Update "Can you trust"

Translation by Nadebula on Apr 21st

1 files changed, 174 insertions, 8 deletions

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+++ b/docs/can-you-trust.md
@@ -12,8 +12,9 @@ title: Untitled Document
 
 @firstcopyingnotice{{Copyright © 2002, 2007, 2014, 2015 Richard
 Stallman\
- {This essay was first published on <http://gnu.org>, in 2002. This
-version is part of @fsfsthreecite} Who should your computer take its
+ {本文首先于 2002 年发表于 <http://gnu.org>。此版本是 @fsfsthreecite 的一部分。} 
+
+Who should your computer take its
 orders from? Most people think their computers should obey them, not
 obey someone else. With a plan they call “trusted computing,” large
 media corporations (including the movie companies and record companies),
@@ -23,6 +24,13 @@ version of this scheme is called Palladium.) Proprietary programs have
 included malicious features before, but this plan would make it
 universal.
 
+您的计算机应该听从谁的命令？大多数人认为他们自己的计算机应当听从他们自己
+的命令而非他人的。但是，大型媒体公司（包括电影公司和唱片公司）正在联合大
+型计算机公司，诸如英特尔和微软，试图通过一项它们称之为“信任计算”的阴谋使
+得您的计算机听命于它们而非您。（这种阴谋的微软版本称为 Palladium。）以前
+的私有软件本来就包含恶意功能，但现在这项阴谋将会使它们变为无恶不作的恶意
+软件。
+
 Proprietary software means, fundamentally, that you don’t control what
 it does; you can’t study the source code, or change it. It’s not
 surprising that clever businessmen find ways to use their control to put
@@ -35,6 +43,15 @@ partner can rent out the use of your computer to its clients. These
 malicious features are often secret, but even once you know about them
 it is hard to remove them, since you don’t have the source code.
 
+从本质上说，私有软件意味着您不能控制它们的所作所为；您不能研究它们的源代
+码也不能修改它们。精明的商业人士总会找到办法以便利用他们的控制权将您置于
+不利地位，这并不令人感到丝毫惊讶。微软曾经多次这样做：某个版本的 Windows 
+被设计为能够向微软报告您的硬盘驱动器上安装的所有软件；最近的一项用于 
+Windows 媒体播放器的“安全”更新强制用户接受新的限制。但是，微软并不是唯一
+一家正在如此做的：例如 KaZaa 音乐共享软件被设计为使得 KaZaa 的业务合作伙
+伴可以将您的计算机使用状况出卖给它们的客户。这些恶意的功能通常是隐秘的，
+但即使您能够知道它们的存在，也难以移除它们，由于您不能访问它们的源代码。
+
 In the past, these were isolated incidents. “Trusted computing” would
 make the practice pervasive. “Treacherous computing” is a more
 appropriate name, because the plan is designed to make sure your
@@ -42,6 +59,11 @@ computer will systematically disobey you. In fact, it is designed to
 stop your computer from functioning as a general-purpose computer. Every
 operation may require explicit permission.
 
+在过去，这些行为只是孤立事件。然而，所谓的“信任计算”将会使得这种行为无处
+不在。“背叛计算”无疑是一个更为贴切的名字，由于这个阴谋被设计的初衷是确保
+您的计算机系统性地不再听命于您。事实上，它被设计为使您的计算机不再成为通
+用目的计算机。任何一项操作都可能要求得到它们的明确授权。
+
 The technical idea underlying treacherous computing is that the computer
 includes a digital encryption and signature device, and the keys are
 kept secret from you. Proprietary programs will use this device to
@@ -52,6 +74,13 @@ impose those rules automatically on your work. If you don’t allow your
 computer to obtain the new rules periodically from the internet, some
 capabilities will automatically cease to function.
 
+背叛计算的基本技术思想是使计算机包含一个数字加密与签名设备，而它所用的密
+钥对您是绝密的。私有软件将会利用这一设备来控制哪些您可以运行其他程序或是
+您可以访问哪些文档或数据，以及那些您可以跳转到其上的程序。这些程序将会不
+断从互联网上下载更多的认证限制规则，并且自动将这些限制强加到您的工作中。
+如果您不想让您的计算机定期从互联网上获取新的限制规则，一些功能将会自动停
+止工作。
+
 Of course, Hollywood and the record companies plan to use treacherous
 computing for Digital Restrictions Management (DRM), so that downloaded
 videos and music can be played only on one specified computer. Sharing
@@ -62,17 +91,32 @@ someone will find a way to produce unencrypted versions, and to upload
 and share them, so DRM will not entirely succeed, but that is no excuse
 for the system.)
 
