外国情报监控法庭（FISA），
后者声称它不能有效地证实 NSA 对其监控行为有说明的义务。[(11)](#FOOT11)）
犯罪的嫌疑将成为访问这些数据的理由，于是，一旦揭露者被指控从事间谍活动，
试图找到这个间谍将会为访问所采集到的数据提供理由。

In addition, the state’s surveillance staff will misuse the data for
personal reasons. Some NSA agents used US surveillance systems to track
their lovers—past, present, or wished-for—in a practice called
“LOVEINT.”[(12)](#FOOT12) The NSA says it has caught and punished this a
few times; we don’t know how many other times it wasn’t caught. But
these events shouldn’t surprise us, because police have long used their
access to driver’s license records to track down someone attractive, a
practice known as “running a plate for a date.”[(13)](#FOOT13)

此外，国家监控系统的工作人员将会出于个人原因滥用数据。一些 NSA 间谍使用
美国国家监控系统来跟踪他们的情人——不论是过去的、现在的还是正在追求的——
并称此行为为 LOVEINT [(12)](#FOOT12)。NSA 宣称它已经发现了几次这样的行为
并对其进行了处罚；但是我们不知道还有多少次这样的行为未被抓到。然而，这些
事件并不会让我们感到惊讶，由于警方已经长期利用他们可访问的驾照记录以跟踪
那些迷倒了他们的对象。这种行为称之为“查询车牌获得约会”[(13)](#FOOT13)。

Surveillance data will always be used for other purposes, even if this
is prohibited. Once the data has been accumulated and the state has the
possibility of access to it, it can misuse that data in dreadful ways,
as shown by examples from Europe[(14)](#FOOT14) and the
US.[(15)](#FOOT15)

监控数据总是会被用于其他目的，即使这是被禁止的。只要数据被采集，国家就有
可能访问它们。国家可以以极坏的方式滥用这些数据，发生在欧洲[(14)](#FOOT14)
和美国[(15)](#FOOT15)的一些例子证实了这一点。

Personal data collected by the state is also likely to be obtained by
outside crackers that break the security of the servers, even by
crackers working for hostile states.[(16)](#FOOT16)

国家所采集的个人信息同样可能由于服务器的安全措施被攻陷而被境外破解者获得，
甚至是被那些效力于敌对国家的破解者获得[(16)](#FOOT16)。

Governments can easily use massive surveillance capability to subvert
democracy directly.[(17)](#FOOT17)

政府可以轻松地利用大规模监控能力直接颠覆民主[(17)](#FOOT17)。

Total surveillance accessible to the state enables the state to launch a
massive fishing expedition against any person. To make journalism and
democracy safe, we must limit the accumulation of data that is easily
accessible to the state.

国家对监控数据的完全访问权力使得国家可能对任何人发动大规模的彻底搜查。为
了保护新闻业和民主的安全，我们必须限制对信息的采集，而这些信息是国家可以
轻松访问的。

### Robust Protection for Privacy Must Be Technical {#robust-protection-for-privacy-must-be-technical .subheading}

### 对隐私的有效保护必须是技术层面的 {#robust-protection-for-privacy-must-be-technical .subheading}

The Electronic Frontier Foundation and other organizations propose a set
of legal principles designed to prevent the abuses of massive
surveillance.[(18)](#FOOT18) These principles include, crucially,
explicit legal protection for whistleblowers; as a consequence, they
would be adequate for protecting democratic freedoms—if adopted
completely and enforced without exception forever.

电子前哨基金会（EFF）和一些其他组织提出了一系列法律准则以期阻止大规模的
监控滥用[(18)](#FOOT18)。这些准则关键性地包括了对揭露者的明确的法律保护。
其结果是这些准则将足以保护民主自由——如果它们能够永久地得到完全采纳，并且
被没有例外地严格强制执行。

However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history shows,
they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act), suspended, or
ignored.[(19)](#FOOT19)

然而，这样的法律保护是不牢靠的：如同最近多年的历史事实所展示的，它们可以
被废除（如同在美国外国情报监控法案（FISA）修正案中）、被架空或者被无视[(19)](#FOOT19)。

Meanwhile, demagogues will cite the usual excuses as grounds for total
surveillance; any terrorist attack, even one that kills just a handful
of people, can be hyped to provide an opportunity.

同时，一些蛊惑民心的政客将会援引常见的理由作为支持完全监控的基础；任何恐
怖袭击，即使只是造成了极少的人员伤亡，也可以被夸大作为证据以支持上述理由。

If limits on access to the data are set aside, it will be as if they had
never existed: years’ worth of dossiers would suddenly become available
for misuse by the state and its agents and, if collected by companies,
for their private misuse as well. If, however, we stop the collection of
dossiers on everyone, those dossiers won’t exist, and there will be no
way to compile them retroactively. A new illiberal regime would have to
implement surveillance afresh, and it would only collect data starting
at that date. As for suspending or momentarily ignoring this law, the
idea would hardly make sense.

