diff options
| author | Zhang, Chao B <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> | 2016-04-28 13:28:39 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Zhang, Chao B <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> | 2016-05-04 09:13:49 +0800 |
| commit | 560ac77ea155857da879648e559a60b528b19730 (patch) | |
| tree | fdecb4402ef272d0af218627f27312d3e2a93334 /SecurityPkg | |
| parent | 8b0280362459f819ec5517af961a9b2407f2e0a5 (diff) | |
| download | edk2-platforms-560ac77ea155857da879648e559a60b528b19730.tar.xz | |
SecurityPkg: AuthVariableLib: Remove Customized SecureBoot Mode transition.
Remove Customized SecureBoot Mode transition logic for Mantis 1263, including AuditMode/DeployedMode/PK update management.
Also remove image verification logic in AuditMode.
The feature has been moved to
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/Customized-Secure-Boot
Previous check-in hash is
SHA-1: 4fc08e8d683522f255727626197d919a40d4836c
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: El-Haj-Mahmoud Samer <samer.el-haj-mahmoud@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'SecurityPkg')
5 files changed, 237 insertions, 1866 deletions
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c index 4649e50e5e..6e1e284801 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c @@ -56,54 +56,6 @@ EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = { {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, 0, 80 }
};
-//
-// Secure Boot Mode state machine
-//
-SECURE_BOOT_MODE mSecureBootState[SecureBootModeTypeMax] = {
- // USER MODE
- {
- AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE, // AuditMode
- FALSE, // IsAuditModeRO, AuditMode is RW
- DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE, // DeployedMode
- FALSE, // IsDeployedModeRO, DeployedMode is RW
- SETUP_MODE_DISABLE, // SetupMode
- // SetupMode is always RO
- SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE // SecureBoot
- },
- // SETUP MODE
- {
- AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE, // AuditMode
- FALSE, // IsAuditModeRO, AuditMode is RW
- DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE, // DeployedMode
- TRUE, // IsDeployedModeRO, DeployedMode is RO
- SETUP_MODE_ENABLE, // SetupMode
- // SetupMode is always RO
- SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE // SecureBoot
- },
- // AUDIT MODE
- {
- AUDIT_MODE_ENABLE, // AuditMode
- TRUE, // AuditModeValAttr RO, AuditMode is RO
- DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE, // DeployedMode
- TRUE, // DeployedModeValAttr RO, DeployedMode is RO
- SETUP_MODE_ENABLE, // SetupMode
- // SetupMode is always RO
- SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE // SecureBoot
- },
- // DEPLOYED MODE
- {
- AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE, // AuditMode, AuditMode is RO
- TRUE, // AuditModeValAttr RO
- DEPLOYED_MODE_ENABLE, // DeployedMode
- TRUE, // DeployedModeValAttr RO, DeployedMode is RO
- SETUP_MODE_DISABLE, // SetupMode
- // SetupMode is always RO
- SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE // SecureBoot
- }
-};
-
-SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE mSecureBootMode;
-
/**
Finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.
@@ -298,902 +250,6 @@ AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp ( }
/**
- Initialize Secure Boot variables.
-
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
-
-**/
-EFI_STATUS
-InitSecureBootVariables (
- VOID
- )
-{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- UINT8 *Data;
- UINTN DataSize;
- UINT32 SecureBoot;
- UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
- SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE SecureBootMode;
- BOOLEAN IsPkPresent;
-
- //
- // Find "PK" variable
- //
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize);
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- IsPkPresent = FALSE;
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));
- } else {
- IsPkPresent = TRUE;
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));
- }
-
- //
- // Init "SecureBootMode" variable.
- // Initial case
- // SecureBootMode doesn't exist. Init it with PK state
- // 3 inconsistency cases need to sync
- // 1.1 Add PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var
- // 1.2 Delete PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var
- // 1.3 Set AuditMode ->Delete PK -> system break -> Update SecureBootMode Var
- //
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid, (VOID **)&Data, &DataSize);
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- //
- // Variable driver Initial Case
- //
- if (IsPkPresent) {
- SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeUserMode;
- } else {
- SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode;
- }
- } else {
- //
- // 3 inconsistency cases need to sync
- //
- SecureBootMode = (SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE)*Data;
- ASSERT(SecureBootMode < SecureBootModeTypeMax);
-
- if (IsPkPresent) {
- //
- // 3.1 Add PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var
- //
- if (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) {
- SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeUserMode;
- } else if (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {
- SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode;
- }
- } else {
- //
- // 3.2 Delete PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var
- // 3.3 Set AuditMode ->Delete PK -> system break -> Update SecureBootMode Var. Reinit to be SetupMode
- //
- if ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {
- SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status) || (SecureBootMode != (SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE)*Data)) {
- //
- // Update SecureBootMode Var
- //
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
- &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid,
- &SecureBootMode,
- sizeof (UINT8),
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- return Status;
- }
- }
-
- //
- // Init "AuditMode"
- //
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].AuditMode,
- sizeof(UINT8),
- EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- return Status;
- }
-
- //
- // Init "DeployedMode"
- //
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].DeployedMode,
- sizeof(UINT8),
- EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- return Status;
- }
-
- //
- // Init "SetupMode"
- //
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].SetupMode,
- sizeof(UINT8),
- EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- return Status;
- }
-
- //
- // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.
- // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in User Mode or Deployed Mode, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.
- // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.
- //
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID **)&Data, &DataSize);
- if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- if (IsPkPresent) {
- SecureBootEnable = *Data;
- }
- } else if ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {
- //
- // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in User Mode or Deployed Mode.