+当然，好莱坞和唱片公司计划将背叛计算用于数字版权管理（DRM），这样，您下载
+到的视频和音乐将只能在某一台特定的计算机上播放。分享将会成为完全不可能，
+至少是对于那些您从这些公司获得的经过认证的文件。您，作为公众的一员，理应
+拥有分享这些内容的自由和能力。（我希望某些人能够找到一种方式来制作未加密
+的版本并且上传分享它们。这样 DRM 将不能完全得逞，但是，这不能成为我们原谅
+它的理由。）
+
 Making sharing impossible is bad enough, but it gets worse. There are
 plans to use the same facility for email and documents—resulting in
 email that disappears in two weeks, or documents that can only be read
 on the computers in one company.
 
+禁止分享已经足够恶劣了，但是事情正在向着更坏的方向发展。已经有计划将这种
+机制用于邮件和文档——使得邮件将会在两周之后消失，或者文档只能被某家公司的
+计算机读取。
+
 Imagine if you get an email from your boss telling you to do something
 that you think is risky; a month later, when it backfires, you can’t use
 the email to show that the decision was not yours. “Getting it in
 writing” doesn’t protect you when the order is written in disappearing
 ink.
 
+假设您收到上司的邮件，对方要求您去做某些您认为过于激进冒险的事情。一个月
+之后，当事情进展未达预期之时，您不能利用那封消失了的邮件证明这一决策并非
+您所做出。此时的白纸黑字并不能证明您的清白，如果它是用会褪色的墨水写的。
+
 Imagine if you get an email from your boss stating a policy that is
 illegal or morally outrageous, such as to shred your company’s audit
 documents, or to allow a dangerous threat to your country to move
@@ -81,6 +125,12 @@ activity. With treacherous computing, the reporter won’t be able to read
 the document; her computer will refuse to obey her. Treacherous
 computing becomes a paradise for corruption.
 
+假设您收到上司的邮件，邮件中说明了一种非法的或者通常是令人无法容忍的政策，
+例如销毁您的公司的审计档案，或者放任某种对您的公司的威胁发展坐大。今天，
+您还可以将其发送给记者并曝光这种行为。但是，一旦有了背叛计算，记者将不能
+读取您的文档；由于记者的计算机拒绝听命于本人。背叛计算将会成为腐败和犯罪
+的渊薮。
+
 Word processors such as Microsoft Word could use treacherous computing
 when they save your documents, to make sure no competing word processors
 can read them. Today we must figure out the secrets of Word format by
@@ -90,6 +140,13 @@ saving them, the free software community won’t have a chance of
 developing software to read them—and if we could, such programs might
 even be forbidden by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
 
+诸如微软 Word 等文字处理器可能会使用背叛计算来保存您的文档，以使得竞争对
+手的文字处理器不能读取它们。如今，我们必须试图通过耗时费力的试验来破解 
+Word 格式的秘密，以使得自由的文字处理器能够读取 Word 文档。但如果 Word 
+在保存文档时使用背叛计算加密文档内容，自由软件社区将毫无机会开发出能够读
+取它们的软件——即使我们能够开发出来，这样的软件也可能甚至会被数字千年版权
+法案（DMCA）判定为非法。
+
 Programs that use treacherous computing will continually download new
 authorization rules through the internet, and impose those rules
 automatically on your work. If Microsoft, or the US government, does not
@@ -99,6 +156,12 @@ document. Each computer would obey when it downloads the new
 instructions. Your writing would be subject to 1984-style retroactive
 erasure. You might be unable to read it yourself.
 
+使用背叛计算的软件将会持续从互联网下载新的认证限制规则，并且将其强加于您
+的工作。如果微软或者美国政府不喜欢您在文档中所写的内容，它们可以发送新的
+指令通知所有计算机拒绝任何人读取该文档。每台计算机在下载到新的指令时都会
+执行它。这样，您所写的内容将会遭受《1984》式的反动的抹除，甚至您自己都可
+能再也不能读取它。
+
 You might think you can find out what nasty things a
 treacherous-computing application does, study how painful they are, and
 decide whether to accept them. Even if you can find this out, it would
@@ -108,6 +171,13 @@ hooked and they know it; then they can change the deal. Some
 applications will automatically download upgrades that will do something
 different—and they won’t give you a choice about whether to upgrade.
 
