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diff --git a/docs/surveillance-vs-democracy.md b/docs/surveillance-vs-democracy.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bff9e5b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/surveillance-vs-democracy.md @@ -0,0 +1,709 @@ +--- +Generator: 'texi2html 1.82' +description: Untitled Document +distribution: global +keywords: Untitled Document +resource-type: document +title: Untitled Document +... + +1. How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand? {#how-much-surveillance-can-democracy-withstand .chapter} +================================================= + +Thanks to Edward Snowden’s disclosures, we know that the current level +of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human rights. +The repeated harassment and prosecution of dissidents, sources, and +journalists in the US and elsewhere provides confirmation. We need to +reduce the level of general surveillance, but how far? Where exactly is +the *maximum tolerable level of surveillance,* which we must ensure is +not exceeded? It is the level beyond which surveillance starts to +interfere with the functioning of democracy, in that whistleblowers +(such as Snowden) are likely to be caught. + +Faced with government secrecy, we the people depend on whistleblowers to +tell us what the state is doing.[(1)](#FOOT1) However, today’s +surveillance intimidates potential whistleblowers, which means it is too +much. To recover our democratic control over the state, we must reduce +surveillance to the point where whistleblowers know they are safe. + +Using free/libre software, as I’ve advocated for 30 years, is the first +step in taking control of our digital lives, and that includes +preventing surveillance. We can’t trust nonfree software; the NSA +uses[(2)](#FOOT2) and even creates[(3)](#FOOT3) security weaknesses in +nonfree software to invade our own computers and routers. Free software +gives us control of our own computers, but that won’t protect our +privacy once we set foot on the internet.[(4)](#FOOT4) +@firstcopyingnotice{{@footnoterule @smallskip Copyright © 2015 Richard +Stallman\ + {A version of this article was first published on the [Wired](Wired) +web site under the same title (Wired, 14 October 2013, +<http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/a-necessary-evil-what-it-takes-for-democracy-to-survive-surveillance>). +This version is part of @fsfsthreecite} + +Bipartisan legislation to “curtail the domestic surveillance +powers”[(5)](#FOOT5) in the US is being drawn up, but it relies on +limiting the government’s use of our virtual dossiers. That won’t +suffice to protect whistleblowers if “catching the whistleblower” is +grounds for access sufficient to identify him or her. We need to go +further. + +### The Upper Limit on Surveillance in a Democracy {#the-upper-limit-on-surveillance-in-a-democracy .subheading} + +If whistleblowers don’t dare reveal crimes and lies, we lose the last +shred of effective control over our government and institutions. That’s +why surveillance that enables the state to find out who has talked with +a reporter is too much surveillance—too much for democracy to endure. + +An unnamed US government official ominously told journalists in 2011 +that the US would not subpoena reporters because “We know who you’re +talking to.”[(6)](#FOOT6) Sometimes journalists’ phone call records are +subpoenaed[(7)](#FOOT7) to find this out, but Snowden has shown us that +in effect they subpoena all the phone call records of everyone in the +US, all the time, from Verizon[(8)](#FOOT8) and from other companies +too.[(9)](#FOOT9)\ + Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from states +that are willing to play dirty tricks on them. The ACLU has demonstrated +the US government’s systematic practice of infiltrating peaceful +dissident groups[(10)](#FOOT10) on the pretext that there might be +terrorists among them. The point at which surveillance is too much is +the point at which the state can find who spoke to a known journalist or +a known dissident. + +### Information, Once Collected, Will Be Misused {#information-once-collected-will-be-misused .subheading} + +When people recognize that the level of general surveillance is too +high, the first response is to propose limits on access to the +accumulated data. That sounds nice, but it won’t fix the problem, not +even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules. (The +NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it was unable to effectively +hold the NSA accountable.)[(11)](#FOOT11) Suspicion of a crime will be +grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of “espionage,” +finding the “spy” will provide an excuse to access the accumulated +material. + +In addition, the state’s surveillance staff will misuse the data for +personal reasons. Some NSA agents used US surveillance systems to track +their lovers—past, present, or wished-for—in a practice called +“LOVEINT.”