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+1. Misinterpreting Copyright—A Series of Errors {#misinterpreting-copyrighta-series-oferrors .chapter}
+===============================================
+
+@begingroup @advance@vsize by 6pt Something strange and dangerous is
+happening in copyright law. Under the US Constitution, copyright exists
+to benefit users—those who read books, listen to music, watch movies, or
+run software—not for the sake of publishers or authors. Yet even as
+people tend increasingly to reject and disobey the copyright
+restrictions imposed on them “for their own benefit,” the US government
+is adding more restrictions, and trying to frighten the public into
+obedience with harsh new penalties.
+
+How did copyright policies come to be diametrically opposed to their
+stated purpose? And how can we bring them back into alignment with that
+purpose? To understand, we should start by looking at the root of United
+States copyright law: the US Constitution.
+
+### Copyright in the US Constitution {#copyright-in-the-us-constitution .subheading}
+
+When the US Constitution was drafted, the idea that authors were
+entitled to a copyright monopoly was proposed—and rejected. The founders
+of our country adopted a different premise, that copyright is not a
+natural right of authors, but an artificial concession made to them for
+the sake of progress. The Constitution gives permission for a copyright
+system with this clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 8):
+
+> \[Congress shall have the power\] to promote the Progress of Science
+> and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
+> Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
+> Discoveries.
+
+The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that promoting progress means
+benefit for the users of copyrighted works. For example, in *Fox Film v.
+Doyal,*[(1)](#FOOT1) the court said,
+
+> The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
+> conferring the \[copyright\] monopoly lie in the general benefits
+> derived by the public from the labors of authors.
+
+This fundamental decision explains why copyright is not *required* by
+the Constitution, only *permitted* as an option—and why it is supposed
+to last for “limited times.” If copyright were a natural right,
+something that authors have because they deserve it, nothing could
+justify terminating this right after a certain period of time, any more
+than everyone’s house should become public property after a certain
+lapse of time from its construction.
+
+@firstcopyingnotice{{@footnoterule@smallskip Copyright © 2002, 2003,
+2007, 2009–2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.\
+ {This essay was first published on <http://gnu.org>, in 2002. This
+version is part of @fsfsthreecite}
+
+### The “Copyright Bargain” {#the-copyright-bargain .subheading}
+
+The copyright system works by providing privileges and thus benefits to
+publishers and authors; but it does not do this for their sake. Rather,
+it does this to modify their behavior: to provide an incentive for
+authors to write more and publish more. In effect, the government spends
+the public’s natural rights, on the public’s behalf, as part of a deal
+to bring the public more published works. Legal scholars call this
+concept the “copyright bargain.” It is like a government purchase of a
+highway or an airplane using taxpayers’ money, except that the
+government spends our freedom instead of our money.
+
+But is the bargain as it exists actually a good deal for the public?
+Many alternative bargains are possible; which one is best? Every issue
+of copyright policy is part of this question. If we misunderstand the
+nature of the question, we will tend to decide the issues badly.
+
+The Constitution authorizes granting copyright powers to authors. In
+practice, authors typically cede them to publishers; it is usually the
+publishers, not the authors, who exercise these powers and get most of
+the benefits, though authors may get a small portion. Thus it is usually
+the publishers that lobby to increase copyright powers. To better
+reflect the reality of copyright rather than the myth, this article
+refers to publishers rather than authors as the holders of copyright
+powers. It also refers to the users of copyrighted works as “readers,”
+even though using them does not always mean reading, because “the users”
+is remote and abstract.
+
+### The First Error: “Striking a Balance” {#the-first-error-striking-a-balance .subheading}
+
+The copyright bargain places the public first: benefit for the reading
+public is an end in itself; benefits (if any) for publishers are just a
+means toward that end. Readers’ interests and publishers’ interests are
+thus qualitatively unequal in priority. The first step in
+misinterpreting the purpose of copyright is the elevation of the
+publishers to the same level of importance as the readers.