- //
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
- &SecureBootEnable,
- sizeof (UINT8),
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- return Status;
- }
- }
-
- //
- // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
- //
- if ((SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE)
- && ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode))) {
- SecureBoot = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;
- } else {
- SecureBoot = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;
- }
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &SecureBoot,
- sizeof (UINT8),
- EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
- );
-
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SecureBootMode is %x\n", SecureBootMode));
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBoot));
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));
-
- //
- // Save SecureBootMode in global space
- //
- mSecureBootMode = SecureBootMode;
-
- return Status;
-}
-
-/**
- Update SecureBootMode variable.
-
- @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.
-
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
-
-**/
-EFI_STATUS
-UpdateSecureBootMode(
- IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode
- )
-{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
-
- //
- // Update "SecureBootMode" variable to new Secure Boot Mode
- //
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
- &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid,
- &NewMode,
- sizeof (UINT8),
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
- );
-
- if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "SecureBootMode Update to %x\n", NewMode));
- mSecureBootMode = NewMode;
- } else {
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "SecureBootMode Update failure %x\n", Status));
- }
-
- return Status;
-}
-
-/**
- Current secure boot mode is AuditMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition
- to a new mode.
-
- @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.
-
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
-
-**/
-EFI_STATUS
-TransitionFromAuditMode(
- IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode
- )
-{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- VOID *AuditVarData;
- VOID *DeployedVarData;
- VOID *SetupVarData;
- VOID *SecureBootVarData;
- UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
- UINTN DataSize;
-
- //
- // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver
- // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.
- //
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &AuditVarData,
- &DataSize
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &DeployedVarData,
- &DataSize
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &SetupVarData,
- &DataSize
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &SecureBootVarData,
- &DataSize
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- //
- // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC
- // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow.
- // other tranisition logic are all memory operations.
- //
- Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));
- }
-
- if (NewMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {
- //
- // Since PK is enrolled, can't rollback, always update SecureBootMode in memory
- //
- mSecureBootMode = NewMode;
- Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
-
- //
- // AuditMode ----> DeployedMode
- // Side Effects
- // AuditMode =: 0 / DeployedMode := 1 / SetupMode := 0
- //
- // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
- //
- CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode, sizeof(UINT8));
- //
- // Update the value of DeployedMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
- //
- CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));
- //
- // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
- //
- CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));
-
- if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {
- //
- // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating
- // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot
- // Variable in runtime.
- //
- return Status;
- }
-
- //
- // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
- //
- CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));
-
- //
- // Create "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.
- //
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;
- AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
- &SecureBootEnable,
- sizeof (SecureBootEnable),
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
- );
- } else {
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode, NewMode));
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- return Status;
-}
-
-/**
- Current secure boot mode is DeployedMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition
- to a new mode.
-
- @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.
-
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
-
-**/
-EFI_STATUS
-TransitionFromDeployedMode(
- IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode
- )
-{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- VOID *DeployedVarData;
- VOID *SetupVarData;
- VOID *SecureBootVarData;
- UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
- UINTN DataSize;
-
- //
- // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver
- // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.
- //
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &DeployedVarData,
- &DataSize
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &SetupVarData,
- &DataSize
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &SecureBootVarData,
- &DataSize
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- //
- // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC
- // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow.
- // other tranisition logic are all memory operations.
- //
- Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));
- }
-
- switch(NewMode) {
- case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:
- //
- // DeployedMode ----> UserMode
- // Side Effects
- // DeployedMode := 0
- //
- // Platform Specific DeployedMode clear. UpdateSecureBootMode fails and no other variables are updated before. rollback this transition
- //
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- return Status;
- }
- CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));
-
- break;
-
- case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:
- //
- // Since PK is processed before, can't rollback, still update SecureBootMode in memory
- //
- mSecureBootMode = NewMode;
- Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
-
- //
- // DeployedMode ----> SetupMode
- //
- // Platform Specific PKpub clear or Delete Pkpub
- // Side Effects
- // DeployedMode := 0 / SetupMode := 1 / SecureBoot := 0
- //
- // Update the value of DeployedMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
- //
- CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));
- //
- // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
- //
- CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));
-
- if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {
- //
- // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating
- // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot
- // Variable in runtime.
- //
- return Status;
- }
-
- //
- // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
- //
- CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));
-
- //
- // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is Disabled.
- //
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;
- AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
- &SecureBootEnable,
- 0,
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
- );
- break;
-
- default:
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode, NewMode));
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- return Status;
-}
-
-/**
- Current secure boot mode is UserMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition
- to a new mode.
-
- @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.
-
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
-
-**/
-EFI_STATUS
-TransitionFromUserMode(
- IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode
- )
-{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- VOID *AuditVarData;
- VOID *DeployedVarData;
- VOID *SetupVarData;
- VOID *PkVarData;
- VOID *SecureBootVarData;
- UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
- UINTN DataSize;
- VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableEntry;
-
- //
- // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver
- // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.
- //
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &AuditVarData,
- &DataSize
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &DeployedVarData,
- &DataSize
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &SetupVarData,
- &DataSize
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &SecureBootVarData,
- &DataSize
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- //
- // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC
- // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow.
- // Other tranisition logic are all memory operations and PK delete is assumed to be always successful.
- //
- if (NewMode != SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {
- Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));
- }
- } else {
- //
- // UserMode -----> AuditMode. Check RemainingSpace for SecureBootMode var first.
- // Will update SecureBootMode after DeletePK logic
- //
- VariableEntry.VariableSize = sizeof(UINT8);
- VariableEntry.Guid = &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid;
- VariableEntry.Name = EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME;
- if (!mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry, NULL)) {
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
- }
- }
-
- switch(NewMode) {
- case SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode:
- //
- // UpdateSecureBootMode fails and no other variables are updated before. rollback this transition
- //
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- return Status;
- }
-
- //
- // UserMode ----> DeployedMode
- // Side Effects
- // DeployedMode := 1
- //
- CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));
- break;
-
- case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:
- //
- // UserMode ----> AuditMode
- // Side Effects
- // Delete PKpub / SetupMode := 1 / SecureBoot := 0
- //
- // Delete PKpub without verification. Should always succeed.