[(12)](#FOOT12) The NSA says it has caught and punished this a +few times; we don’t know how many other times it wasn’t caught. But +these events shouldn’t surprise us, because police have long used their +access to driver’s license records to track down someone attractive, a +practice known as “running a plate for a date.”[(13)](#FOOT13) + +Surveillance data will always be used for other purposes, even if this +is prohibited. Once the data has been accumulated and the state has the +possibility of access to it, it can misuse that data in dreadful ways, +as shown by examples from Europe[(14)](#FOOT14) and the +US.[(15)](#FOOT15) + +Personal data collected by the state is also likely to be obtained by +outside crackers that break the security of the servers, even by +crackers working for hostile states.[(16)](#FOOT16) + +Governments can easily use massive surveillance capability to subvert +democracy directly.[(17)](#FOOT17) + +Total surveillance accessible to the state enables the state to launch a +massive fishing expedition against any person. To make journalism and +democracy safe, we must limit the accumulation of data that is easily +accessible to the state. + +### Robust Protection for Privacy Must Be Technical {#robust-protection-for-privacy-must-be-technical .subheading} + +The Electronic Frontier Foundation and other organizations propose a set +of legal principles designed to prevent the abuses of massive +surveillance.[(18)](#FOOT18) These principles include, crucially, +explicit legal protection for whistleblowers; as a consequence, they +would be adequate for protecting democratic freedoms—if adopted +completely and enforced without exception forever. + +However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history shows, +they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act), suspended, or +ignored.[(19)](#FOOT19) + +Meanwhile, demagogues will cite the usual excuses as grounds for total +surveillance; any terrorist attack, even one that kills just a handful +of people, can be hyped to provide an opportunity. + +If limits on access to the data are set aside, it will be as if they had +never existed: years’ worth of dossiers would suddenly become available +for misuse by the state and its agents and, if collected by companies, +for their private misuse as well. If, however, we stop the collection of +dossiers on everyone, those dossiers won’t exist, and there will be no +way to compile them retroactively. A new illiberal regime would have to +implement surveillance afresh, and it would only collect data starting +at that date. As for suspending or momentarily ignoring this law, the +idea would hardly make sense. + +### First, Don’t Be Foolish {#first-dont-be-foolish .subheading} + +To have privacy, you must not throw it away: the first one who has to +protect your privacy is you. Avoid identifying yourself to web sites, +contact them with Tor, and use browsers that block the schemes they use +to track visitors. Use the GNU Privacy Guard to encrypt the contents of +your email. Pay for things with cash. + +Keep your own data; don’t store your data in a company’s “convenient” +server. It’s safe, however, to entrust a data backup to a commercial +service, provided you put the files in an archive and encrypt the whole +archive, including the names of the files, with free software on your +own computer before uploading it. + +For privacy’s sake, you must avoid nonfree software since, as a +consequence of giving others control of your computing, it is likely to +spy on you.[(20)](#FOOT20) Avoid service as a software +substitute;[(21)](#FOOT21) as well as giving others control of your +computing, it requires you to hand over all the pertinent data to the +server. + +Protect your friends’ and acquaintances’ privacy, too. Don’t give out +their personal information[(22)](#FOOT22) except how to contact them, +and never give any web site your list of email or phone contacts. Don’t +tell a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that they +might not wish to publish in a newspaper. Better yet, don’t be used by +Facebook at all. Reject communication systems that require users to give +their real names, even if you are going to give yours, since they +pressure other people to surrender their privacy. + +Self-protection is essential, but even the most rigorous self-protection +is insufficient to protect your privacy on or from systems that don’t +belong to you. When we communicate with others or move around the city, +our privacy depends on the practices of society. We can avoid some of +the systems that surveil our communications and movements, but not all +of them. Clearly, the better solution is to make all these systems stop +surveilling people other than legitimate suspects. + +### We Must Design Every System for Privacy {#we-must-design-every-system-for-privacy .subheading} + +If we don’t want a total surveillance society, we must consider +surveillance a kind of social pollution, and limit the surveillance +impact of each new digital system just as we limit the environmental +impact of physical construction. + +For example: “smart” meters for electricity are touted for sending the +power company moment-by-moment data about each customer’s electric +usage, including how usage compares with users in general. This is +implemented based on general surveillance, but does not require any +surveillance. It would be easy for the power company to calculate the +average usage in a residential neighborhood by dividing the total usage +by the number of subscribers, and send that to the meters. Each +customer’s meter could compare her usage, over any desired period of +time, with the average usage pattern for that period. The same benefit, +with no surveillance! + +We need to design such privacy into all our digital systems. + +### Remedy for Collecting Data: Leaving It Dispersed {#remedy-for-collecting-data-leaving-it-dispersed .subheading} + +One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is to keep the data +dispersed and inconvenient to access. Old-fashioned security cameras +were no threat to privacy.[(23)](#FOOT23) The recording was stored on +the premises, and kept for a few weeks at most. Because of the +inconvenience of accessing these recordings, it was never done +massively; they were accessed only in the places where someone reported +a crime. It would not be feasible to physically collect millions of +tapes every day and watch them or copy them. + +Nowadays, security cameras have become surveillance cameras: they are +connected to the internet so recordings can be collected in a data +center and saved forever. This is already dangerous, but it is going to +get worse. Advances in face recognition may bring the day when suspected +journalists can be tracked on the street all the time to see who they +talk with. + +Internet-connected cameras often have lousy digital security themselves, +so anyone could watch what the camera sees.[(24)](#FOOT24) To restore +privacy, we should ban the use of internet-connected cameras aimed where +and when the public is admitted, except when carried by people. Everyone +must be free to post photos and video recordings occasionally, but the +systematic accumulation of such data on the internet must be limited. + +### Remedy for Internet Commerce Surveillance {#remedy-for-internet-commerce-surveillance .subheading} + +Most data collection comes from people’s own digital activities. Usually +the data is collected first by companies. But when it comes to the +threat to privacy and democracy, it makes no difference whether +surveillance is done directly by the state or farmed out to a business, +because the data that the companies collect is systematically available +to the state. + +The NSA, through PRISM, has gotten into the databases of many large +internet corporations.[(25)](#FOOT25) AT&T has saved all its phone call +records since 1987 and makes them available to the DEA[(26)](#FOOT26) to +search on request. Strictly speaking, the US government does not possess +that data, but in practical terms it may as well possess it. + +The goal of making journalism and democracy safe therefore requires that +we reduce the data collected about people by any organization, not just +by the state. We must redesign digital systems so that they do not +accumulate data about their users. If they need digital data about our +transactions, they should not be allowed to keep them more than a short +time beyond what is inherently necessary for their dealings with us. + +One of the motives for the current level of surveillance of the internet +is that sites are financed through advertising based on tracking users’ +activities and propensities. This converts a mere annoyance—advertising +that we can learn to ignore—into a surveillance system that harms us +whether we know it or not. Purchases over the internet also track their +users. And we are all aware that “privacy policies” are more excuses to +violate privacy than commitments to uphold it. + +We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous +payments—anonymous for the payer, that is. (We don’t want the payee to +dodge taxes.) Bitcoin is not anonymous,[(27)](#FOOT27) though there are +efforts to develop ways to pay anonymously with Bitcoin. However, +technology for digital cash was first developed in the +1980s;[(28)](#FOOT28)we need only suitable business arrangements, and +for the state not to obstruct them. + +A further threat from sites’ collection of personal data is that +security breakers might get in, take it, and misuse it. This includes +customers’ credit card details. An anonymous payment system would end +this danger: a security hole in the site can’t hurt you if the site +knows nothing about you. + +### Remedy for Travel Surveillance {#remedy-for-travel-surveillance .subheading} + +We must convert digital toll collection to anonymous payment (using +digital cash, for instance). License-plate recognition systems recognize +all license plates, and the data can be kept +indefinitely;[(29)](#FOOT29) they should be required by law to notice +and record only those license numbers that are on a list of cars sought +by court orders. A less secure alternative would record all cars locally +but only for a few days, and not make the full data available over the +internet; access to the data should be limited to searching for a list +of court-ordered license numbers. + +The US “no-fly” list must be abolished because it is punishment without +trial.