+
+It is often said that US copyright law is meant to “strike a balance”
+between the interests of publishers and readers. Those who cite this
+interpretation present it as a restatement of the basic position stated
+in the Constitution; in other words, it is supposed to be equivalent to
+the copyright bargain.
+
+But the two interpretations are far from equivalent; they are different
+conceptually, and different in their implications. The balance concept
+assumes that the readers’ and publishers’ interests differ in importance
+only quantitatively, in *how much weight* we should give them, and in
+what actions they apply to. The term “stakeholders” is often used to
+frame the issue in this way; it assumes that all kinds of interest in a
+policy decision are equally important. This view rejects the qualitative
+distinction between the readers’ and publishers’ interests which is at
+the root of the government’s participation in the copyright bargain.
+
+The consequences of this alteration are far-reaching, because the great
+protection for the public in the copyright bargain—the idea that
+copyright privileges can be justified only in the name of the readers,
+never in the name of the publishers—is discarded by the “balance”
+interpretation. Since the interest of the publishers is regarded as an
+end in itself, it can justify copyright privileges; in other words, the
+“balance” concept says that privileges can be justified in the name of
+someone other than the public.
+
+As a practical matter, the consequence of the “balance” concept is to
+reverse the burden of justification for changes in copyright law. The
+copyright bargain places the burden on the publishers to convince the
+readers to cede certain freedoms. The concept of balance reverses this
+burden, practically speaking, because there is generally no doubt that
+publishers will benefit from additional privilege. Unless harm to the
+readers can be proved, sufficient to “outweigh” this benefit, we are led
+to conclude that the publishers are entitled to almost any privilege
+they request.
+
+Since the idea of “striking a balance” between publishers and readers
+denies the readers the primacy they are entitled to, we must reject it.
+
+### Balancing against What? {#balancing-against-what .subheading}
+
+When the government buys something for the public, it acts on behalf of
+the public; its responsibility is to obtain the best possible deal—best
+for the public, not for the other party in the agreement.
+
+For example, when signing contracts with construction companies to build
+highways, the government aims to spend as little as possible of the
+public’s money. Government agencies use competitive bidding to push the
+price down.
+
+As a practical matter, the price cannot be zero, because contractors
+will not bid that low. Although not entitled to special consideration,
+they have the usual rights of citizens in a free society, including the
+right to refuse disadvantageous contracts; even the lowest bid will be
+high enough for some contractor to make money. So there is indeed a
+balance, of a kind. But it is not a deliberate balancing of two
+interests each with claim to special consideration. It is a balance
+between a public goal and market forces. The government tries to obtain
+for the taxpaying motorists the best deal they can get in the context of
+a free society and a free market.
+
+In the copyright bargain, the government spends our freedom instead of
+our money. Freedom is more precious than money, so government’s
+responsibility to spend our freedom wisely and frugally is even greater
+than its responsibility to spend our money thus. Governments must never
+put the publishers’ interests on a par with the public’s freedom.
+
+### Not “Balance” but “Trade-Off” {#not-balance-but-trade-off .subheading}
+
+The idea of balancing the readers’ interests against the publishers’ is
+the wrong way to judge copyright policy, but there are indeed two
+interests to be weighed: two interests *of the readers.* Readers have an
+interest in their own freedom in using published works; depending on
+circumstances, they may also have an interest in encouraging publication
+through some kind of incentive system.
+
+The word “balance,” in discussions of copyright, has come to stand as
+shorthand for the idea of “striking a balance” between the readers and
+the publishers. Therefore, to use the word “balance” in regard to the
+readers’ two interests would be confusing.[(2)](#FOOT2) We need another
+term.
+
+In general, when one party has two goals that partly conflict, and
+cannot completely achieve both of them, we call this a “trade-off.”
+Therefore, rather than speaking of “striking the right balance” between
+parties, we should speak of “finding the right trade-off between
+spending our freedom and keeping it.”
+
+### The Second Error: Maximizing One Output {#the-second-error-maximizing-one-output .subheading}
+
+The second mistake in copyright policy consists of adopting the goal of
+maximizing—not just increasing—the number of published works. The
+erroneous concept of “striking a balance” elevated the publishers to
+parity with the readers; this second error places them far above the
+readers.
