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% Public domain.
\begin{cabstract}
- %\pkuthssffaq % 中文测试文字。
+ 现代微处理器设计主要需要考虑性能和功耗。但随着软硬件系统越来越复杂,
+ 安全性在处理器设计中越来越重要。熔断(Meltdown)和幽灵(Spectre)攻
+ 击的发现,表明处理器微体系结构的优化,虽然不影响程序的正确运行,但是
+ 可能带来安全性的问题。其中 Spectre 攻击利用处理器的推测式执行,通过
+ 暂态指令的执行构造隐蔽信道,将程序中的秘密信息泄露给攻击者,破坏了程
+ 序的安全保证和系统的隔离性。由于推测式执行是微处理器设计中提升性能的
+ 重要手段,在防御 Spectre攻击的同时,减少防御手段带来的性能下降,是一
+ 个重要的问题。
+
+ 本文基于模拟平台,针对推测式执行侧信道攻击设计实现了一种防御结构。主
+ 要工作内容如下:
+ \begin{enumerate}
+ \item 调研 Meltdown 和 Spectre 攻击,分析其技术原理。
+ \item 调研现有的 Meltdown 和 Spectre 防御方案,分析这些方案的设计思
+ 想、实现方法、安全性和性能开销。
+ \item 设计一种针对 Spectre 攻击的防御结构,并在模拟平台中实现。该结
+ 构动态追踪信息流,检测推测式执行的指令与推测的内存读取之间的依赖关
+ 系,标记存在数据泄露风险的指令。进一步地,针对有风险的内存读取指令,
+ 采用安全的数据装载方案,避免在高速缓存状态中留下暂态执行的痕迹。
+ \item 基于模拟平台对该防御结构进行评估。利用构造的攻击程序进行测试,
+ 表明该防御结构可以防御测试中的攻击,满足安全性要求。利用 SPEC
+ CPU2006 进行性能评测,平均性能开销为 8.5\%,需要安全执行的推测式数
+ 据读取显著减少,降低了防御的性能开销。
+ \end{enumerate}
\end{cabstract}
\begin{eabstract}
- %Test of the English abstract.
+ Performance and power consumption are the main factors of modern
+ processor design. As software and hardware systems become more and
+ more complex, security is becoming important in microprocessor
+ design. The disclosure of Meltdown and Spectre shows that
+ microarchitecture optimizations can bring security issues, although
+ the programs still run correctly. Spectre exploits speculative
+ execution, constructing covert channel with transient instructions,
+ and leak secret information to the attacker, breaking the security
+ guarentee of the program and system isolation. Since speculative
+ execution is an important method to optimize the performance in
+ microprocessor design, it's important to defend against Spectre
+ attack, while minimize the performance loss of the defense.
+
+ This thesis designs a microarchitecture to defend against
+ speculation side channels based on the a simulation platform. The
+ contribution of this thesis is as follows:
+ \begin{enumerate}
+ \item Investigate on Meltdown and Spectre attacks, and analyze how
+ these attacks work.
+ \item Investigate on current defenses of Meltdown and Spectre
+ attacks, analyze their idea, implementation, security and
+ performance overhead.
+ \item Design a microarchitecture to defend against spectre attack
+ and implement it on a simulation platform. This microarchitecture
+ tracks the information flow, detecting the dependency of a
+ speculated instruction and a speculated data load from memory, and
+ tags the instruction which may leak data. For memory reads which
+ is likely unsafe, a safe loading mechanism is used, avoiding
+ leaving transient execution side effects in the cache.
+ \item Evaluate the microarchitecture on the simulation
+ platform. Tested with a constructed proof of concept code, this
+ microarchitecture design can defend the tested attacks, meeting
+ the security requirement. Evaluated with SPEC CPU2006, this
+ microarchitecture has an average performance overhead of 8.5\%,
+ and the number of speculated loads that need to be safely executed
+ is significantly decreased, thus the performance overhead of the
+ defence is smaller.
+ \end{enumerate}
\end{eabstract}
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