如果对数据访问的限制被搁置一旁，它就如同从未存在过一般：多年来的有价值的
档案将会立即可被国家和它的间谍所滥用。如果这些档案被商业公司获得，也会被
这些商业公司出于其私有目的而被滥用。然而，如果我们能够阻止对每个人的档案
的采集，这些档案将不复存在，并且国家不能反动地对它们进行编译。一种新的不
允许言论或行动自由的政体将会不得不从头实施监控，并且它自成立之初只会采集
新的数据。至于架空或者立即无视这条法律，这种想法几乎没有任何意义。

### First, Don’t Be Foolish {#first-dont-be-foolish .subheading}

### 最重要的是，不要犯傻！ {#first-dont-be-foolish .subheading}

To have privacy, you must not throw it away: the first one who has to
protect your privacy is you. Avoid identifying yourself to web sites,
contact them with Tor, and use browsers that block the schemes they use
to track visitors. Use the GNU Privacy Guard to encrypt the contents of
your email. Pay for things with cash.

如果您想要拥有隐私，您一定不要主动将其放弃：有义务保护您的隐私的最重要的
人就是您自己！您必须避免向网站暴露自己的身份，您可以使用 Tor 同它们联络，
或者使用那些能够阻止网站用于跟踪访问者的阴谋诡计的浏览器。您可以使用 GNU 
隐私卫士（GNU PG）加密您的邮件内容。您可以使用现金支付任何费用。

Keep your own data; don’t store your data in a company’s “convenient”
server. It’s safe, however, to entrust a data backup to a commercial
service, provided you put the files in an archive and encrypt the whole
archive, including the names of the files, with free software on your
own computer before uploading it.

保护您自己的数据；不要将您的数据储存在某家商业公司的“简便易用”的服务器上。
然而，在下面这种情况下，将数据存储在商业服务之上是安全的：只要您将文件置
于归档文件中，并且加密整个归档文件，包括文件名。务必使用自由软件在您自己
的计算机上进行操作，然后再上传。

For privacy’s sake, you must avoid nonfree software since, as a
consequence of giving others control of your computing, it is likely to
spy on you.[(20)](#FOOT20) Avoid service as a software
substitute;[(21)](#FOOT21) as well as giving others control of your
computing, it requires you to hand over all the pertinent data to the
server.

出于隐私考虑，您必须避免使用私有软件，这是由于私有软件赋予他人控制您的计
算机使用的权力，它们很可能在监控您[(20)](#FOOT20)。您还应该拒绝使用“软件
即服务”（SaaSS）[(21)](#FOOT21)，同样由于这赋予了他人控制您的计算机使用
的权力，它要求您将全部相关数据提交到它们的服务器。

Protect your friends’ and acquaintances’ privacy, too. Don’t give out
their personal information[(22)](#FOOT22) except how to contact them,
and never give any web site your list of email or phone contacts. Don’t
tell a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that they
might not wish to publish in a newspaper. Better yet, don’t be used by
Facebook at all. Reject communication systems that require users to give
their real names, even if you are going to give yours, since they
pressure other people to surrender their privacy.

您也需要保护您的朋友或熟人的隐私。除了联系方式以外，不要泄露他们的任何个
人信息[(22)](#FOOT22)。并且不要向任何网站泄露您的邮件列表或者电话联系人。
不要将您的朋友的任何信息告诉诸如 Facebook 这样的公司，因为您的朋友也许并
不想在报纸上公布他们的名字。如果可能，根本不要被 Facebook 所利用。拒绝使
用任何要求用户提供真实姓名的通讯系统，即使您愿意供出您的名字，由于这些通
讯系统向他人施压以迫使他们交出隐私。

Self-protection is essential, but even the most rigorous self-protection
is insufficient to protect your privacy on or from systems that don’t
belong to you. When we communicate with others or move around the city,
our privacy depends on the practices of society. We can avoid some of
the systems that surveil our communications and movements, but not all
of them. Clearly, the better solution is to make all these systems stop
surveilling people other than legitimate suspects.

自我保护是至关重要的，但即使是最严密的自我保护也不足以保护您的隐私免于被
不属于您的系统所泄露。当我们与他人通讯或者在城市内出行的时候，我们的隐私
取决于社会的实践。我们可以避开一些但不是全部的可以监控我们的通讯或行踪的
系统。显然，更佳的解决方案是使得所有这些系统停止监控人们，而非使嫌疑对象
合法。

### We Must Design Every System for Privacy {#we-must-design-every-system-for-privacy .subheading}

### 我们必须为了隐私而去设计各种系统 {#we-must-design-every-system-for-privacy .subheading}

If we don’t want a total surveillance society, we must consider
surveillance a kind of social pollution, and limit the surveillance
impact of each new digital system just as we limit the environmental
impact of physical construction.

如果我们不想要一个全面监控的社会，我们必须将监控视为一种社会污染，并且限
制每一个新的数字系统的监控影响，如同我们限制实体建设的环境影响。

For example: “smart” meters for electricity are touted for sending the
power company moment-by-moment data about each customer’s electric
usage, including how usage compares with users in general. This is
implemented based on general surveillance, but does not require any
surveillance. It would be easy for the power company to calculate the
average usage in a residential neighborhood by dividing the total usage
by the number of subscribers, and send that to the meters. Each
customer’s meter could compare her usage, over any desired period of
time, with the average usage pattern for that period. The same benefit,
with no surveillance!