+
+When we purchase something, we do not generally buy the whole quantity
+in stock or the most expensive model. Instead we conserve funds for
+other purchases, by buying only what we need of any particular good, and
+choosing a model of sufficient rather than highest quality. The
+principle of diminishing returns suggests that spending all our money on
+one particular good is likely to be an inefficient allocation of
+resources; we generally choose to keep some money for another use.
+
+Diminishing returns applies to copyright just as to any other purchase.
+The first freedoms we should trade away are those we miss the least, and
+whose sacrifice gives the largest encouragement to publication. As we
+trade additional freedoms that cut closer to home, we find that each
+trade is a bigger sacrifice than the last, while bringing a smaller
+increment in literary activity. Well before the increment becomes zero,
+we may well say it is not worth its incremental price; we would then
+settle on a bargain whose overall result is to increase the amount of
+publication, but not to the utmost possible extent.
+
+Accepting the goal of maximizing publication rejects all these wiser,
+more advantageous bargains in advance—it dictates that the public must
+cede nearly all of its freedom to use published works, for just a little
+more publication.
+
+### The Rhetoric of Maximization {#the-rhetoric-of-maximization .subheading}
+
+In practice, the goal of maximizing publication regardless of the cost
+to freedom is supported by widespread rhetoric which asserts that public
+copying is illegitimate, unfair, and intrinsically wrong. For instance,
+the publishers call people who copy “pirates,” a smear term designed to
+equate sharing information with your neighbor with attacking a ship.
+(This smear term was formerly used by authors to describe publishers who
+found lawful ways to publish unauthorized editions; its modern use by
+the publishers is almost the reverse.) This rhetoric directly rejects
+the constitutional basis for copyright, but presents itself as
+representing the unquestioned tradition of the American legal system.
+
+The “pirate” rhetoric is typically accepted because it so pervades the
+media that few people realize how radical it is. It is effective because
+if copying by the public is fundamentally illegitimate, we can never
+object to the publishers’ demand that we surrender our freedom to do so.
+In other words, when the public is challenged to show why publishers
+should not receive some additional power, the most important reason of
+all—“We want to copy”—is disqualified in advance.
+
+This leaves no way to argue against increasing copyright power except
+using side issues. Hence, opposition to stronger copyright powers today
+almost exclusively cites side issues, and never dares cite the freedom
+to distribute copies as a legitimate public value.
+
+As a practical matter, the goal of maximization enables publishers to
+argue that “A certain practice is reducing our sales—or we think it
+might—so we presume it diminishes publication by some unknown amount,
+and therefore it should be prohibited.” We are led to the outrageous
+conclusion that the public good is measured by publishers’ sales: What’s
+good for General Media is good for the USA.
+
+### The Third Error: Maximizing Publishers’ Power {#the-third-error-maximizing-publishers-power .subheading}
+
+Once the publishers have obtained assent to the policy goal of
+maximizing publication output at any cost, their next step is to infer
+that this requires giving them the maximum possible powers—making
+copyright cover every imaginable use of a work, or applying some other
+legal tool such as “shrink wrap” licenses to equivalent effect. This
+goal, which entails the abolition of “fair use” and the “right of first
+sale,” is being pressed at every available level of government, from
+states of the US to international bodies.
+
+This step is erroneous because strict copyright rules obstruct the
+creation of useful new works. For instance, Shakespeare borrowed the
+plots of some of his plays from works others had published a few decades
+before, so if today’s copyright law had been in effect, his plays would
+have been illegal.
+
+Even if we wanted the highest possible rate of publication, regardless
+of cost to the public, maximizing publishers’ power is the wrong way to
+get it. As a means of promoting progress, it is self-defeating.