+您可能认为您能够通过某种方式发现一款背叛计算的应用程序会做出哪些龌龊的事
+情，了解那些行为是多么地让人痛苦，然后决定是否接受它们。但即使您能够发现
+这些，对您来说接受这些协议也是愚蠢的，您甚至不能指望这些条款会维持现状而
+不是变得更坏。您一旦依赖于使用这些软件，您已经对此成瘾并且它们知道这一点；
+然后它们可以更改条款使其对您更加不利。一些应用程序会自动下载更新，而这些
+更新会在暗中做一些其他事情——而它们不会给您是否接受更新的选择权。
+
 Today you can avoid being restricted by proprietary software by not
 using it. If you run GNU/Linux or another free operating system, and if
 you avoid installing proprietary applications on it, then you are in
@@ -117,6 +187,12 @@ use the corrected version. You can also run free application programs
 and tools on nonfree operating systems; this falls short of fully giving
 you freedom, but many users do it.
 
+如今，您仍然可以通过拒绝使用私有软件来避免受其限制。如果您运行 GNU/Linux 
+或者其他的自由操作系统，并且您避免在其上安装私有软件，那么您仍然掌控着
+您的计算机的行为。如果一款自由软件包含恶意功能，社区中的其他开发者将会将
+其移除，您将能够使用修正后的版本。您也可以在私有操作系统上运行自由软件和
+工具；这并不能完全赋予您自由，但很多用户确实如此做。
+
 Treacherous computing puts the existence of free operating systems and
 free applications at risk, because you may not be able to run them at
 all. Some versions of treacherous computing would require the operating
@@ -127,6 +203,12 @@ the operating system developer. You could not run free applications on
 such a system. If you did figure out how, and told someone, that could
 be a crime.
 
+背叛计算将自由操作系统和自由软件置于绝境，因为您甚至可能完全不能运行它们。
+某些版本的背叛计算将会要求操作系统必须是由某家特定公司所具体认证的。这时
+自由操作系统将不被允许安装。某些版本的背叛计算可能会要求每个应用程序都要
+经过操作系统开发厂商具体认证。这时，您不能在这样的操作系统上运行自由软件。
+如果您设法找到破解方法并且告知他人，这将被视为犯罪行为。
+
 There are proposals already for US laws that would require all computers
 to support treacherous computing, and to prohibit connecting old
 computers to the internet. The CBDTPA (we call it the Consume But Don’t
@@ -140,21 +222,44 @@ individual action (take it or leave it). To oppose treacherous
 computing,[(2)](#FOOT2) we must join together and confront the situation
 as a collective choice.
 
+事实上，美国法律已经有提案要求所有计算机支持背叛计算，并且禁止老旧计算机
+接入互联网。美国消费者宽带和数字电视推广法案（CBDTPA，我们称之为 Consume 
+But Don't Try Programming Act，即“消灭并禁止尝试编程法案”）就是其中之一。
+但即使它们还没有从法律层面完全强制您转向背叛计算，这也会为您施加巨大压力
+以迫使您最终接受。如今，人们通常在通讯中使用 Word 文档格式，尽管这会导致
+诸多问题[(1)](#FOOT1)。如果只有支持背叛计算的机器才能读取最新的 Word 文档，
+那么很多人将会转向它，如果他们仅仅将这种情况看作个人行为（即“爱用不用”）。
+为了反对背叛计算[(2)](#FOOT2)，我们必须联合起来，并且作为一种集体的抉择来
+勇敢面对这一困境。
+
 To block treacherous computing will require large numbers of citizens to
 organize. We need your help! Please support
 [DefectiveByDesign.org](DefectiveByDesign.org), the FSF’s campaign
 against Digital Restrictions Management.
 
+阻止背叛计算将会需要大量的公民来组织参与。我们需要您的帮助！请支持 
+[DefectiveByDesign.org](DefectiveByDesign.org) 作为自由软件基金会反对数字
+版权管理的运动。
+
 ### Postscripts {#postscripts .subheading}
 
+### 补篇 {#postscripts .subheading}
+
 1.  The computer security field uses the term “trusted computing” in a
     different way—beware of confusion between the two meanings.
+
+1.  计算机安全领域以另一种方式使用短语“信任计算”——注意不要混淆二者的涵义。
+
 2.  The GNU Project distributes the GNU Privacy Guard, a program that
     implements public-key encryption and digital signatures, which you
     can use to send secure and private email. It is useful to explore
     how GPG differs from treacherous computing, and see what makes one
     helpful and the other so dangerous.
 