- //
- PkVarData = NULL;
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- PkVarData,
- 0,
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "UserMode -> AuditMode. Delete PK fail %x\n", Status));
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- //
- // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable
- //
- Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- //
- // Since PK is deleted successfully, Doesn't break, continue to update other variable.
- //
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));
- }
- CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode, sizeof(UINT8));
-
- //
- // Fall into SetupMode logic
- //
- case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:
- //
- // Since PK is deleted before , can't rollback, still update SecureBootMode in memory
- //
- mSecureBootMode = NewMode;
- Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
-
- //
- // UserMode ----> SetupMode
- // Side Effects
- // DeployedMode :=0 / SetupMode :=1 / SecureBoot :=0
- //
- // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
- //
- CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));
-
- if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {
- //
- // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating
- // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot
- // Variable in runtime.
- //
- return Status;
- }
-
- //
- // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
- //
- CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));
-
- //
- // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is Disabled.
- //
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;
- AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
- &SecureBootEnable,
- 0,
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
- );
-
- break;
-
- default:
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeUserMode, NewMode));
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- return Status;
-}
-
-/**
- Current secure boot mode is SetupMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition
- to a new mode.
-
- @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.
-
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
-
-**/
-EFI_STATUS
-TransitionFromSetupMode(
- IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode
- )
-{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- VOID *AuditVarData;
- VOID *SetupVarData;
- VOID *SecureBootVarData;
- UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
- UINTN DataSize;
-
- //
- // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver
- // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.
- //
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &AuditVarData,
- &DataSize
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &SetupVarData,
- &DataSize
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &SecureBootVarData,
- &DataSize
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- //
- // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC
- // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow.
- // Other tranisition logic are all memory operations and PK delete is assumed to be always successful.
- //
- Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));
- }
-
- switch(NewMode) {
- case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:
- //
- // UpdateSecureBootMode fails and no other variables are updated before. rollback this transition
- //
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- return Status;
- }
-
- //
- // SetupMode ----> AuditMode
- // Side Effects
- // AuditMode := 1
- //
- // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
- //
- CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode, sizeof(UINT8));
- break;
-
- case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:
- //
- // Since PK is enrolled before, can't rollback, still update SecureBootMode in memory
- //
- mSecureBootMode = NewMode;
- Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
-
- //
- // SetupMode ----> UserMode
- // Side Effects
- // SetupMode := 0 / SecureBoot := 1
- //
- // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
- //
- CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));
-
- if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {
- //
- // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating
- // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot
- // Variable in runtime.
- //
- return Status;
- }
-
- //
- // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
- //
- CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));
-
- //
- // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.
- //
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;
- AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
- &SecureBootEnable,
- sizeof (SecureBootEnable),
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
- );
- break;
-
- default:
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode, NewMode));
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- return Status;
-}
-
-/**
- This function performs main secure boot mode transition logic.
-
- @param[in] CurMode Current Secure Boot Mode.
- @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.
-
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
- @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The Current Secure Boot Mode is wrong.
-
-**/
-EFI_STATUS
-SecureBootModeTransition(
- IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE CurMode,
- IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode
- )
-{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
-
- //
- // SecureBootMode transition
- //
- switch (CurMode) {
- case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:
- Status = TransitionFromUserMode(NewMode);
- break;
-
- case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:
- Status = TransitionFromSetupMode(NewMode);
- break;
-
- case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:
- Status = TransitionFromAuditMode(NewMode);
- break;
-
- case SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode:
- Status = TransitionFromDeployedMode(NewMode);
- break;
-
- default:
- Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- return Status;
-
-}
-
-/**
Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.
@param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.
@@ -1541,6 +597,129 @@ Done: }
}
+/**
+ Update platform mode.
+
+ @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.
+
+ @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
+ @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+UpdatePlatformMode (
+ IN UINT32 Mode
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ VOID *Data;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+ UINT8 SecureBootMode;
+ UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
+ UINTN VariableDataSize;
+
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &Data,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
+ //
+ mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;
+ CopyMem (Data, &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));
+
+ if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {
+ //
+ // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating
+ // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot
+ // Variable in runtime.
+ //
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.
+ // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,
+ // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.
+ //
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &Data,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+ //
+ // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.
+ // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.
+ // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.
+ //
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;
+ } else {
+ if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {
+ SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;
+ } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {
+ SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;
+ } else {
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ }
+
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &SecureBootMode,
+ sizeof(UINT8),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.
+ //
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
+ &Data,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+
+ if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {
+ //
+ // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.
+ //
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;
+ VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"
+ // variable is not in secure boot state.
+ //
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;
+ VariableDataSize = 0;
+ }
+
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
+ &SecureBootEnable,
+ VariableDataSize,
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
+ );
+ return Status;
+}
/**
Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt variable.
@@ -1701,121 +880,6 @@ VendorKeyIsModified ( }
/**
- Process Secure Boot Mode variable.
-
- Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
- This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
- This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
- This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
- buffer overflow, integer overflow.
- This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.
-
- @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
- @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
- @param[in] Data Data pointer.
- @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the
- data, this value contains the required size.
- @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable
-
- @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter
- @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation
- check carried out by the firmware.
- @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is Read-Only.
- @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.