例如，智能电表宣称它能够向电力公司持续发送每位用户的电力消耗，包括与普通
用户相比较的情况。这种统计是基于普遍监控而实现的，但实际上却又不需要任何
监控行为。电力公司可以容易地计算出某一居住区的平均电力消耗，通过将总消耗
除以购电者的数量，并且将这个平均值发送至电表。每个用户的电表可以将本人的
电力使用情况同任何时期的平均电力使用相比较，这样就可以不用监控而实现所有
好处。

We need to design such privacy into all our digital systems.

我们需要将这样的隐私设计融入我们所有的数字系统。

### Remedy for Collecting Data: Leaving It Dispersed {#remedy-for-collecting-data-leaving-it-dispersed .subheading}

### 针对数据采集的补救：让数据分散开来 {#remedy-for-collecting-data-leaving-it-dispersed .subheading}

One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is to keep the data
dispersed and inconvenient to access. Old-fashioned security cameras
were no threat to privacy.[(23)](#FOOT23) The recording was stored on
the premises, and kept for a few weeks at most. Because of the
inconvenience of accessing these recordings, it was never done
massively; they were accessed only in the places where someone reported
a crime. It would not be feasible to physically collect millions of
tapes every day and watch them or copy them.

使监控行为不危害隐私的一种方式是保持数据处于分散状态从而难于访问。老式的
安全摄像机对于隐私很少构成威胁[(23)](#FOOT23)，由于录像数据存储在安装这
些设备的营业场所内，并且至多被保存几周。由于访问这些数据相对困难，这种数
据采集行动从未被大规模部署；只有当某人报导一起犯罪行为时，这些影响数据才
会被访问。每天对数以百万计的数据卡带进行人工采集再进行观看或复制可能是不
现实的。

Nowadays, security cameras have become surveillance cameras: they are
connected to the internet so recordings can be collected in a data
center and saved forever. This is already dangerous, but it is going to
get worse. Advances in face recognition may bring the day when suspected
journalists can be tracked on the street all the time to see who they
talk with.

如今，安全摄像机已经变成了监控摄像机：由于它们被连接到互联网，影像记录可
以被采集到一所数据中心并被永久保存。这已经是很危险的了，但事情正在变得更
坏。面部识别技术的发展使得这样的事情成为可能：对可疑的新闻记者在街道上进
行不间断跟踪以便察看他们同何人交谈。

Internet-connected cameras often have lousy digital security themselves,
so anyone could watch what the camera sees.[(24)](#FOOT24) To restore
privacy, we should ban the use of internet-connected cameras aimed where
and when the public is admitted, except when carried by people. Everyone
must be free to post photos and video recordings occasionally, but the
systematic accumulation of such data on the internet must be limited.

通常，联网的摄像机自身的数据安全措施极差，使得几乎任何人都能察看它所记录
的内容[(24)](#FOOT24)。为了重获隐私，我们应当禁止在针对公众的场合使用联
网的摄像机，除非它由人进行操作。每个人必须被允许偶尔发布照片或视频记录，
但对于互联网上的相关数据的系统性采集行为必须受到限制。

### Remedy for Internet Commerce Surveillance {#remedy-for-internet-commerce-surveillance .subheading}

### 针对互联网商业监控的补救 {#remedy-for-internet-commerce-surveillance .subheading}

Most data collection comes from people’s own digital activities. Usually
the data is collected first by companies. But when it comes to the
threat to privacy and democracy, it makes no difference whether
surveillance is done directly by the state or farmed out to a business,
because the data that the companies collect is systematically available
to the state.

大部分数据采集行为来自于人们自身的数字活动。数据通常首先由商业公司进行采
集。但是，当讨论监控行为对隐私和民主的威胁的时候，监控行为直接由国家进行
或者由商业公司代为进行并无本质区别，由于商业公司所采集的数据，国家也可以
系统性地获取。

The NSA, through PRISM, has gotten into the databases of many large
internet corporations.[(25)](#FOOT25) AT&T has saved all its phone call
records since 1987 and makes them available to the DEA[(26)](#FOOT26) to
search on request. Strictly speaking, the US government does not possess
that data, but in practical terms it may as well possess it.

NSA 通过棱镜计划（PRISM）进入了多家大型互联网公司的数据库[(25)](#FOOT25)。
AT&T 自 1987 年起保存了所有通话记录并且允许美国缉毒局（DEA）对其所有数据
进行搜索[(26)](#FOOT26)。严格地说，美国政府并不直接拥有这些数据，但它实际
上拥有这些数据。

The goal of making journalism and democracy safe therefore requires that
we reduce the data collected about people by any organization, not just
by the state. We must redesign digital systems so that they do not
accumulate data about their users. If they need digital data about our
transactions, they should not be allowed to keep them more than a short
time beyond what is inherently necessary for their dealings with us.

因此，为了保证新闻业和民主的安全，我们必须减少由任何组织采集的关于个人的
数据，而不仅仅是由国家采集的数据。我们必须这样重新设计各种数字系统以使其
不再采集其用户的数据。如果它们确实需要关于我们的重要数字数据，当超出处理
数据所需的基本时间以后，它们不应该被允许继续保留那些数据。

One of the motives for the current level of surveillance of the internet
is that sites are financed through advertising based on tracking users’
activities and propensities. This converts a mere annoyance—advertising
that we can learn to ignore—into a surveillance system that harms us
whether we know it or not. Purchases over the internet also track their
users. And we are all aware that “privacy policies” are more excuses to
violate privacy than commitments to uphold it.