+2.  GNU 计划发布了 GNU 隐私卫士（GPG），这是一款能够实施公钥加密和数字
+    签名的软件，您可以使用它发送安全私密的邮件。您需要认清 GPG 和背叛计算
+    的本质区别，并且知道为何前者是有益的而后者是极度阴险的。
+
     When someone uses GPG to send you an encrypted document, and you use
     GPG to decode it, the result is an unencrypted document that you can
     read, forward, copy, and even reencrypt to send it securely to
@@ -165,20 +270,37 @@ against Digital Restrictions Management.
     *they* use *it*. Treacherous computing is designed to impose
     restrictions on the users; *it* uses *them*.
 
+    当某人使用 GPG 向您发送一份加密文档，并且您使用 GPG 对其解密，将会得到
+    一份未加密的文档。您可以读取、复制、回复甚至重新对其加密并且安全地发送
+    给他人。而背叛计算应用程序只是让您可以读取屏幕上的单词，但并不允许您生
+    成一份未加密的文档副本用于其他用途。GPG，作为一款自由软件，使安全特性
+    对用户可用，即“他们利用它”。而背叛计算被设计为向用户施加限制，即“它利
+    用他们”。
+
 3.  The supporters of treacherous computing focus their discourse on its
     beneficial uses. What they say is often correct, just not important.
 
+    背叛计算的支持者总是着重论述其好处。他们所说的往往是正确的，但并不重要。
+
     Like most hardware, treacherous-computing hardware can be used for
     purposes which are not harmful. But these features can be
     implemented in other ways, without treacherous-computing hardware.
     The principal difference that treacherous computing makes for users
     is the nasty consequence: rigging your computer to work against you.
 
+    同大多数硬件一样，背叛计算硬件也可以被用于非恶意用途，但这些功能也可由
+    不带背叛计算的硬件以其他方式实现。基本的区别在于背叛计算对用户所做的是
+    这样龌龊的事情：让您的计算机以对您不利的方式运行。
+
     What they say is true, and what I say is true. Put them together and
     what do you get? Treacherous computing is a plan to take away our
     freedom, while offering minor benefits to distract us from what we
     would lose.
 
+    如果他们说的是事实，将二者放在一起考虑将会得出什么结论？背叛计算是一套
+    剥夺我们的自由的阴谋，它提供了一些小恩小惠以吸引我们的注意力，使我们忽
+    视我们将会因此失去的更为重要的东西。
+
 4.  Microsoft presents Palladium as a security measure, and claims that
     it will protect against viruses, but this claim is evidently false.
     A presentation by Microsoft Research in October 2002 stated that one
@@ -187,6 +309,11 @@ against Digital Restrictions Management.
     will continue to be able to do all the things that they can
     do today.
 
+    微软将 Palladium 作为一项安全措施推出，并宣称它将提供反病毒保护，但这
+    是确凿的谎言。由微软研究院于 2002 年十月提供的一份演示文稿指出 Palladium 
+    的特性之一现存的操作系统和应用程序仍然能够运行；因此，病毒自然可以继
+    续做它们现在所能做的一切。
+    
     When Microsoft employees speak of “security” in connection with
     Palladium, they do not mean what we normally mean by that word:
     protecting your machine from things you do not want. They mean
@@ -197,6 +324,13 @@ against Digital Restrictions Management.
     quotation marks, recognizing that this is somewhat of an absurdity
     in the context of Palladium.
 
+    当微软员工提及与 Palladium 相关联的“安全”概念时，它并非指的是我们通常
+    理解的安全：保护您的机器免受您不想要的东西的危害。相反，他们指的是保
+    护您的计算机上的数据，并且阻止您以其他人不喜欢的方式访问它们。演示文稿
+    的一页幻灯片列出了 Palladium 可用于保守的几类机密，包括“第三方机密”和
+    “用户机密”——但它将“用户机密”置于引号之中，指出这在 Palladium 的语境中
+    是一种荒谬的东西。
+
     The presentation made frequent use of other terms that we frequently
     associate with the context of security, such as “attack,” “malicious
     code,” “spoofing,” as well as “trusted.” None of them means what it
@@ -206,6 +340,12 @@ against Digital Restrictions Management.
     to do. “Spoofing” doesn’t mean someone’s fooling you, it means your
     fooling Palladium. And so on.
 