-
-**/
-EFI_STATUS
-ProcessSecureBootModeVar (
- IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
- IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
- IN VOID *Data,
- IN UINTN DataSize,
- IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL
- )
-{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- VOID *VarData;
- UINTN VarDataSize;
-
- //
- // Check "AuditMode", "DeployedMode" Variable ReadWrite Attributes
- // if in Runtime, Always RO
- // if in Boottime, Depends on current Secure Boot Mode
- //
- if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime()) {
- return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;
- }
-
- //
- // Delete not OK
- //
- if ((DataSize != sizeof(UINT8)) || (Attributes == 0)) {
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME) == 0) {
- if(mSecureBootState[mSecureBootMode].IsAuditModeRO) {
- return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;
- }
- } else {
- //
- // Platform specific deployedMode clear. Set DeployedMode = RW
- //
- if (!InCustomMode() || !UserPhysicalPresent() || mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {
- if(mSecureBootState[mSecureBootMode].IsDeployedModeRO) {
- return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (*(UINT8 *)Data != 0 && *(UINT8 *)Data != 1) {
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- //
- // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver
- // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.
- //
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- VariableName,
- VendorGuid,
- &VarData,
- &VarDataSize
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- ASSERT(FALSE);
- }
-
- //
- // If AuditMode/DeployedMode is assigned same value. Simply return EFI_SUCCESS
- //
- if (*(UINT8 *)VarData == *(UINT8 *)Data) {
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
- }
-
- //
- // Perform SecureBootMode transition
- //
- if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME) == 0) {
- DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x Transfer to SecureBootMode %x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode));
- return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode);
- } else if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME) == 0) {
- if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {
- //
- // Platform specific DeployedMode clear. InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent() is checked before
- //
- DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x. Transfer to SecureBootMode %x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeUserMode));
- return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeUserMode);
- } else {
- DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x. Transfer to SecureBootMode %x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode));
- return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode);
- }
- }
-
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
-}
-
-/**
Process variable with platform key for verification.
Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
@@ -1853,7 +917,6 @@ ProcessVarWithPk ( BOOLEAN Del;
UINT8 *Payload;
UINTN PayloadSize;
- VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableEntry[2];
if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||
(Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {
@@ -1868,51 +931,18 @@ ProcessVarWithPk ( // Init state of Del. State may change due to secure check
//
Del = FALSE;
- Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
- PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
- if (PayloadSize == 0) {
- Del = TRUE;
- }
-
- //
- // Check the variable space for both PKpub and SecureBootMode variable.
- //
- VariableEntry[0].VariableSize = PayloadSize;
- VariableEntry[0].Guid = &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid;
- VariableEntry[0].Name = EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME;
-
- VariableEntry[1].VariableSize = sizeof(UINT8);
- VariableEntry[1].Guid = &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid;
- VariableEntry[1].Name = EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME;
-
- if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) ||
- (((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) && !IsPk)) {
+ if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {
+ Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
+ PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
+ if (PayloadSize == 0) {
+ Del = TRUE;
+ }
Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
- //
- // If delete PKpub, only check for "SecureBootMode" only
- // if update / add PKpub, check both NewPKpub & "SecureBootMode"
- //
- if (IsPk) {
- //
- // Delete PKpub
- //
- if (Del && ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode))
- && !mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[1], NULL)){
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
- //
- // Add PKpub
- //
- } else if (!Del && ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode))
- && !mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[0], &VariableEntry[1], NULL)) {
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
- }
- }
-
Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (
VariableName,
VendorGuid,
@@ -1925,17 +955,10 @@ ProcessVarWithPk ( return Status;
}
- if (((mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) && (mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) || IsPk) {
+ if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {
Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();
}
- } else if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode || mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {
- //
- // If delete PKpub, check "SecureBootMode" only
- //
- if (IsPk && Del && !mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[1], NULL)){
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
- }
-
+ } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {
//
// Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.
//
@@ -1950,19 +973,8 @@ ProcessVarWithPk ( );
} else {
//
- // SetupMode or AuditMode to add PK
// Verify against the certificate in data payload.
//
- //
- // Check PKpub & SecureBootMode variable space consistency
- //
- if (!mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[0], &VariableEntry[1], NULL)) {
- //
- // No enough variable space to set PK successfully.
- //
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
- }
-
Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (
VariableName,
VendorGuid,
@@ -1975,30 +987,16 @@ ProcessVarWithPk ( }
if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {
- //
- // Delete or Enroll PK causes SecureBootMode change
- //
- if (!Del) {
- if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) {
- //
- // If enroll PK in setup mode, change to user mode.
- //
- Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeUserMode);
- } else if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {
- //
- // If enroll PK in Audit mode, change to Deployed mode.
- //
- Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode);
- } else {
- DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "PK is updated in %x mode. No SecureBootMode change.\n", mSecureBootMode));
- }
- } else {
- if ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {
- //
- // If delete PK in User Mode or DeployedMode, change to Setup Mode.
- //
- Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode);
- }
+ if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {
+ //
+ // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.
+ //
+ Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);
+ } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){
+ //
+ // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.
+ //
+ Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);
}
}
@@ -2051,8 +1049,7 @@ ProcessVarWithKek ( }
Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
- if ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode || mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)
- && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {
+ if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {
//
// Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.
//
@@ -2089,7 +1086,7 @@ ProcessVarWithKek ( return Status;
}
- if ((mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) && (mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) {
+ if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {
Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();
}
}
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthServiceInternal.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthServiceInternal.h index 83b0f23624..e7c4bf043d 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthServiceInternal.h +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthServiceInternal.h @@ -120,54 +120,6 @@ typedef struct { } AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA;
#pragma pack()
-///
-/// "SecureBootMode" variable stores current secure boot mode.
-/// The value type is SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE.
-///
-#define EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME L"SecureBootMode"
-
-typedef enum {
- SecureBootModeTypeUserMode,
- SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode,
- SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode,
- SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode,
- SecureBootModeTypeMax
-} SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE;
-
-//
-// Record status info of Customized Secure Boot Mode.