当前的互联网监控级别的动机之一是网站通过跟踪用户的活动和偏好的广告行为而
获得经济支持。这使得广告，作为一种我们可以学会无视之的行为，从一种仅仅是
恼人的行为变成了一种对我们造成伤害的监控系统，不论我们是否了解它的内情。
互联网购物同样会跟踪用户，我们都已经意识到，所谓的“隐私条款”与其说是维护
用户隐私的承诺，不如说是它们用于侵犯用户隐私的借口。

We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous
payments—anonymous for the payer, that is. (We don’t want the payee to
dodge taxes.) Bitcoin is not anonymous,[(27)](#FOOT27) though there are
efforts to develop ways to pay anonymously with Bitcoin. However,
technology for digital cash was first developed in the
1980s;[(28)](#FOOT28)we need only suitable business arrangements, and
for the state not to obstruct them.

我们可以通过采用一种匿名支付系统——即隐藏付款人的身份——来解决以上两个问题。
（我们并不想协助收款人避税。）比特币不是匿名的[(27)](#FOOT27)，尽管有人
试图开发出允许使用比特币进行匿名支付的方式。然而，数字货币技术的开发始于 
20 世纪 80 年代[(28)](#FOOT28)；我们只需要对商业规则进行适当调整，并且使
得国家不会阻止它们。

A further threat from sites’ collection of personal data is that
security breakers might get in, take it, and misuse it. This includes
customers’ credit card details. An anonymous payment system would end
this danger: a security hole in the site can’t hurt you if the site
knows nothing about you.

网站对个人数据的采集的更大的威胁在于破解者可以攻陷安全措施，获取并滥用个
人数据。这可能还包括用户的信用卡信息。而匿名支付系统可以终结这种威胁：网
站的安全漏洞不会危害您，如果网站并不知道您的任何信息。

### Remedy for Travel Surveillance {#remedy-for-travel-surveillance .subheading}

### 针对旅行监控的补救 {#remedy-for-travel-surveillance .subheading}

We must convert digital toll collection to anonymous payment (using
digital cash, for instance). License-plate recognition systems recognize
all license plates, and the data can be kept
indefinitely;[(29)](#FOOT29) they should be required by law to notice
and record only those license numbers that are on a list of cars sought
by court orders. A less secure alternative would record all cars locally
but only for a few days, and not make the full data available over the
internet; access to the data should be limited to searching for a list
of court-ordered license numbers.

我们必须将数字收费系统改为匿名支付系统（例如使用数字货币）。牌照识别系统
将会识别各种牌照，而这些数据可以被无限期保存[(29)](#FOOT29)；应该由法律
要求它们仅仅记录那些由法庭命令要求追查的牌照号码。另一种不太安全的措施是
在本地记录所有车辆牌照，但仅保存几天时间，并且不允许从网络访问所有数据；
对数据的访问应该限于搜索一系列由法庭命令要求追查的牌照号码之中。

The US “no-fly” list must be abolished because it is punishment without
trial.[(30)](#FOOT30)

美国“禁飞黑名单”必须被废除，由于这是一种未经审判的刑罚[(30)](#FOOT30)。

It is acceptable to have a list of people whose person and luggage will
be searched with extra care, and anonymous passengers on domestic
flights could be treated as if they were on this list. It is also
acceptable to bar non-citizens, if they are not permitted to enter the
country at all, from boarding flights to the country. This ought to be
enough for all legitimate purposes.

要求对某个黑名单上的乘客的行李进行额外的搜查是可以接受的，国内航班上的匿
名乘客可以被视为在此黑名单之上。禁止非某国公民登上飞往该国的航班也是可以
接受的，如果他们甚至未被批准入境。这些措施对于任何法律目的都是足够的。

Many mass transit systems use some kind of smart cards or RFIDs for
payment. These systems accumulate personal data: if you once make the
mistake of paying with anything but cash, they associate the card
permanently with your name. Furthermore, they record all travel
associated with each card. Together they amount to massive surveillance.
This data collection must be reduced.

很多公共交通系统使用某种智能卡或者射频识别（RFID）设备进行支付。这些系统
将会采集个人数据：只要您错误地使用现金以外的任何方式进行支付，它们将会将
此卡片和您的姓名永久关联起来。接下来，它们将会记录与每块卡片相关联的所有
出行信息。这些行为加起来已经构成了大规模监控，这样的数据采集必须被限制。

Navigation services do surveillance: the user’s computer tells the map
service the user’s location and where the user wants to go; then the
server determines the route and sends it back to the user’s computer,
which displays it. Nowadays, the server probably records the user’s
locations, since there is nothing to prevent it. This surveillance is
not inherently necessary, and redesign could avoid it: free/libre
software in the user’s computer could download map data for the
pertinent regions (if not downloaded previously), compute the route, and
display it, without ever telling anyone where the user is or wants to
go.