+
+### The Results of the Three Errors {#the-results-of-the-three-errors .subheading}
+
+The current trend in copyright legislation is to hand publishers broader
+powers for longer periods of time. The conceptual basis of copyright, as
+it emerges distorted from the series of errors, rarely offers a basis
+for saying no. Legislators give lip service to the idea that copyright
+serves the public, while in fact giving publishers whatever they ask
+for.
+
+For example, here is what Senator Hatch said when introducing S.
+483,[(3)](#FOOT3) a 1995 bill to increase the term of copyright by 20
+years:
+
+> I believe we are now at such a point with respect to the question of
+> whether the current term of copyright adequately protects the
+> interests of authors and the related question of whether the term of
+> protection continues to provide a sufficient incentive for the
+> creation of new works of authorship.[(4)](#FOOT4)
+
+This bill extended the copyright on already published works written
+since the 1920s. This change was a giveaway to publishers with no
+possible benefit to the public, since there is no way to retroactively
+increase now the number of books published back then. Yet it cost the
+public a freedom that is meaningful today—the freedom to redistribute
+books from that era. Note the use of the propaganda term,
+“protect,”[(5)](#FOOT5) which embodies the second of the three errors.
+
+The bill also extended the copyrights of works yet to be written. For
+works made for hire, copyright would last 95 years instead of the
+present 75 years. Theoretically this would increase the incentive to
+write new works; but any publisher that claims to need this extra
+incentive should be required to substantiate the claim with projected
+balance sheets for 75 years in the future.
+
+Needless to say, Congress did not question the publishers’ arguments: a
+law extending copyright was enacted in 1998. It was officially called
+the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, named after one of its
+sponsors who died earlier that year. We usually call it the Mickey Mouse
+Copyright Act, since we presume its real motive was to prevent the
+copyright on the appearance of Mickey Mouse from expiring. Bono’s widow,
+who served the rest of his term, made this statement:
+
+> Actually, Sonny wanted the term of copyright protection to last
+> forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the
+> Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our
+> copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As you know, there
+> is also Jack Valenti’s[(6)](#FOOT6) proposal for term to last forever
+> less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
+> Congress.[(7)](#FOOT7)
+
+The Supreme Court later heard a case that sought to overturn the law on
+the grounds that the retroactive extension fails to serve the
+Constitution’s goal of promoting progress. The court responded by
+abdicating its responsibility to judge the question; on copyright, the
+Constitution requires only lip service.
+
+Another law, passed in 1997, made it a felony to make sufficiently many
+copies of any published work, even if you give them away to friends just
+to be nice. Previously this was not a crime in the US at all.
+
+An even worse law, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), was
+designed to bring back what was then called “copy protection”—now known
+as DRM (Digital Restrictions Management)[(8)](#FOOT8)—which users
+already detested, by making it a crime to defeat the restrictions, or
+even publish information about how to defeat them. This law ought to be
+called the “Domination by Media Corporations Act” because it effectively
+offers publishers the chance to write their own copyright law. It says
+they can impose any restrictions whatsoever on the use of a work, and
+these restrictions take the force of law provided the work contains some
+sort of encryption or license manager to enforce them.
+
+One of the arguments offered for this bill was that it would implement a
+recent treaty to increase copyright powers. The treaty was promulgated
+by the World “Intellectual Property”[(9)](#FOOT9) Organization, an
+organization dominated by copyright- and patent-holding interests, with
+the aid of pressure from the Clinton administration; since the treaty
+only increases copyright power, whether it serves the public interest in
+any country is doubtful. In any case, the bill went far beyond what the
+treaty required.
+
+Libraries were a key source of opposition to this bill, especially to
+the aspects that block the forms of copying that are considered fair
+use. How did the publishers respond? Former representative Pat
+Schroeder, now a lobbyist for the Association of American Publishers,
+said that the publishers “could not live with what \[the libraries
+were\] asking for.” Since the libraries were asking only to preserve
+part of the status quo, one might respond by wondering how the
+publishers had survived until the present day.