-//
-typedef struct {
- ///
- /// AuditMode variable value
- ///
- UINT8 AuditMode;
- ///
- /// AuditMode variable RW
- ///
- BOOLEAN IsAuditModeRO;
- ///
- /// DeployedMode variable value
- ///
- UINT8 DeployedMode;
- ///
- /// AuditMode variable RW
- ///
- BOOLEAN IsDeployedModeRO;
- ///
- /// SetupMode variable value
- ///
- UINT8 SetupMode;
- ///
- /// SetupMode is always RO. Skip IsSetupModeRO;
- ///
-
- ///
- /// SecureBoot variable value
- ///
- UINT8 SecureBoot;
-} SECURE_BOOT_MODE;
-
extern UINT8 *mPubKeyStore;
extern UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;
extern UINT32 mMaxKeyNumber;
@@ -181,17 +133,6 @@ extern VOID *mHashCtx; extern AUTH_VAR_LIB_CONTEXT_IN *mAuthVarLibContextIn;
-/**
- Initialize Secure Boot variables.
-
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
-
-**/
-EFI_STATUS
-InitSecureBootVariables (
- VOID
- );
/**
Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set
@@ -286,39 +227,6 @@ FilterSignatureList ( );
/**
- Process Secure Boot Mode variable.
-
- Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
- This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
- This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
- This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
- buffer overflow, integer overflow.
- This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.
-
- @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
- @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
- @param[in] Data Data pointer.
- @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the
- data, this value contains the required size.
- @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable
-
- @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter
- @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation
- check carried out by the firmware.
- @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is Read-Only.
- @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.
-
-**/
-EFI_STATUS
-ProcessSecureBootModeVar (
- IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
- IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
- IN VOID *Data,
- IN UINTN DataSize,
- IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL
- );
-
-/**
Process variable with platform key for verification.
Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c index 6467c0695c..c4fbb649f1 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ UINT32 mMaxKeyNumber; UINT32 mMaxKeyDbSize;
UINT8 *mCertDbStore;
UINT32 mMaxCertDbSize;
+UINT32 mPlatformMode;
UINT8 mVendorKeyState;
EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};
@@ -109,17 +110,6 @@ VARIABLE_ENTRY_PROPERTY mAuthVarEntry[] = { MAX_UINTN
}
},
- {
- &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid,
- L"SecureBootMode",
- {
- VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_REVISION,
- VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_READ_ONLY,
- VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT,
- sizeof (UINT8),
- sizeof (UINT8)
- }
- }
};
VOID **mAuthVarAddressPointer[10];
@@ -153,6 +143,8 @@ AuthVariableLibInitialize ( UINT8 *Data;
UINTN DataSize;
UINTN CtxSize;
+ UINT8 SecureBootMode;
+ UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
UINT8 CustomMode;
UINT32 ListSize;
@@ -228,11 +220,31 @@ AuthVariableLibInitialize ( mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA));
}
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));
+ } else {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));
+ }
+
//
- // Init Secure Boot variables
+ // Create "SetupMode" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
//
- Status = InitSecureBootVariables ();
-
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;
+ } else {
+ mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;
+ }
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &mPlatformMode,
+ sizeof(UINT8),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
//
// Create "SignatureSupport" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
@@ -249,6 +261,57 @@ AuthVariableLibInitialize ( }
//
+ // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.
+ // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.
+ // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.
+ //
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize);
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE){
+ SecureBootEnable = *(UINT8 *) Data;
+ }
+ } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {
+ //
+ // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.
+ //
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
+ &SecureBootEnable,
+ sizeof (UINT8),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
+ //
+ if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {
+ SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;
+ } else {
+ SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;
+ }
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &SecureBootMode,
+ sizeof (UINT8),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));
+
+ //
// Initialize "CustomMode" in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE state.
//
CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;
@@ -408,16 +471,10 @@ AuthVariableLibProcessVariable ( {
EFI_STATUS Status;
- //
- // Process PK, KEK, Sigdb, AuditMode, DeployedMode separately.
- //
if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){
Status = ProcessVarWithPk (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, TRUE);
} else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) {
Status = ProcessVarWithPk (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, FALSE);
- } else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid)
- && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME) == 0 || StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME) == 0)) {
- Status = ProcessSecureBootModeVar(VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes);
} else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&
((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) ||
(StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.inf index bf2c9f244d..572ba4e120 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.inf +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.inf @@ -87,10 +87,6 @@ ## PRODUCES ## Variable:L"AuthVarKeyDatabase"
gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid
- ## CONSUMES ## Variable:L"SecureBootMode"
- ## PRODUCES ## Variable:L"SecureBootMode"
- gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid
-
gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the certificate.
gEfiCertPkcs7Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the certificate.
gEfiCertX509Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the signature.
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c index 8cedb1bfb0..4b0e3f1fbd 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c @@ -712,58 +712,6 @@ GetImageExeInfoTableSize ( }
/**
- Create signature list based on input signature data and certificate type GUID. Caller is reposible
- to free new created SignatureList.
-
- @param[in] SignatureData Signature data in SignatureList.
- @param[in] SignatureDataSize Signature data size.
- @param[in] CertType Certificate Type.
- @param[out] SignatureList Created SignatureList.
- @param[out] SignatureListSize Created SignatureListSize.
-
- @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully create signature list.