导航服务也会进行监控：用户的计算机将用户的所在地和目的地告知地图服务；而
后服务器确定路线，返回用户的计算机并且显示出来。现在，服务器很可能会记录
用户的位置信息，由于没有什么措施能够阻止它们这样做。这种监控行为本质上并
不必要，并且可以通过重新设计来解决：用户计算机中的自由软件将会下载相关地
区的地图数据（如果之前从未下载），计算出最佳路线并且显示出来，而无需告知
任何人用户的所在地或目的地。

Systems for borrowing bicycles, etc., can be designed so that the
borrower’s identity is known only inside the station where the item was
borrowed. Borrowing would inform all stations that the item is “out,” so
when the user returns it at any station (in general, a different one),
that station will know where and when that item was borrowed. It will
inform the other station that the item is no longer “out.” It will also
calculate the user’s bill, and send it (after waiting some random number
of minutes) to headquarters along a ring of stations, so that
headquarters would not find out which station the bill came from. Once
this is done, the return station would forget all about the transaction.
If an item remains “out” for too long, the station where it was borrowed
can inform headquarters; in that case, it could send the borrower’s
identity immediately.

用于诸如自行车租借等目的的系统可以这样设计：租借者的身份仅在其借出物品的
站点内可知。物品借出时，将会通知所有站点某件物品处于借出状态，这样，当用
户将物品返还回任何站点（通常是另一处站点）的时候，该站点将会获知该物品被
借出的时间和地点，同时将会告知所有其他站点该物品不再处于借出状态。站点还
会计算用户的账单并将账单信息（等待随机长度的时间之后）沿着一系列环形拓扑
结构的站点之间的线路发送至总部。这样，总部将不会获知账单信息来自哪个站点。
当这一操作完成后，归还站点将会忘记所有与这笔已完成的业务有关的信息。如果
某一物品长时间处于借出状态，借出该物品的站点将会告知总部。此时，它可以立
即发送借用者的身份信息。

### Remedy for Communications Dossiers {#remedy-for-communications-dossiers .subheading}

### 关于通讯档案的补救 {#remedy-for-communications-dossiers .subheading}

Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive data
on their users’ contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc.). With mobile
phones, they also record the user’s physical location.[(31)](#FOOT31)
They keep these dossiers for a long time: over 30 years, in the case of
AT&T. Soon they will even record the user’s body
activities.[(32)](#FOOT32) It appears that the NSA collects cell phone
location data in bulk.[(33)](#FOOT33)\

互联网服务供应商（ISP）和电信公司保存着它们的用户的联系人的海量数据（浏
览、通话记录等）。对于移动电话，还会记录用户的物理位置[(31)](#FOOT31)，
例如 AT&T 已保存了超过 30 年。不久以后它们甚至还会记录用户的身体活动[(32)](#FOOT32)。
并且 NSA 很可能正在大规模采集移动电话的物理位置数据[(33)](#FOOT33)。\

 Unmonitored communication is impossible where systems create such
dossiers. So it should be illegal to create or keep them. ISPs and phone
companies must not be allowed to keep this information for very long, in
the absence of a court order to surveil a certain party.

只要通讯系统创建这样的通讯档案，不受监视的通讯就不可能实现。因此创建或记
录这些通讯档案应该被判定为非法。ISP 和电信公司必须不被允许长期保存这些信
息，或者在没有法庭命令的情况下长期监控某一特定人群。

This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won’t physically
stop the government from collecting all the information immediately as
it is generated—which is what the US does with some or all phone
companies.[(34)](#FOOT34) We would have to rely on prohibiting that by
law. However, that would be better than the current situation, where the
relevant law (the PAT RIOT Act) does not clearly prohibit the practice.
In addition, if the government did resume this sort of surveillance, it
would not get data about everyone’s phone calls made prior to that time.

这种解决方案并不是完全令人满意，由于这并不能实际上阻止政府在通讯信息生成
的时候立即对其进行采集——这正是美国政府对部分或全部电信公司所做的[(34)](#FOOT34)。
我们可能想要依靠法律禁止这种行为。但是，这种假设比现实的状况好得多，现实
中的相关法律（美国爱国者法案，我称之为 PAT RIOT Act）并不明确禁止这种行
为。此外，如果政府重启这种监控，它不应得到重启监控的时间点之前发生的每位
用户的通话记录数据。

For privacy about who you exchange email with, a simple partial solution
is for you and others to use email services in a country that would
never cooperate with your own government, and which communicate with
each other using encryption. However, Ladar Levison (owner of the mail
service Lavabit that US surveillance sought to corrupt completely) has a
more sophisticated idea for an encryption system through which your
email service would know only that you sent mail to some user of my
email service, and my email service would know only that I received mail
from some user of your email service, but it would be hard to determine
that you had sent mail to me.

为了保护您的电子邮件联系人的隐私，一种简单的方式是您和他人都使用某个不会
与您所在国家政府进行合作的国家提供的邮件服务，并且在通讯过程中使用加密。
然而，Ladar Levison（Lavabit 的拥有者，美国监控系统试图对其邮件服务实现
完全控制）提出了一种更为高级的加密系统设想：您向我的邮件服务的某位客户发
送邮件，我的邮件服务所知道的只是我收到了来自您所使用的邮件服务的某位用户
的邮件，但难以确认是您向我发送了邮件。

### But Some Surveillance Is Necessary {#but-some-surveillance-is-necessary .subheading}

### 但是，适度的监控是必需的 {#but-some-surveillance-is-necessary .subheading}

For the state to find criminals, it needs to be able to investigate
specific crimes, or specific suspected planned crimes, under a court
order. With the internet, the power to tap phone conversations would
naturally extend to the power to tap internet connections. This power is
easy to abuse for political reasons, but it is also necessary.
Fortunately, this won’t make it possible to find whistleblowers after
the fact, if (as I recommend) we prevent digital systems from
accumulating massive dossiers before the fact.