[(30)](#FOOT30) + +It is acceptable to have a list of people whose person and luggage will +be searched with extra care, and anonymous passengers on domestic +flights could be treated as if they were on this list. It is also +acceptable to bar non-citizens, if they are not permitted to enter the +country at all, from boarding flights to the country. This ought to be +enough for all legitimate purposes. + +Many mass transit systems use some kind of smart cards or RFIDs for +payment. These systems accumulate personal data: if you once make the +mistake of paying with anything but cash, they associate the card +permanently with your name. Furthermore, they record all travel +associated with each card. Together they amount to massive surveillance. +This data collection must be reduced. + +Navigation services do surveillance: the user’s computer tells the map +service the user’s location and where the user wants to go; then the +server determines the route and sends it back to the user’s computer, +which displays it. Nowadays, the server probably records the user’s +locations, since there is nothing to prevent it. This surveillance is +not inherently necessary, and redesign could avoid it: free/libre +software in the user’s computer could download map data for the +pertinent regions (if not downloaded previously), compute the route, and +display it, without ever telling anyone where the user is or wants to +go. + +Systems for borrowing bicycles, etc., can be designed so that the +borrower’s identity is known only inside the station where the item was +borrowed. Borrowing would inform all stations that the item is “out,” so +when the user returns it at any station (in general, a different one), +that station will know where and when that item was borrowed. It will +inform the other station that the item is no longer “out.” It will also +calculate the user’s bill, and send it (after waiting some random number +of minutes) to headquarters along a ring of stations, so that +headquarters would not find out which station the bill came from. Once +this is done, the return station would forget all about the transaction. +If an item remains “out” for too long, the station where it was borrowed +can inform headquarters; in that case, it could send the borrower’s +identity immediately. + +### Remedy for Communications Dossiers {#remedy-for-communications-dossiers .subheading} + +Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive data +on their users’ contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc.). With mobile +phones, they also record the user’s physical location.[(31)](#FOOT31) +They keep these dossiers for a long time: over 30 years, in the case of +AT&T. Soon they will even record the user’s body +activities.[(32)](#FOOT32) It appears that the NSA collects cell phone +location data in bulk.[(33)](#FOOT33)\ + Unmonitored communication is impossible where systems create such +dossiers. So it should be illegal to create or keep them. ISPs and phone +companies must not be allowed to keep this information for very long, in +the absence of a court order to surveil a certain party. + +This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won’t physically +stop the government from collecting all the information immediately as +it is generated—which is what the US does with some or all phone +companies.[(34)](#FOOT34) We would have to rely on prohibiting that by +law. However, that would be better than the current situation, where the +relevant law (the PAT RIOT Act) does not clearly prohibit the practice. +In addition, if the government did resume this sort of surveillance, it +would not get data about everyone’s phone calls made prior to that time. + +For privacy about who you exchange email with, a simple partial solution +is for you and others to use email services in a country that would +never cooperate with your own government, and which communicate with +each other using encryption. However, Ladar Levison (owner of the mail +service Lavabit that US surveillance sought to corrupt completely) has a +more sophisticated idea for an encryption system through which your +email service would know only that you sent mail to some user of my +email service, and my email service would know only that I received mail +from some user of your email service, but it would be hard to determine +that you had sent mail to me. + +### But Some Surveillance Is Necessary {#but-some-surveillance-is-necessary .subheading} + +For the state to find criminals, it needs to be able to investigate +specific crimes, or specific suspected planned crimes, under a court +order. With the internet, the power to tap phone conversations would +naturally extend to the power to tap internet connections. This power is +easy to abuse for political reasons, but it is also necessary. +Fortunately, this won’t make it possible to find whistleblowers after +the fact, if (as I recommend) we prevent digital systems from +accumulating massive dossiers before the fact. + +Individuals with special state-granted power, such as police, forfeit +their right to privacy and must be monitored. (In fact, police have +their own jargon term for perjury, “testilying,”[(35)](#FOOT35) since +they do it so frequently, particularly about protesters and +photographers.[(36)](#FOOT36)) One city in California that required +police to wear video cameras all the time found their use of force fell +by 60 percent.[(37)](#FOOT37) The ACLU is in favor of this. + +Corporations are not people, and not entitled to human +rights.[(38)](#FOOT38) It is legitimate to require businesses to publish +the details of processes that might cause chemical, biological, nuclear, +fiscal, computational (e.g., DRM[(39)](#FOOT39)) or political (e.g., +lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for public +well-being. The danger of these operations (consider the BP oil spill, +the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs that of +terrorism. + +However, journalism must be protected from surveillance even when it is +carried out as part of a business. + +Digital technology has brought about a tremendous increase in the level +of surveillance of our movements, actions, and communications. It is far +more than we experienced in the 1990s, and far more than people behind +the Iron Curtain experienced in the 1980s,[(40)](#FOOT40) and proposed +legal limits on state use of the accumulated data would not alter that. + +Companies are designing even more intrusive surveillance. Some project +that pervasive surveillance, hooked to companies such as Facebook, could +have deep effects on how people think.[(41)](#FOOT41)Such possibilities +are imponderable; but the threat to democracy is not speculation. It +exists and is visible today. + +Unless we believe that our free countries previously suffered from a +grave surveillance deficit, and ought to be surveilled more than the +Soviet Union and East Germany were, we must reverse this increase. That +requires stopping the accumulation of big data about people. + +<div class="footnote"> + +------------------------------------------------------------------------ + +### Footnotes + +### [(1)](#DOCF1) + +@raggedright Maira Sutton, “We’re TPP Activists: Reddit Asked Us +Everything,” 21 November 2013, +<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/reddit-tpp-ama>. @end raggedright + +### [(2)](#DOCF2) + +@raggedright Glyn Moody, “How Can Any Company Ever Trust Microsoft +Again?” 17 June 2013, +<http://www.computerworlduk.com/blogs/open-enterprise/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again-3569376/>. +@end raggedright + +### [(3)](#DOCF3) + +@raggedright James Ball, Julian Borger and Glenn Greenwald, “Revealed: +How US and UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security,” +6 September 2013, +<http://theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security>. +@end raggedright + +### [(4)](#DOCF4) + +@raggedright Bruce Schneier, “Want to Evade NSA Spying? Don’t Connect to +the Internet,” 7 October 2013, <http://www.wired.com/2013/10/149481/>. +@end raggedright + +### [(5)](#DOCF5) + +@raggedright Dan Roberts, “Patriot Act Author Prepares Bill to Put NSA +Bulk Collection ’Out of Business,’” 10 October 2013, +<http://theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill>. +@end raggedright + +### [(6)](#DOCF6) + +@raggedright Lucy Dalglish, “Lessons from Wye River,” The News Media & +the Law (Summer 2011): p. 1, +[http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/\ +news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river](http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/%3Cbr%3Enews-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river). +@end raggedright + +### [(7)](#DOCF7) + +@raggedright Washington Agencies, “Yemen leak: former FBI man admits +passing information to Associated Press,” 24 September 2013, +[http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/\ +sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press](http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/%3Cbr%3Esep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press). +@end raggedright + +### [(8)](#DOCF8) + +@raggedright See “Verizon forced to hand over telephone data—full court +ruling” (6 June 2013), at +<http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order>, +for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under which the US +government “is collecting the phone records of millions of US customers +of Verizon.” @end raggedright + +### [(9)](#DOCF9) + +@raggedright Siobhan Gorman, Evan Perez, and Janet Hook, “NSA +Data-Mining Digs into Networks Beyond Verizon,” 7 June 2013, +<http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07>. +@end raggedright + +### [(10)](#DOCF10) + +@raggedright ACLU, “Policing Free Speech: Police Surveillance And +Obstruction of First Amendment-Protected Activity,” 29 June 2010, +<https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf>. @end raggedright + +### [(11)](#DOCF11) + +@raggedright David Kravets, Kim Zetter, Kevin Poulsen, “NSA Illegally +Gorged on U.S. Phone Records for Three Years,” 10 September 2013, +<http://www.wired.com/2013/09/nsa-violations/>. @end raggedright + +### [(12)](#DOCF12) + +@raggedright Adam Gabbatt and agencies, “NSA Analysts ‘Wilfully +Violated’ Surveillance Systems, Agency Admits,” 24 August 2013, +<http://theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems>. +@end raggedright + +### [(13)](#DOCF13) + +@raggedright M. L. Elrick, “Cops Tap Database to Harass, Intimidate,” +31 July 2001, +<http://sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm#.VeQiuxcpDow>. @end +raggedright + +### [(14)](#DOCF14) + +@raggedright Rick Falkvinge, “Collected Personal Data Will Always Be +Used against the Citizens,” 17 March 2012, +<http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/>. +@end raggedright + +### [(15)](#DOCF15) + +@raggedright Consider, for instance, the US internment of Japanese +Americans during WWII. @end raggedright + +### [(16)](#DOCF16) + +@raggedright Mike Masnick, “Second OPM Hack Revealed: Even Worse Than +the First,” 12 June 2015, +<https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150612/16334231330/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first.shtml>. +@end raggedright + +### [(17)](#DOCF17) + +@raggedright Joanna Berendt, “Macedonia Government Is Blamed for +Wiretapping Scandal,” 21 June 2015, +<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html?_r=0>. +@end raggedright + +### [(18)](#DOCF18) + +@raggedright “International Principles on the Application of Human +Rights to Communications Surveillance,” last modified May 2014,\ + <https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text>. @end raggedright + +### [(19)](#DOCF19) + +@raggedright Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, “Officials Say U.S. +Wiretaps Exceeded Law,” 15 April 2009, +<http://nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html>. @end raggedright + +### [(20)](#DOCF20) + +@raggedright For decades, the free software movement has been denouncing +the abusive surveillance machine of proprietary software companies such +as Microsoft and Apple. For a growing list of the ways in which +surveillance has spread across industries, not only in the software +business, but also in the hardware and—away from the keyboard—in the +mobile computing industry, in the office, at home, in transportation +systems, and in the classroom, see +<http://gnu.org/philosophy/proprietary/proprietary-surveillance.html>. +@end raggedright + +### [(21)](#DOCF21) + +@raggedright See “Who Does That Server Really Serve?” (@pageref{Server}) +for more information on this issue. @end raggedright + +### [(22)](#DOCF22) + +@raggedright Nicole Perlroth, “In Cybersecurity, Sometimes the Weakest +Link Is a Family Member,” 21 May 2014, +[http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/\ +in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/](http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/%3Cbr%3Ein-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/). +@end raggedright + +### [(23)](#DOCF23) + +@raggedright I assume here that the security camera points at the inside +of a store, or at the street. Any camera pointed at someone’s private +space by someone else violates privacy, but that is another issue. @end +raggedright + +### [(24)](#DOCF24) + +@raggedright Ms. Smith, “CIA Wants to Spy On You through Your +Appliances,” 18 March 2012, [http://networkworld.com/article/2221934/\ +microsoft-subnet/cia-wants-to-spy-on-you-through-your-appliances.html](http://networkworld.com/article/2221934/%3Cbr%3Emicrosoft-subnet/cia-wants-to-spy-on-you-through-your-appliances.html). +@end raggedright + +### [(25)](#DOCF25) + +@raggedright Jon Queally, “Latest Docs Show Financial Ties between NSA +and Internet Companies,” 23 August 2013, +<http://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/08/23/latest-docs-show-financial-ties-between-nsa-and-internet-companies>. +@end raggedright + +### [(26)](#DOCF26) + +@raggedright Scott Shane and Colin Moynihan, “Drug Agents Use Vast Phone +Trove, Eclipsing N.S.A.’s,” 1 September 2013, +[http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/\ +drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/%3Cbr%3Edrug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0). +@end raggedright + +### [(27)](#DOCF27) + +@raggedright Dan Kaminsky, “Let’s Cut through the Bitcoin Hype: A +Hacker-Entrepreneur’s Take,” 3 May 2013, +[http://wired.com/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-\ +bitcoin-hype/](http://wired.com/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-%3Cbr%3Ebitcoin-hype/). +@end raggedright + +### [(28)](#DOCF28) + +@raggedright Steven Levy, “E-Money (That’s What I Want),” Wired, 2.12 +(December 1994), +<http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html>. @end +raggedright + +### [(29)](#DOCF29) + +@raggedright Richard Bilton, “Camera Grid to Log Number Plates,” last +updated on 22 May 2009, +<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/whos_watching_you/8064333.stm>. +@end raggedright + +### [(30)](#DOCF30) + +@raggedright Nusrat Choudhury, “Victory! Federal Court Recognizes +Constitutional Rights of Americans on the No-Fly List,” 29 August 2013, +[https://www.aclu.org/blog/victory-federal-court-recognizes-constitutional-rights-americans-\ +no-fly-list](https://www.aclu.org/blog/victory-federal-court-recognizes-constitutional-rights-americans-%3Cbr%3Eno-fly-list). +@end raggedright + +### [(31)](#DOCF31) + +@raggedright Kai Biermann, “Betrayed by Our Own Data,” 26 March 2011, +<http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz>. +@end raggedright + +### [(32)](#DOCF32) + +@raggedright Sara M. Watson, “The Latest Smartphones Could Turn Us All +into Activity Trackers,” 10 October 2013, +[http://wired.com/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-\ +of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-\ +activity-trackers/](http://wired.com/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-%3Cbr%3Eof-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-%3Cbr%3Eactivity-trackers/). +@end raggedright + +### [(33)](#DOCF33) + +@raggedright Patrick Toomey, “It Sure Sounds Like the NSA Is Tracking +Our Locations,” 30 September 2013, [https://aclu.org/blog/it-\ +sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-our-locations](https://aclu.org/blog/it-%3Cbr%3Esure-sounds-nsa-tracking-our-locations). +@end raggedright + +### [(34)](#DOCF34) + +@raggedright Glenn Greenwald, “NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions +of Verizon Customers Daily,” 6 June 2013, +<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order>. +@end raggedright + +### [(35)](#DOCF35) + +@raggedright See, for instance, the articles “Testilying: Cops Are Liars +Who Get Away with Perjury” (Nick Malinowski, 3 February 2013, +[http://vice.com/read/\ +testilying-cops-are-liars-who-get-away-with-perjury](http://vice.com/read/%3Cbr%3Etestilying-cops-are-liars-who-get-away-with-perjury)) +and “Detective Is Found Guilty of Planting Drugs” (Tim Stelloh, +1 November 2011, +[http://nytimes.com/2011/11/02/nyregion/brooklyn-detective-convicted-of-\ +planting-drugs-on-innocent-people.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0](http://nytimes.com/2011/11/02/nyregion/brooklyn-detective-convicted-of-%3Cbr%3Eplanting-drugs-on-innocent-people.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)), +for examples of the extent to which this practice has been normalized. +@end raggedright + +### [(36)](#DOCF36) + +@raggedright See the Photography Is Not a Crime web site, at\ + <http://photographyisnotacrime.com/>, for more on this issue. @end +raggedright + +### [(37)](#DOCF37) + +@raggedright Kevin Drum,“Ubiquitous Surveillance, Police Edition,” +22 August 2013,\ + [http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-\ +police-edition](http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-%3Cbr%3Epolice-edition). +@end raggedright + +### [(38)](#DOCF38) + +@raggedright Public Citizen, “Call Your Representative: Tell Her or Him +to Co-Sponsor a Constitutional Amendment to Overturn Citizens United and +Restore Democracy to the People,” accessed August 2015, +<http://action.citizen.org/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=12266>. +@end raggedright + +### [(39)](#DOCF39) + +@raggedright See the related section in “Words to Avoid (or User with +Care)” (@pageref{DRM}) for more on this. @end raggedright + +### [(40)](#DOCF40) + +@raggedright James Allworth, “Your Smartphone Works for the Surveillance +State,” 7 June 2013, +<https://hbr.org/2013/06/your-iphone-works-for-the-secret-police>. @end +raggedright + +### [(41)](#DOCF41) + +@raggedright Evan Selinger and Brett Frischmann, “Will the Internet of +Things Result in Predictable People?” 10 August 2015, +<http://theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/10/internet-of-things-predictable-people>. +@end raggedright + +</div> + +------------------------------------------------------------------------ + +This document was generated by *tonghuix* on *March 25, 2016* using +[*texi2html 1.82*](http://www.nongnu.org/texi2html/).\ |