+
+Congressman Barney Frank, in a meeting with me and others who opposed
+this bill, showed how far the US Constitution’s view of copyright has
+been disregarded. He said that new powers, backed by criminal penalties,
+were needed urgently because the “movie industry is worried,” as well as
+the “music industry” and other “industries.” I asked him, “But is this
+in the public interest?” His response was telling: “Why are you talking
+about the public interest? These creative people don’t have to give up
+their rights for the public interest!” The “industry” has been
+identified with the “creative people” it hires, copyright has been
+treated as its entitlement, and the Constitution has been turned upside
+down.
+
+The DMCA was enacted in 1998. As enacted, it says that fair use remains
+nominally legitimate, but allows publishers to prohibit all software or
+hardware that you could practice it with. Effectively, fair use is
+prohibited.
+
+Based on this law, the movie industry has imposed censorship on free
+software for reading and playing DVDs, and even on the information about
+how to read them. In April 2001, Professor Edward Felten of Princeton
+University was intimidated by lawsuit threats from the Recording
+Industry Association of America (RIAA) into withdrawing a scientific
+paper stating what he had learned about a proposed encryption system for
+restricting access to recorded music.
+
+We are also beginning to see e-books that take away many of readers’
+traditional freedoms—for instance, the freedom to lend a book to your
+friend, to sell it to a used book store, to borrow it from a library, to
+buy it without giving your name to a corporate data bank, even the
+freedom to read it twice. Encrypted e-books generally restrict all these
+activities—you can read them only with special secret software designed
+to restrict you.
+
+I will never buy one of these encrypted, restricted e-books, and I hope
+you will reject them too. If an e-book doesn’t give you the same
+freedoms as a traditional paper book, don’t accept it!
+
+Anyone independently releasing software that can read restricted e-books
+risks prosecution. A Russian programmer, Dmitry Sklyarov, was arrested
+in 2001 while visiting the US to speak at a conference, because he had
+written such a program in Russia, where it was lawful to do so. Now
+Russia is preparing a law to prohibit it too, and the European Union
+recently adopted one.
+
+Mass-market e-books have been a commercial failure so far, but not
+because readers chose to defend their freedom; they were unattractive
+for other reasons, such as that computer display screens are not easy
+surfaces to read from. We can’t rely on this happy accident to protect
+us in the long term; the next attempt to promote e-books will use
+“electronic paper”—book-like objects into which an encrypted, restricted
+e-book can be downloaded. If this paper-like surface proves more
+appealing than today’s display screens, we will have to defend our
+freedom in order to keep it. Meanwhile, e-books are making inroads in
+niches: NYU and other dental schools require students to buy their
+textbooks in the form of restricted e-books.
+
+The media companies are not satisfied yet. In 2001, Disney-funded
+Senator Hollings proposed a bill called the “Security Systems Standards
+and Certification Act” (SSSCA),[(10)](#FOOT10) which would require all
+computers (and other digital recording and playback devices) to have
+government-mandated copy-restriction systems. That is their ultimate
+goal, but the first item on their agenda is to prohibit any equipment
+that can tune digital HDTV unless it is designed to be impossible for
+the public to “tamper with” (i.e., modify for their own purposes). Since
+free software is software that users can modify, we face here for the
+first time a proposed law that explicitly prohibits free software for a
+certain job. Prohibition of other jobs will surely follow. If the FCC
+adopts this rule, existing free software such as GNU Radio would be
+censored.
+
+To block these bills and rules requires political action.[(11)](#FOOT11)
+
+### Finding the Right Bargain {#finding-the-right-bargain .subheading}
+
+What is the proper way to decide copyright policy? If copyright is a
+bargain made on behalf of the public, it should serve the public
+interest above all. The government’s duty when selling the public’s
+freedom is to sell only what it must, and sell it as dearly as possible.
+At the very least, we should pare back the extent of copyright as much
+as possible while maintaining a comparable level of publication.
+
+Since we cannot find this minimum price in freedom through competitive
+bidding, as we do for construction projects, how can we find it?