国家为了缉捕罪犯，它需要能够在法庭命令下调查特定的犯罪行为或者疑似犯罪预
谋。在互联网时代，监听通话的权力自然延伸到监听互联网连接的权力。这种权力
容易处于政治原因而被滥用，但这也是必需的。幸运的是，这并不会使得在案件发
生之后找到揭露者变为可能，如果（如我所建议的）能够阻止数字系统在事件发生
之前进行大规模档案信息采集。

Individuals with special state-granted power, such as police, forfeit
their right to privacy and must be monitored. (In fact, police have
their own jargon term for perjury, “testilying,”[(35)](#FOOT35) since
they do it so frequently, particularly about protesters and
photographers.[(36)](#FOOT36)) One city in California that required
police to wear video cameras all the time found their use of force fell
by 60 percent.[(37)](#FOOT37) The ACLU is in favor of this.

拥有国家赋予的权力的个人，例如警察，将被收回个人的隐私权并且必须被监视。
（事实上，警察拥有属于他们自己的伪证罪的别名 testilying[(35)](#FOOT35)。
由于他们经常做出这样的事情，特别是对于抗议者和摄影师[(36)](#FOOT36)。）
加州的某个城市要求警察随时随身携带摄像机之后，他们的武力使用下降了 60% [(37)](#FOOT37)。
ACLU 对此表示欢迎。

Corporations are not people, and not entitled to human
rights.[(38)](#FOOT38) It is legitimate to require businesses to publish
the details of processes that might cause chemical, biological, nuclear,
fiscal, computational (e.g., DRM[(39)](#FOOT39)) or political (e.g.,
lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for public
well-being. The danger of these operations (consider the BP oil spill,
the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs that of
terrorism.

商业公司不是自然人，因此不应被赋予自然人的权利[(38)](#FOOT38)。要求商业
公司公开其行为的细节是正当合理的，这些行为可能会造成对社会的化学、生物、
核、财政、计算机相关（例如数字版权管理 DRM [(39)](#FOOT39)）或者政治（
例如游说拉票行为）等方面的危害，这些危害级别必须被控制在公众幸福所要求
的范围以内。这些行为造成的危害（考虑诸如墨西哥湾漏油事件、福岛核电站事
故、2008 年财政危机等）更甚于恐怖主义。

However, journalism must be protected from surveillance even when it is
carried out as part of a business.

然而，新闻业必须被保护免遭监控，即使这种监控行为是作为某项业务的一部分而
被执行的。

Digital technology has brought about a tremendous increase in the level
of surveillance of our movements, actions, and communications. It is far
more than we experienced in the 1990s, and far more than people behind
the Iron Curtain experienced in the 1980s,[(40)](#FOOT40) and proposed
legal limits on state use of the accumulated data would not alter that.

数字技术的进展极大地提高了我们的出行、活动和通讯所受的监控水平。这种监控
水平远远超过了 20 世纪 90 年代我们所经历过的，也远远超过了 20 世纪 80 年
代生活在铁幕笼罩之下的人们所经历的[(40)](#FOOT40)。而提议对国家使用采集
到的数据进行法律限制并不能改变这种状况。

Companies are designing even more intrusive surveillance. Some project
that pervasive surveillance, hooked to companies such as Facebook, could
have deep effects on how people think.[(41)](#FOOT41)Such possibilities
are imponderable; but the threat to democracy is not speculation. It
exists and is visible today.

商业公司正在设计更具侵略性的监控设施。一些充斥着监控行为的工程依附于诸如 
Facebook 之类的公司，它们可能对人们的思考方式产生深远的影响[(41)](#FOOT41)。
这样的可能性是不可预测的；然而它对民主的威胁已经不是推测。这种威胁无处不
在，随时可见。

Unless we believe that our free countries previously suffered from a
grave surveillance deficit, and ought to be surveilled more than the
Soviet Union and East Germany were, we must reverse this increase. That
requires stopping the accumulation of big data about people.