-
-**/
-EFI_STATUS
-CreateSignatureList(
- IN UINT8 *SignatureData,
- IN UINTN SignatureDataSize,
- IN EFI_GUID *CertType,
- OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **SignatureList,
- OUT UINTN *SignatureListSize
- )
-{
- EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignList;
- UINTN SignListSize;
- EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Signature;
-
- SignList = NULL;
- *SignatureList = NULL;
-
- SignListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + SignatureDataSize;
- SignList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignListSize);
- if (SignList == NULL) {
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
- }
-
- SignList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;
- SignList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignListSize;
- SignList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) SignatureDataSize + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1;
- CopyMem (&SignList->SignatureType, CertType, sizeof (EFI_GUID));
-
- DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "SignatureDataSize %x\n", SignatureDataSize));
- Signature = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SignList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));
- CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, SignatureData, SignatureDataSize);
-
- *SignatureList = SignList;
- *SignatureListSize = SignListSize;
-
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
-
-}
-
-/**
Create an Image Execution Information Table entry and add it to system configuration table.
@param[in] Action Describes the action taken by the firmware regarding this image.
@@ -1149,53 +1097,6 @@ IsTimeZero ( }
/**
- Record multiple certificate list & verification state of a verified image to
- IMAGE_EXECUTION_TABLE.
-
- @param[in] CertBuf Certificate list buffer.
- @param[in] CertBufLength Certificate list buffer.
- @param[in] Action Certificate list action to be record.
- @param[in] ImageName Image name.
- @param[in] ImageDevicePath Image device path.
-
-**/
-VOID
-RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
- IN UINT8 *CertBuf,
- IN UINTN CertBufLength,
- IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action,
- IN CHAR16 *ImageName OPTIONAL,
- IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *ImageDevicePath OPTIONAL
- )
-{
- UINT8 CertNumber;
- UINT8 *CertPtr;
- UINTN Index;
- UINT8 *Cert;
- UINTN CertSize;
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;
- UINTN SignatureListSize;
-
- CertNumber = (UINT8) (*CertBuf);
- CertPtr = CertBuf + 1;
- for (Index = 0; Index < CertNumber; Index++) {
- CertSize = (UINTN) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)CertPtr);
- Cert = (UINT8 *)CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32);
-
- //
- // Record all cert in cert chain to be passed
- //
- Status = CreateSignatureList(Cert, CertSize, &gEfiCertX509Guid, &SignatureList, &SignatureListSize);
- if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- AddImageExeInfo (Action, ImageName, ImageDevicePath, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);
- FreePool (SignatureList);
- }
- }
-}
-
-
-/**
Check whether the timestamp signature is valid and the signing time is also earlier than
the revocation time.
@@ -1305,23 +1206,17 @@ Done: Check whether the image signature is forbidden by the forbidden database (dbx).
The image is forbidden to load if any certificates for signing are revoked before signing time.
- @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from the signed image.
- @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
- @param[in] IsAuditMode Whether system Secure Boot Mode is in AuditMode.
- @param[in] ImageName Name of the image to verify.
- @param[in] ImageDevicePath DevicePath of the image to verify.
+ @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from the signed image.
+ @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
@retval TRUE Image is forbidden by dbx.
@retval FALSE Image is not forbidden by dbx.
**/
BOOLEAN
-IsForbiddenByDbx (
- IN UINT8 *AuthData,
- IN UINTN AuthDataSize,
- IN BOOLEAN IsAuditMode,
- IN CHAR16 *ImageName OPTIONAL,
- IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *ImageDevicePath OPTIONAL
+IsForbiddenByDbx (
+ IN UINT8 *AuthData,
+ IN UINTN AuthDataSize
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
@@ -1344,10 +1239,6 @@ IsForbiddenByDbx ( UINT8 *Cert;
UINTN CertSize;
EFI_TIME RevocationTime;
- UINT8 *SignerCert;
- UINTN SignerCertLength;
- UINT8 *UnchainCert;
- UINTN UnchainCertLength;
//
// Variable Initialization
//
@@ -1362,10 +1253,6 @@ IsForbiddenByDbx ( BufferLength = 0;
TrustedCert = NULL;
TrustedCertLength = 0;
- SignerCert = NULL;
- SignerCertLength = 0;
- UnchainCert = NULL;
- UnchainCertLength = 0;
//
// The image will not be forbidden if dbx can't be got.
@@ -1480,41 +1367,12 @@ IsForbiddenByDbx ( }
Done:
- if (IsForbidden && IsAuditMode) {
- Pkcs7GetCertificatesList(AuthData, AuthDataSize, &SignerCert, &SignerCertLength, &UnchainCert, &UnchainCertLength);
-
- //
- // Record all certs in image to be failed
- //
- if ((SignerCertLength != 0) && (SignerCert != NULL)) {
- RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
- SignerCert,
- SignerCertLength,
- EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,
- ImageName,
- ImageDevicePath
- );
- }
-
- if ((UnchainCertLength != 0) && (UnchainCert != NULL)) {
- RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
- UnchainCert,
- UnchainCertLength,
- EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,
- ImageName,
- ImageDevicePath
- );
- }
- }
-
if (Data != NULL) {
FreePool (Data);
}
Pkcs7FreeSigners (CertBuffer);
Pkcs7FreeSigners (TrustedCert);
- Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCert);
- Pkcs7FreeSigners (UnchainCert);
return IsForbidden;
}
@@ -1523,11 +1381,8 @@ Done: /**
Check whether the image signature can be verified by the trusted certificates in DB database.
- @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.
- @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
- @param[in] IsAuditMode Whether system Secure Boot Mode is in AuditMode.
- @param[in] ImageName Name of the image to verify.
- @param[in] ImageDevicePath DevicePath of the image to verify.
+ @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.
+ @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
@retval TRUE Image passed verification using certificate in db.
@retval FALSE Image didn't pass verification using certificate in db.