+    该演示文稿频繁使用一些我们经常与安全语境相关联的短语，诸如“攻击”、“恶
+    意代码”、“冒名顶替”，当然还有“信任”。它们在这里的涵义都不是其通常的涵
+    义。例如，“攻击”不是指某人试图伤害您，而是指您试图复制受保护的音乐；
+    “恶意代码”指您自行安装的代码，用于使您的机器去做那些其他人不希望您做的
+    事情；“冒名顶替”不是指其他人愚弄您，而是指您愚弄 Palladium，等等。
+
 5.  A previous statement by the Palladium developers stated the basic
     premise that whoever developed or collected information should have
     total control of how you use it. This would represent a
@@ -213,6 +353,13 @@ against Digital Restrictions Management.
     system, and create an unprecedented system of control. The specific
     problems of these systems are no accident; they result from the
     basic goal. It is the goal we must reject.
+
+    先前由 Palladium 开发者发出的一份声明提出了一种基本的前提条件，即信息的
+    任何制造者和收集者对于您如何使用该信息应当拥有完全控制权。这意味着对已
+    有的伦理和法律系统理念的彻底颠覆，并且将会创建一个史无前例的控制体系。
+    这些系统的具体问题绝非偶然，因为它是基于上述基本目标的。这种基本目标是
+    我们必须坚决反对的。
+
 6.  As of 2015, treacherous computing has been implemented for PCs in
     the form of the “Trusted Platform Module”; however, for practical
     reasons, the TPM has proved a total failure for the goal of
@@ -225,16 +372,30 @@ against Digital Restrictions Management.
     secondary uses—for instance, to verify that no one has
     surreptitiously changed the system in a computer.
 
+    直至 2015 年，背叛计算在个人计算机（PC）中以“信任平台模块”（TPM）的形
+    式实现；然而由于实践上的原因，TPM 被证实完全未能实现其目标：为数字版权
+    管理（DRM）提供远程认证平台。因此，计算机公司以其他方式实现 DRM。现在，
+    TPM 完全没有被用于实现 DRM，并且有理由怀疑将它们用于 DRM 是根本不可行
+    的。讽刺的是，这意味着只有当前的 TPM 应用是无害的非重要应用——例如，证
+    实没有人偷偷地更改了计算机中的系统。
+
     Therefore, we conclude that the “Trusted Platform Modules” available
     for PCs are not dangerous, and there is no reason not to include one
     in a computer or support it in system software.
 
+    因此，我们得出结论：PC 中的 TPM 并不危险，没有理由不在 PC 中安装一块
+    TPM，或者不对其提供任何系统软件支持。
+
     This does not mean that everything is rosy. Other hardware systems
     for blocking the owner of a computer from changing the software in
     it are in use in some ARM PCs as well as processors in portable
     phones, cars, TVs and other devices, and these are fully as bad as
     we expected.
 
+    这并不意味着所有事情都是美好的。其他硬件系统诸如某些 ARM PC 以及移动
+    电话处理器、汽车、电视机等禁止其拥有者替换其中的软件，这与我们所预期
+    的一样坏。
+
     This also does not mean that remote attestation is harmless. If ever
     a device succeeds in implementing that, it will be a grave threat to
     users’ freedom. The current “Trusted Platform Module” is harmless
@@ -242,6 +403,10 @@ against Digital Restrictions Management.
     attestation feasible. We must not presume that all future attempts
     will fail too.
 
+    这也不意味着远程认证是无害的。如果一旦有一款设备成功实施了它，它将对
+    用户的自由造成毁灭性的影响。当前的 TPM 无害，仅仅是因为它暂时未能实现
+    其使远程认证成为可能的企图。我们一定不要假设它在未来的所有企图都将失败。
+
 <div class="footnote">
 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -250,15 +415,14 @@ against Digital Restrictions Management.
 
 ### [(1)](#DOCF1)
 
-@raggedright See my article “We Can Put an End to Word Attachments,” at
-<http://gnu.org/philosophy/no-word-attachments.html>, for a description
-of the problems Word documents cause and a number of suggestions on how
-to tackle them. @end raggedright
+@raggedright 参见我的文章 “We Can Put an End to Word Attachments,” 位于
+<http://gnu.org/philosophy/no-word-attachments.html>, 以获知 Word 文档所能
+导致的一系列问题的描述以及我们关于如何解决它们的一些建议。@end raggedright
 
 ### [(2)](#DOCF2)
 
-@raggedright For further information, see the “‘Trusted Computing’
-Frequently Asked Questions,” at
+@raggedright 如需获得更多信息，参见 “‘Trusted Computing’
+Frequently Asked Questions,” 一文，位于
 <http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/tcpa-faq.html>. @end raggedright
 
 </div>
@@ -267,3 +431,5 @@ Frequently Asked Questions,” at
 
 This document was generated by *tonghuix* on *March 25, 2016* using
 [*texi2html 1.82*](http://www.nongnu.org/texi2html/).\
+
+汉化：Nadebula