除非我们坚信我们的自由国家之前的监控行为严重欠缺，并且我们理应受到更甚于
苏联和联邦德国那样的监控。否则我们必须逆转这种监控升级的趋势，这依赖于阻
止对民众的大数据进行大规模采集。

<div class="footnote">

------------------------------------------------------------------------

### Footnotes

### [(1)](#DOCF1)

@raggedright Maira Sutton, “We’re TPP Activists: Reddit Asked Us
Everything,” 21 November 2013,
<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/reddit-tpp-ama>. @end raggedright

### [(2)](#DOCF2)

@raggedright Glyn Moody, “How Can Any Company Ever Trust Microsoft
Again?” 17 June 2013,
<http://www.computerworlduk.com/blogs/open-enterprise/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again-3569376/>.
@end raggedright

### [(3)](#DOCF3)

@raggedright James Ball, Julian Borger and Glenn Greenwald, “Revealed:
How US and UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security,”
6 September 2013,
<http://theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security>.
@end raggedright

### [(4)](#DOCF4)

@raggedright Bruce Schneier, “Want to Evade NSA Spying? Don’t Connect to
the Internet,” 7 October 2013, <http://www.wired.com/2013/10/149481/>.
@end raggedright

### [(5)](#DOCF5)

@raggedright Dan Roberts, “Patriot Act Author Prepares Bill to Put NSA
Bulk Collection ’Out of Business,’” 10 October 2013,
<http://theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill>.
@end raggedright

### [(6)](#DOCF6)

@raggedright Lucy Dalglish, “Lessons from Wye River,” The News Media &
the Law (Summer 2011): p. 1,
[http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/\
news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river](http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/%3Cbr%3Enews-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river).
@end raggedright

### [(7)](#DOCF7)

@raggedright Washington Agencies, “Yemen leak: former FBI man admits
passing information to Associated Press,” 24 September 2013,
[http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/\
sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press](http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/%3Cbr%3Esep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press).
@end raggedright

### [(8)](#DOCF8)

@raggedright 参见 “Verizon forced to hand over telephone data—full court
ruling” (6 June 2013) 位于
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order>,
以获得关于美国外国情报监控法庭（FISA）之下美国政府采集 Verizon 旗下数以百万计的美国客户的通话记录的信息。 @end raggedright

### [(9)](#DOCF9)

@raggedright Siobhan Gorman, Evan Perez, and Janet Hook, “NSA
Data-Mining Digs into Networks Beyond Verizon,” 7 June 2013,
<http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07>.
@end raggedright

### [(10)](#DOCF10)

@raggedright ACLU, “Policing Free Speech: Police Surveillance And
Obstruction of First Amendment-Protected Activity,” 29 June 2010,
<https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf>. @end raggedright

### [(11)](#DOCF11)

@raggedright David Kravets, Kim Zetter, Kevin Poulsen, “NSA Illegally
Gorged on U.S. Phone Records for Three Years,” 10 September 2013,
<http://www.wired.com/2013/09/nsa-violations/>. @end raggedright

### [(12)](#DOCF12)

@raggedright Adam Gabbatt and agencies, “NSA Analysts ‘Wilfully
Violated’ Surveillance Systems, Agency Admits,” 24 August 2013,
<http://theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems>.
@end raggedright

### [(13)](#DOCF13)

@raggedright M. L. Elrick, “Cops Tap Database to Harass, Intimidate,”
31 July 2001,
<http://sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm#.VeQiuxcpDow>. @end
raggedright

### [(14)](#DOCF14)

@raggedright Rick Falkvinge, “Collected Personal Data Will Always Be
Used against the Citizens,” 17 March 2012,
<http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/>.
@end raggedright

### [(15)](#DOCF15)

@raggedright 考虑二战期间被收容的日裔美国人。 @end raggedright

### [(16)](#DOCF16)

@raggedright Mike Masnick, “Second OPM Hack Revealed: Even Worse Than
the First,” 12 June 2015,
<https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150612/16334231330/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first.shtml>.
@end raggedright

### [(17)](#DOCF17)

@raggedright Joanna Berendt, “Macedonia Government Is Blamed for
Wiretapping Scandal,” 21 June 2015,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html?_r=0>.
@end raggedright

### [(18)](#DOCF18)

@raggedright “International Principles on the Application of Human
Rights to Communications Surveillance,” last modified May 2014,\
 <https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text>. @end raggedright

### [(19)](#DOCF19)

@raggedright Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, “Officials Say U.S.
Wiretaps Exceeded Law,” 15 April 2009,
<http://nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html>. @end raggedright

### [(20)](#DOCF20)

@raggedright 几十年来，自由软件运动一直致力于揭露私有软件公司诸如微软
和苹果的专权的监控机制。监控行为已经在各行业之间蔓延，而不再限于软件产
业，并且——离开键盘的限制——进入移动计算业界，在办公室、家庭、交通工具、
教室内等。如需获知监控行为进入这些领域的不断增加的方式，参见
<http://gnu.org/philosophy/proprietary/proprietary-surveillance.html>.
@end raggedright

### [(21)](#DOCF21)

@raggedright 参见 “Who Does That Server Really Serve?” (@pageref{Server})
一文以获取更多信息。 @end raggedright

### [(22)](#DOCF22)

@raggedright Nicole Perlroth, “In Cybersecurity, Sometimes the Weakest
Link Is a Family Member,” 21 May 2014,
[http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/\
in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/](http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/%3Cbr%3Ein-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/).
@end raggedright

### [(23)](#DOCF23)

@raggedright 我在此假定安全摄像机用于诸如商店内部或大街上。任何由其他
人架设的对准某人私人空间的摄像机侵犯了隐私，但这是另一个问题。 @end
raggedright

### [(24)](#DOCF24)

@raggedright Ms. Smith, “CIA Wants to Spy On You through Your
Appliances,” 18 March 2012, [http://networkworld.com/article/2221934/\
microsoft-subnet/cia-wants-to-spy-on-you-through-your-appliances.html](http://networkworld.com/article/2221934/%3Cbr%3Emicrosoft-subnet/cia-wants-to-spy-on-you-through-your-appliances.html).
@end raggedright