@@ -1535,11 +1390,8 @@ Done: **/
BOOLEAN
IsAllowedByDb (
- IN UINT8 *AuthData,
- IN UINTN AuthDataSize,
- IN BOOLEAN IsAuditMode,
- IN CHAR16 *ImageName OPTIONAL,
- IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *ImageDevicePath OPTIONAL
+ IN UINT8 *AuthData,
+ IN UINTN AuthDataSize
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
@@ -1555,10 +1407,6 @@ IsAllowedByDb ( UINTN DbxDataSize;
UINT8 *DbxData;
EFI_TIME RevocationTime;
- UINT8 *SignerCert;
- UINTN SignerCertLength;
- UINT8 *UnchainCert;
- UINTN UnchainCertLength;
Data = NULL;
CertList = NULL;
@@ -1567,10 +1415,6 @@ IsAllowedByDb ( DbxData = NULL;
RootCertSize = 0;
VerifyStatus = FALSE;
- SignerCert = NULL;
- SignerCertLength = 0;
- UnchainCert = NULL;
- UnchainCertLength = 0;
DataSize = 0;
Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
@@ -1655,62 +1499,6 @@ Done: SecureBootHook (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, CertList->SignatureSize, CertData);
}
- if (IsAuditMode) {
-
- Pkcs7GetCertificatesList(AuthData, AuthDataSize, &SignerCert, &SignerCertLength, &UnchainCert, &UnchainCertLength);
- if (VerifyStatus) {
- if ((SignerCertLength != 0) && (SignerCert != NULL)) {
- //
- // Record all cert in signer's cert chain to be passed
- //
- RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
- SignerCert,
- SignerCertLength,
- EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,
- ImageName,
- ImageDevicePath
- );
- }
-
- if ((UnchainCertLength != 0) && (UnchainCert != NULL)) {
- //
- // Record all certs in unchained certificates lists to be failed
- //
- RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
- UnchainCert,
- UnchainCertLength,
- EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,
- ImageName,
- ImageDevicePath
- );
- }
- } else {
- //
- // Record all certs in image to be failed
- //
- if ((SignerCertLength != 0) && (SignerCert != NULL)) {
- RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
- SignerCert,
- SignerCertLength,
- EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,
- ImageName,
- ImageDevicePath
- );
- }
-
- if ((UnchainCertLength != 0) && (UnchainCert != NULL)) {
- RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
- UnchainCert,
- UnchainCertLength,
- EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,
- ImageName,
- ImageDevicePath
- );
- }
- }
- }
-
-
if (Data != NULL) {
FreePool (Data);
}
@@ -1718,370 +1506,10 @@ Done: FreePool (DbxData);
}
- Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCert);
- Pkcs7FreeSigners (UnchainCert);
-
return VerifyStatus;
}
/**
- Provide verification service for signed images in AuditMode, which include both signature validation
- and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and
- MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.
-
- In this implementation, only verify external executables when in AuditMode.
- Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored. Other authentication status
- are record into IMAGE_EXECUTION_TABLE.
-
- The image verification policy is:
- If the image is signed,
- At least one valid signature or at least one hash value of the image must match a record
- in the security database "db", and no valid signature nor any hash value of the image may
- be reflected in the security database "dbx".
- Otherwise, the image is not signed,
- The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db", and
- not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".
-
- Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
- PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure
- within this image buffer before use.
-
- @param[in] AuthenticationStatus
- This is the authentication status returned from the security
- measurement services for the input file.
- @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
- being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
- @param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.
- @param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.
- @param[in] BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service.
-
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The authenticate info is sucessfully stored for the file
- specified by DevicePath and non-NULL FileBuffer
- @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not
- authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE
- Foundation many not use File.
-
-**/
-EFI_STATUS
-EFIAPI
-ImageVerificationInAuditMode (
- IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,
- IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,
- IN VOID *FileBuffer,
- IN UINTN FileSize,
- IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy
- )
-{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- UINT16 Magic;
- EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;
- EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;
- EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action;
- WIN_CERTIFICATE *WinCertificate;
- UINT32 Policy;
- PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;
- UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
- WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;
- WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *WinCertUefiGuid;
- UINT8 *AuthData;
- UINTN AuthDataSize;
- EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *SecDataDir;
- UINT32 OffSet;
- CHAR16 *FilePathStr;
- UINTN SignatureListSize;
-
- SignatureList = NULL;
- WinCertificate = NULL;
- SecDataDir = NULL;
- PkcsCertData = NULL;
- FilePathStr = NULL;
- Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED;
- Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
-
-
- //
- // Check the image type and get policy setting.
- //
- switch (GetImageType (File)) {
-
- case IMAGE_FROM_FV:
- Policy = ALWAYS_EXECUTE;
- break;
-
- case IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM:
- Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy);
- break;
-
- case IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA:
- Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy);
- break;
-
- case IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA:
- Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy);
- break;
-
- default:
- Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
- break;
- }
-
- //
- // If policy is always/never execute, return directly.
- //
- if (Policy == ALWAYS_EXECUTE) {
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
- }
-
- //
- // Get Image Device Path Str
- //
- FilePathStr = ConvertDevicePathToText (File, FALSE, TRUE);
-
- //
- // Authentication failed because of (unspecified) firmware security policy
- //
- if (Policy == NEVER_EXECUTE) {
- //
- // No signature, record FilePath/FilePathStr only
- //
- AddImageExeInfo (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_POLICY_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED, FilePathStr, File, NULL, 0);
- goto END;
- }
-
- //
- // The policy QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
- // violates the UEFI spec and has been removed.
- //
- ASSERT (Policy != QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION && Policy != ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION);
- if (Policy == QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION || Policy == ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
- CpuDeadLoop ();
- }
-
- //
- // Read the Dos header.
- //
- if (FileBuffer == NULL) {
- Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- goto END;
- }
-
- mImageBase = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer;
- mImageSize = FileSize;
-
- ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));
- ImageContext.Handle = (VOID *) FileBuffer;
- ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead;
-
- //
- // Get information about the image being loaded
- //
- Status = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext);
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- //
- // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage
- //
- goto END;
- }
-
-
- DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) mImageBase;
- if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {
- //
- // DOS image header is present,
- // so read the PE header after the DOS image header.