+
+One possible method is to reduce copyright privileges in stages, and
+observe the results. By seeing if and when measurable diminutions in
+publication occur, we will learn how much copyright power is really
+necessary to achieve the public’s purposes. We must judge this by actual
+observation, not by what publishers say will happen, because they have
+every incentive to make exaggerated predictions of doom if their powers
+are reduced in any way.
+
+Copyright policy includes several independent dimensions, which can be
+adjusted separately. After we find the necessary minimum for one policy
+dimension, it may still be possible to reduce other dimensions of
+copyright while maintaining the desired publication level.
+
+One important dimension of copyright is its duration, which is now
+typically on the order of a century. Reducing the monopoly on copying to
+ten years, starting from the date when a work is published, would be a
+good first step. Another aspect of copyright, which covers the making of
+derivative works, could continue for a longer period.
+
+Why count from the date of publication? Because copyright on unpublished
+works does not directly limit readers’ freedom; whether we are free to
+copy a work is moot when we do not have copies. So giving authors a
+longer time to get a work published does no harm. Authors (who generally
+do own the copyright prior to publication) will rarely choose to delay
+publication just to push back the end of the copyright term.
+
+Why ten years? Because that is a safe proposal; we can be confident on
+practical grounds that this reduction would have little impact on the
+overall viability of publishing today. In most media and genres,
+successful works are very profitable in just a few years, and even
+successful works are usually out of print well before ten. Even for
+reference works, whose useful life may be many decades, ten-year
+copyright should suffice: updated editions are issued regularly, and
+many readers will buy the copyrighted current edition rather than copy a
+ten-year-old public domain version.
+
+Ten years may still be longer than necessary; once things settle down,
+we could try a further reduction to tune the system. At a panel on
+copyright at a literary convention, where I proposed the ten-year term,
+a noted fantasy author sitting beside me objected vehemently, saying
+that anything beyond five years was intolerable.
+
+But we don’t have to apply the same time span to all kinds of works.
+Maintaining the utmost uniformity of copyright policy is not crucial to
+the public interest, and copyright law already has many exceptions for
+specific uses and media. It would be foolish to pay for every highway
+project at the rates necessary for the most difficult projects in the
+most expensive regions of the country; it is equally foolish to “pay”
+for all kinds of art with the greatest price in freedom that we find
+necessary for any one kind.
+
+So perhaps novels, dictionaries, computer programs, songs, symphonies,
+and movies should have different durations of copyright, so that we can
+reduce the duration for each kind of work to what is necessary for many
+such works to be published. Perhaps movies over one hour long could have
+a 20-year copyright, because of the expense of producing them. In my own
+field, computer programming, three years should suffice, because product
+cycles are even shorter than that.
+
+Another dimension of copyright policy is the extent of fair use: some
+ways of reproducing all or part of a published work that are legally
+permitted even though it is copyrighted. The natural first step in
+reducing this dimension of copyright power is to permit occasional
+private small-quantity noncommercial copying and distribution among
+individuals. This would eliminate the intrusion of the copyright police
+into people’s private lives, but would probably have little effect on
+the sales of published works. (It may be necessary to take other legal
+steps to ensure that shrink-wrap licenses cannot be used to substitute
+for copyright in restricting such copying.) The experience of Napster
+shows that we should also permit noncommercial verbatim redistribution
+to the general public—when so many of the public want to copy and share,
+and find it so useful, only draconian measures will stop them, and the
+public deserves to get what it wants.
+
+For novels, and in general for works that are used for entertainment,
+noncommercial verbatim redistribution may be sufficient freedom for the
+readers. Computer programs, being used for functional purposes (to get
+jobs done), call for additional freedoms beyond that, including the
+freedom to publish an improved version. See “The Free Software
+Definition,” in this book, for an explanation of the freedoms that
+software users should have. But it may be an acceptable compromise for
+these freedoms to be universally available only after a delay of two or
+three years from the program’s publication.
+
+Changes like these could bring copyright into line with the public’s
+wish to use digital technology to copy. Publishers will no doubt find
+these proposals “unbalanced”; they may threaten to take their marbles
+and go home, but they won’t really do it, because the game will remain
+profitable and it will be the only game in town.