### [(25)](#DOCF25)

@raggedright Jon Queally, “Latest Docs Show Financial Ties between NSA
and Internet Companies,” 23 August 2013,
<http://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/08/23/latest-docs-show-financial-ties-between-nsa-and-internet-companies>.
@end raggedright

### [(26)](#DOCF26)

@raggedright Scott Shane and Colin Moynihan, “Drug Agents Use Vast Phone
Trove, Eclipsing N.S.A.’s,” 1 September 2013,
[http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/\
drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/%3Cbr%3Edrug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0).
@end raggedright

### [(27)](#DOCF27)

@raggedright Dan Kaminsky, “Let’s Cut through the Bitcoin Hype: A
Hacker-Entrepreneur’s Take,” 3 May 2013,
[http://wired.com/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-\
bitcoin-hype/](http://wired.com/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-%3Cbr%3Ebitcoin-hype/).
@end raggedright

### [(28)](#DOCF28)

@raggedright Steven Levy, “E-Money (That’s What I Want),” Wired, 2.12
(December 1994),
<http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html>. @end
raggedright

### [(29)](#DOCF29)

@raggedright Richard Bilton, “Camera Grid to Log Number Plates,” last
updated on 22 May 2009,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/whos_watching_you/8064333.stm>.
@end raggedright

### [(30)](#DOCF30)

@raggedright Nusrat Choudhury, “Victory! Federal Court Recognizes
Constitutional Rights of Americans on the No-Fly List,” 29 August 2013,
[https://www.aclu.org/blog/victory-federal-court-recognizes-constitutional-rights-americans-\
no-fly-list](https://www.aclu.org/blog/victory-federal-court-recognizes-constitutional-rights-americans-%3Cbr%3Eno-fly-list).
@end raggedright

### [(31)](#DOCF31)

@raggedright Kai Biermann, “Betrayed by Our Own Data,” 26 March 2011,
<http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz>.
@end raggedright

### [(32)](#DOCF32)

@raggedright Sara M. Watson, “The Latest Smartphones Could Turn Us All
into Activity Trackers,” 10 October 2013,
[http://wired.com/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-\
of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-\
activity-trackers/](http://wired.com/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-%3Cbr%3Eof-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-%3Cbr%3Eactivity-trackers/).
@end raggedright

### [(33)](#DOCF33)

@raggedright Patrick Toomey, “It Sure Sounds Like the NSA Is Tracking
Our Locations,” 30 September 2013, [https://aclu.org/blog/it-\
sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-our-locations](https://aclu.org/blog/it-%3Cbr%3Esure-sounds-nsa-tracking-our-locations).
@end raggedright

### [(34)](#DOCF34)

@raggedright Glenn Greenwald, “NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions
of Verizon Customers Daily,” 6 June 2013,
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order>.
@end raggedright

### [(35)](#DOCF35)

@raggedright See, for instance, the articles “Testilying: Cops Are Liars
Who Get Away with Perjury” (Nick Malinowski, 3 February 2013,
[http://vice.com/read/\
testilying-cops-are-liars-who-get-away-with-perjury](http://vice.com/read/%3Cbr%3Etestilying-cops-are-liars-who-get-away-with-perjury))
and “Detective Is Found Guilty of Planting Drugs” (Tim Stelloh,
1 November 2011,
[http://nytimes.com/2011/11/02/nyregion/brooklyn-detective-convicted-of-\
planting-drugs-on-innocent-people.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0](http://nytimes.com/2011/11/02/nyregion/brooklyn-detective-convicted-of-%3Cbr%3Eplanting-drugs-on-innocent-people.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)),
for examples of the extent to which this practice has been normalized.
@end raggedright

### [(36)](#DOCF36)

@raggedright See the Photography Is Not a Crime web site, at\
 <http://photographyisnotacrime.com/>, for more on this issue. @end
raggedright

### [(37)](#DOCF37)

@raggedright Kevin Drum,“Ubiquitous Surveillance, Police Edition,”
22 August 2013,\
 [http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-\
police-edition](http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-%3Cbr%3Epolice-edition).
@end raggedright

### [(38)](#DOCF38)

@raggedright Public Citizen, “Call Your Representative: Tell Her or Him
to Co-Sponsor a Constitutional Amendment to Overturn Citizens United and
Restore Democracy to the People,” accessed August 2015,
<http://action.citizen.org/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=12266>.
@end raggedright

### [(39)](#DOCF39)

@raggedright See the related section in “Words to Avoid (or User with
Care)” (@pageref{DRM}) for more on this. @end raggedright

### [(40)](#DOCF40)

@raggedright James Allworth, “Your Smartphone Works for the Surveillance
State,” 7 June 2013,
<https://hbr.org/2013/06/your-iphone-works-for-the-secret-police>. @end
raggedright

### [(41)](#DOCF41)

@raggedright Evan Selinger and Brett Frischmann, “Will the Internet of
Things Result in Predictable People?” 10 August 2015,
<http://theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/10/internet-of-things-predictable-people>.
@end raggedright

</div>

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