- //
- mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;
- } else {
- mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;
- }
-
- //
- // Check PE/COFF image.
- //
- mNtHeader.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);
- if (mNtHeader.Pe32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {
- //
- // It is not a valid Pe/Coff file.
- //
- Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
- goto END;
- }
-
- if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
- //
- // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value
- // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
- // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
- // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
- //
- Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;
- } else {
- //
- // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header
- //
- Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
- }
-
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
- //
- // Use PE32 offset.
- //
- NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
- if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {
- SecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
- }
- } else {
- //
- // Use PE32+ offset.
- //
- NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
- if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {
- SecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
- }
- }
-
- //
- // Start Image Validation.
- //
- if (SecDataDir == NULL || SecDataDir->Size == 0) {
- //
- // This image is not signed. The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db",
- // and not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".
- //
- if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {
- Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
- goto END;
- }
-
- //
- // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX).
- //
- if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
- //
- // Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).
- //
- if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
- Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED;
- }
- }
-
- //
- // Add HASH digest for image without signature
- //
- Status = CreateSignatureList(mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize, &mCertType, &SignatureList, &SignatureListSize);
- if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- AddImageExeInfo (Action, FilePathStr, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);
- FreePool (SignatureList);
- }
- goto END;
- }
-
- //
- // Verify the signature of the image, multiple signatures are allowed as per PE/COFF Section 4.7
- // "Attribute Certificate Table".
- // The first certificate starts at offset (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress) from the start of the file.
- //
- for (OffSet = SecDataDir->VirtualAddress;
- OffSet < (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size);
- OffSet += (WinCertificate->dwLength + ALIGN_SIZE (WinCertificate->dwLength))) {
- WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + OffSet);
- if ((SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) <= sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE) ||
- (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) < WinCertificate->dwLength) {
- break;
- }
-
- //
- // Verify the image's Authenticode signature, only DER-encoded PKCS#7 signed data is supported.
- //
- if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {
- //
- // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS which is described in the
- // Authenticode specification.
- //
- PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) WinCertificate;
- if (PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength <= sizeof (PkcsCertData->Hdr)) {
- break;
- }
- AuthData = PkcsCertData->CertData;
- AuthDataSize = PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr);
- } else if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) {
- //
- // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID which is described in UEFI Spec.
- //
- WinCertUefiGuid = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *) WinCertificate;
- if (WinCertUefiGuid->Hdr.dwLength <= OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData)) {
- break;
- }
- if (!CompareGuid (&WinCertUefiGuid->CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {
- continue;
- }
- AuthData = WinCertUefiGuid->CertData;
- AuthDataSize = WinCertUefiGuid->Hdr.dwLength - OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);
- } else {
- if (WinCertificate->dwLength < sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE)) {
- break;
- }
- continue;
- }
-
- Status = HashPeImageByType (AuthData, AuthDataSize);
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- continue;
- }
-
- Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED;
-
- //
- // Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in forbidden database (dbx).
- // Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed database (db).
- //
- if (!IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize, TRUE, FilePathStr, File)) {
- IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize, TRUE, FilePathStr, File);
- }
-
- //
- // Check the image's hash value.
- //
- if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
- if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
- Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED;
- }
- }
-
- //
- // Add HASH digest for image with signature
- //
- Status = CreateSignatureList(mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize, &mCertType, &SignatureList, &SignatureListSize);
-
- if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
- AddImageExeInfo (Action, FilePathStr, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);
- FreePool (SignatureList);
- } else {
- goto END;
- }
- }
-
-
- if (OffSet != (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size)) {
- //
- // The Size in Certificate Table or the attribute certicate table is corrupted.
- //
- Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
- } else {
- Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
- }
-
-END:
-
- if (FilePathStr != NULL) {
- FreePool(FilePathStr);
- FilePathStr = NULL;
- }
-
- return Status;
-}
-
-/**
Provide verification service for signed images, which include both signature validation
and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and
MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.
@@ -2148,9 +1576,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action;
WIN_CERTIFICATE *WinCertificate;
UINT32 Policy;
- UINT8 *VarData;
- UINT8 SecureBoot;
- UINT8 AuditMode;
+ UINT8 *SecureBoot;
PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;
UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;
@@ -2170,19 +1596,6 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
- GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&VarData, NULL);
- //
- // Skip verification if AuditMode variable doesn't exist. AuditMode should always exist
- //
- if (VarData == NULL) {
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
- }
- AuditMode = *VarData;
- FreePool(VarData);
-
- if (AuditMode == AUDIT_MODE_ENABLE) {
- return ImageVerificationInAuditMode(AuthenticationStatus, File, FileBuffer, FileSize, BootPolicy);
- }
//
// Check the image type and get policy setting.
@@ -2227,22 +1640,22 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( CpuDeadLoop ();
}
- GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&VarData, NULL);
+ GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);
//
// Skip verification if SecureBoot variable doesn't exist.
//
- if (VarData == NULL) {
+ if (SecureBoot == NULL) {
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
- SecureBoot = *VarData;
- FreePool(VarData);
//
// Skip verification if SecureBoot is disabled but not AuditMode
//
- if (SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE) {
+ if (*SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE) {
+ FreePool (SecureBoot);
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
+ FreePool (SecureBoot);
//
// Read the Dos header.
@@ -2413,7 +1826,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( //
// Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in forbidden database (dbx).
//
- if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize, FALSE, NULL, NULL)) {
+ if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {
Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;
VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
break;
@@ -2423,7 +1836,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( // Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed database (db).
//
if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {
- if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize, FALSE, NULL, NULL)) {
+ if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {
VerifyStatus = EFI_SUCCESS;
}
}
|