+
+As we consider reductions in copyright power, we must make sure media
+companies do not simply replace it with end-user license agreements. It
+would be necessary to prohibit the use of contracts to apply
+restrictions on copying that go beyond those of copyright. Such
+limitations on what mass-market nonnegotiated contracts can require are
+a standard part of the US legal system.
+
+### A Personal Note {#a-personal-note .subheading}
+
+I am a software designer, not a legal scholar. I’ve become concerned
+with copyright issues because there’s no avoiding them in the world of
+computer networks, such as the Internet. As a user of computers and
+networks for 30 years, I value the freedoms that we have lost, and the
+ones we may lose next. As an author, I can reject the romantic mystique
+of the author as semidivine creator, often cited by publishers to
+justify increased copyright powers for authors—powers which these
+authors will then sign away to publishers.
+
+Most of this article consists of facts and reasoning that you can check,
+and proposals on which you can form your own opinions. But I ask you to
+accept one thing on my word alone: that authors like me don’t deserve
+special power over you. If you wish to reward me further for the
+software or books I have written, I would gratefully accept a check—but
+please don’t surrender your freedom in my name. @endgroup
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+### Footnotes
+
+### [(1)](#DOCF1)
+
+@raggedright Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 US 123, 1932. @end raggedright
+
+### [(2)](#DOCF2)
+
+@raggedright See Julian Sanchez’s article “The Trouble with ‘Balance’
+Metaphors” (4 February 2011,
+[http://juliansanchez.com/2011/02/04/the-trouble-with-balance-\
+metaphors/](http://juliansanchez.com/2011/02/04/the-trouble-with-balance-%3Cbr%3Emetaphors/))
+for an examination of “how the analogy between sound judgment and
+balancing weights may constrain our thinking in unhealthy ways.” @end
+raggedright
+
+### [(3)](#DOCF3)
+
+@raggedright Congressional Record, S. 483, “The Copyright Term Extension
+Act of 1995,” 2 March 1995, pp. S3390–4. @end raggedright
+
+### [(4)](#DOCF4)
+
+@raggedright Congressional Record, “Statement on Introduced Bills and
+Joint Resolutions,” 2 March 1995, p. S3390,
+<http://gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1995-03-02/pdf/CREC-1995-03-02-pt1-PgS3390-2.pdf>.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(5)](#DOCF5)
+
+@raggedright See @pageref{Protection} for why use the term “protect”
+should be avoided in connection with copyright. @end raggedright
+
+### [(6)](#DOCF6)
+
+@raggedright Jack Valenti was a longtime president of the Motion Picture
+Association of America. @end raggedright
+
+### [(7)](#DOCF7)
+
+@raggedright Congressional Record, remarks of Rep. Bono, 7 October 1998,
+p. H9952,
+<http://gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1998-10-07/pdf/CREC-1998-10-07-pt1-PgH9946.pdf>.
+@end raggedright
+
+### [(8)](#DOCF8)
+
+@raggedright See <http://gnu.org/proprietary/proprietary-drm.html> for
+more on this issue. @end raggedright
+
+### [(9)](#DOCF9)
+
+@raggedright See “Did You Say “Intellectual Property”? It’s a Seductive
+Mirage”( @pageref{Not IPR}) for an explanation of why this term is
+problematic. @end raggedright
+
+### [(10)](#DOCF10)
+
+@raggedright Since renamed to the unpronounceable CBDTPA, for which a
+good mnemonic is “Consume, But Don’t Try Programming Anything,” but it
+really stands for the “Consumer Broadband and Digital Television
+Promotion Act.” @end raggedright
+
+### [(11)](#DOCF11)
+
+If you would like to help, I recommend the web sites
+<http://defectivebydesign.org>, <http://publicknowledge.org>, and
+<http://eff.org>.
+
+</div>
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+This document was generated by *tonghuix* on *March 25, 2016* using
+[*texi2html 1.82*](http://www.nongnu.org/texi2html/).\